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“I can't remember anything
Can't tell if this is true or dream
Deep down inside I feel to scream
This terrible silence stops me

Hold my breath as I wish for death
Oh please, God, wake me
Now the world is gone, I'm just one
Oh God, help me
Hold my breath as I wish for death
Oh please, God, help me

Now that the war is through with me
I'm waking up, I cannot see
That there's not much left of me
Nothing is real but pain now

Darkness imprisoning me
All that I see
Absolute horror
I cannot live
I cannot die
Trapped in myself
Body my holding cell

Hold my breath as I wish for death
Oh please, God, wake me
Back in the womb it's much too real
In pumps life that I must feel
But can't look forward to reveal
Look to the time when I'll live

Landmine has taken my sight
Taken my speech
Taken my hearing
Taken my arms
Taken my legs
Taken my soul
Left me with life in hell”

Fed through the tube that sticks in me
Just like a wartime novelty
Tied to machines that make me be
Cut this life off from me
(Metallica 1988)

Michiel van Bokhorst (288179)

ii

September 28, 2006

Project Report

Evaluation of Embeddedness of HMA Programs by the Netherlands (1996‐2004)

Executive Summary
In post-conflict situations, landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) have a devastating
effect on the population, blocking sustainable development. Poorly trained soldiers and rebellion
started to use landmines in internal conflicts for offensive purposes, or for terrorizing of civilians, in
densely populated areas. The cost of the placement of a landmine is very low, the cost of the
removal are very high. The annual number of casualties in the whole world is between 15.000 and
20.000 civilians. Even a suspicion of the presence of landmines can already have a devastating
effect on communities and their social-economic well being.
Partial through strong lobbying by many NGOs, the 1997 Ottawa Treaty on banning landmines was
established relatively quick. This treaty is nowadays ratified by 151 countries, including the
Netherlands. The humanitarian mine action (HMA) sector was developed to undertake mine risk
education/awareness, de-mining (clearance of landmines and ERW, survey and marking), victim
assistance and social rehabilitation, stigmatization of the use of landmines, and stockpile
destruction. The UNMAS set up the International Mine Action Standards guidelines.
As a donor country for development cooperation, the Netherlands is also funding HMA. The central
aim of the Dutch HMA policy is the clearance of landmines and ERW, in order to limit casualties and
advance socio-economic development. Cost-effectiveness, use of local labour, quick transfer to
national capacity are seem as important. Emphasize is lied on de-mining, The Netherlands started
financially supporting HMA in 1992, and was the eighth largest contributor for the period 1996-2004.
The Netherlands was (co-)funding programs in 20 countries, and some programs that are not specific
for a country.
This research describes the evaluation of the HMA programs that are funded by the Netherlands for
the period 1996-2004, specifically on their embeddedness into a broader development strategy.
Embeddedness is defined as the extent in which other humanitarian objectives and programs are
attached, combined or integrated with HMA programs. Embeddedness has attracted increasingly
attention, because landmines and ERW have a direct threat to individuals and communities, but also
indirectly by being a barrier for short-term emergency interventions and long-term development
efforts. Nevertheless the Netherlands does not directly mention embeddedness of HMA in neither its
HMA policy paper nor in its 2003 macro policy paper on development cooperation.
Seven countries are selected for research, Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia,
Eritrea, Laos, and Mozambique, on the basis of the extent and duration of funding, and interesting
landmines and ERW features. The funded programs in those countries are mainly in line with the
Dutch policy priorities.
Embeddedness in a broader framework for sustainable development of the funded programs was an
issue in different extents. The available information gives clues that embeddedness became more
important during the years, for both donors, as recipient countries and NGOs.
Exact information on socio-economic outcome and impact of the programs is not available, so the
valuing on the criteria was very qualitative and reliant on the reports of NGOs and UN organizations.
A strict judgment on the value of the embeddedness is therefore not possible. Embeddedness was
quite clear in most countries on paper, but not always in practice. Most embeddedness of HMA is on
relief, recovery, rehabilitation and development. The impact of HMA is often safe and sustainable
return of refugees and IDPs, and renewed development opportunities.
It is recommended to get better insight into the socio-economic impact of HMA activities. A good
strategy and/or method should be sought in cooperation with other donors, relevant UN
organizations, and NGOs.
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1 Introduction
Landmines are often used in conflicts, for defending armies or rebellions against enemy forces. In
the post-conflict situation, landmines have a devastating effect on the population, blocking
sustainable development. Humanitarian mine action (HMA) is an important aspect of the
development cooperation. Therefore the title of this project is “Evaluation of Embeddedness of
Humanitarian Mine Action Programs Funded by the Netherlands, for the Period 1996-2004”.
This project report is written for the master project as an important part of the graduation for the
master International Public Management and Policy at the department of Public Administration of
the Erasmus University Rotterdam. This project report is the presentation of my findings of the
evaluation study, in particular on embeddedness of HMA in a broader development strategy. The
research was undertaken as part of an internship at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA).
This report has the following outline: the second chapter deals with the background of the landmine
problem and the Dutch HMA policy. Chapter three analyses the problem of this research. The fourth
chapter shows the research design of the evaluation. In chapter five seven countries are discussed
and the HMA programs funded by the Netherlands are given. The embeddedness of HMA is discussed
in chapter six, which findings are compared to existing research in chapter seven. The report ends
with conclusions and recommendations in chapter eight.
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2 Background of the Landmine Problem and HMA Policies
This chapter describes all the background information that is needed to understand the landmine
problem and the Dutch HMA policies. First the way landmines are used is described; secondly the
size of the landmine problem is sketched, followed by the anti-landmine process towards the
Ottawa Treaty. Fourthly the concept of HMA is explained, and the chapter is ended by an overview
of the Dutch policy.

2.1 The Use of Landmines
Landmines were traditionally used for defensive purposes by state armies by well-trained personnel.
From the Vietnam War, poorly trained soldiers started to use the low-cost landmines in internal
conflicts for offensive purposes, and in densely populated areas. Landmines are not widely used by
professional state armies nowadays (Lawson 1997, p.18; Rutherford 2000, p.81-83).
Landmines have three military roles (TK 24 292 1995-2001, p. nr.1 p.6-7):
1. Hindrance: in armed conflicts to build a barrier or to strengthen an existing barrier, in order to
stop or slow down enemy forces. Infrastructures such as roads and bridges are too valuable to
destroy, because they can be of use in the future. For this purpose ATMs were used, in
combination with APMs to prevent enemy forces from easy clearance. Nowadays anti-handling
devices are often used in stead of APMs to protect the ATMs;
2. Protection: to prevent enemy intruders and protect own forces and installations at military
camps;
3. Strategic/Geopolitical: landmine fields are laid at borders of countries for protection. This is
especially in countries with long, difficult to protect borders as Sweden and Finland (in the past
against the Soviet treat. Remarkable detail is that Finland is the only EU country that did not
sign the Ottawa Treaty yet).
Landmines are indiscriminate on soldiers or civilians. They are also specifically used as a weapon of
terror against civilians in internal conflicts, both by rebellions and armies. Aim is to chase away
civilians and to prevent refugees to return, to make access to water and agricultural area
impossible, and to destabilize social life and disrupt socio-economic life (Rutherford 2000, p.82; TK
24 292 1995-2001, nr.1 p. 8-9).

2.2 The Size of the Problem
Estimates say there are between 30 and 300 million landmines present world wide. At least 84
countries are affected with landmines and and/or explosive remnants of war (ERW), mainly
developing countries. An estimated area of 200.000 km² (about 5 times the size of the Netherlands)
contains landmines and ERW worldwide, and can not be used for any other purpose. Even a
suspicion of the presence of landmines can already has a devastating effect on communities and
their social-economic well being. The negative effect of landmines on the population differs per
country or region. Social economic problems are distorted traditional patterns of living and the
hindrance of economic development, i.e. isolation of land, roads, markets etc, medical care for the
growing number of disabled and their rehabilitation. In post-conflict era, peace-building is difficult
and refugees refuse to return to their home ground (Danida 2001b, p.5; ICBL 2005b, p.4-5, 27; MvBZ
2004e).
In an article of Lawson in 1997 (p.18-19, 22) the following facts about the size are presented:
− About every twenty minutes there is a new landmine victim;
− The deadly casualty rate of landmines is higher than nuclear and chemical weapons combined;
− Twenty new landmines are placed in comparison with every landmine cleared;
− The clearance rate in 1997 gave a duration of 1.100 years to clear all landmines worldwide (with
an assumed 110 million placed landmines);
− In Angola 1 out of 334 of the population is an amputee, were in the U.S. it is 1 out of 22.000;
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For about every 5000 landmines cleared, one de-miner is killed and two are injured;
The production costs for an APM are about US$3, clearance of an APM costs up to US$800;
Over 70% of the casualties are civilians, of which about 25% are children;
Many minefields were never mapped;
Under certain weather conditions and soil type, landmines can move kilometres.

2.3 Anti‐Landmine Process
2.3.1 Pre‐ICBL
During the Cold War most NGOs did not have access to landmine-infected areas, were unaware of
the humanitarian and development problems caused by landmines, or could not assess the problem
properly. Many governments were unaware too. In the 1970s the ICRC started with arguing that the
use of landmines was not legitimate in relation with international humanitarian law, by stating that
“landmines cause superfluous injury unnecessary suffering (damaging effects disproportionate to
the military purpose) and that they are of an indiscriminate nature (no distinction between civilians
and combatants)” (Rutherford 2000, p.80-81). The landmine issue came on the political agenda
which resulted in the Landmines Protocol (Protocol II) of the CCW1 of 1980, later amended at the
CCW Review Conference in May 1996 in Geneva. Both the original Protocol II and the Amended
Protocol II were not far reaching enough to have a considerable probability of solving the
humanitarian problem (Rutherford 2000, p.80-81, 86; TK 25 925 (R 1614) 1998-2005, p. nr.3 p.20).

2.3.2 The Role of NGOs Grows
Until 1994 the use of landmines was considered legal by all states. Belgium was the first state to
have legislation banning the use of APMs. An undeniable very important role in setting the agenda
for the recognition of the landmine problem as a humanitarian problem instead of a political or
defensive issue and a ban was played by the coalition of NGOs called International Campaign to Ban
Landmines (ICBL, founded in 1991). The ICBL2 is a network nowadays of over 1,100 local, national,
regional and international NGOs with a human rights, mine clearance, humanitarian, children’s,
veterans’, medical, development, arms control, religious, environmental, or women’s background.
The coordinator of the ICBL, Jody Williams, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997. Several
scholars suggest that the agenda was set through norm diffusion facilitated by the NGOs (Danida
2001b, p.22; Rutherford 2000, p.74-76).
Two roles were played by the NGOs (Rutherford 2000, p.76, 80, 92-93):
1. Cognitive agenda setting: The NGOs used intense media and public attention to get the issue on
the international political agenda. This was done by showing stories and impressive statistics of
victims of explosions caused by landmines. An example of a statistic was the claim that
landmines caused more victims than biological, chemical and nuclear weapons together;
2. Norm agenda setting: The NGOs helped with the way the issue was uttered and codified by
international law by changing how the legality of landmines and the effects of the use were
alleged by governments. The use of landmines was labelled illegal under existing international
law. This was primarily based on the proportionality principle of the 1977 Protocol II of the
Geneva Convention:
• The military value of use of landmines was becoming more and more contested, and the
humanitarian costs were considered to outweigh military benefits;
• The time-delay feature. As the American senator Patrick Leahy stated that the use of
landmines is “mass destruction in slow motion”.
The NGOs were playing a winning game, despite the disappointing Amended Protocol II of the CCW
in 1996. The UK was together with the U.S. an important opponent of a total ban of APMs. With the
1

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed
to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
2
The ICBL was found in 1992. The original members are the Handicap International (HI), Human Rights Watch
(HRW), the Mine Advisory Group (MAG), Medico International (MI), Physicians for Human Rights (MHR), and
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF).
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help of deceased Princess of Wales Diana, the British NGO successfully influenced the policy of the
UK, leaving the U.S. on its own. Also in other countries NGOs were successfully mobilizing the
public, helped by political figures such as Nelson Mandela. The U.S. went to Ottawa with several
requests, still thinking that they could get a consensus that would be satisfactory for them. The US
argued the strategically need at battle fields, e.g. at the Korean peninsula. The U.S. completely
failed to get its requests granted (Rutherford 2000, p.97-105).

2.3.3 The Ottawa Treaty
After the reviewing conferences on the 1980 CCW in 1995 (Vienna) and 1996 (Geneva), it turned out
that only 40 countries were in favour of a total ban on landmines. The Canadians, under the lead of
minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy, hosted a meeting in Ottawa in October 1996 for the
interested and more progressive governments who were in favour3. This meeting was very
successful, 50 countries, several IGOs and NGOs participated, and 24 countries sent an observer.
The Ottawa Treaty was signed on September 18, 1997, in Oslo, and came into force on March 1,
1999. A minimal of 40 countries ratifying countries were needed, nowadays 151 countries already
ratified (Brinkert 2003, p.782; Danida 2001b, p.22; ICBL 2006a; Rutherford 1999, p.37; Rutherford
2000, p.76-77, 107; TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.13; TK 26 137 (R 1620) 1998-2000, nr.3 p.3).
The Ottawa Treaty turned out to be insufficient with regard to ERW. Many victims were injured or
killed by ERW (AXO and UXO), not only by landmines. Therefore the Protocol V of the CCW was
created to cover ERW and cluster bombs in international law (TK 28 600 V 2002-2003, nr.63 p.2; TK
29 200 V 2004-2005, nr.61 p.1-3).

2.3.4 The Multilateral Treaty Making Process
The resulting Ottawa Treaty is far more successful than other conventions dealing with arms such as
the CCW. Traditionally conventions are negotiated with a strong diplomatic consensus with much
influence of the major state powers and just a small indirect influence of NGOs. The positive
opinions about the Ottawa Convention can be summarized by stating that “[t]he Ottawa Convention
was born out of a desire to make multilateralism work” (Petritsch 2004). The 1899 First
International Peace Conference in The Hague was very similar to the Ottawa process, and both were
very different in comparison with other treaty making processes. Thus it can not be said that the
Ottawa Process was a completely new matter. The Hague Conventions were seen as internationally
binding also for non-signatories (Rutherford 1999, p.36-37).
Table 2-1: “Standard” vs “alternative” multilateralism in the weapon banning treaty making
Issue
“Standard”
“Alternative”
Invitation
International organization
International political leader
Majority voting ⇒ less chance for
Negotiation procedure
Consensus
one member to weaken the treaty
No/minimal ⇒ if no direct
Yes ⇒ for security reasons, e.g. in
national security threat.
Verification measures
case of nuclear weapons
Verification difficult to carry out.
More attractive to sign.
Purpose
State self interest, security
Peaceful international society
Negotiation duration
Fast-track
Long, slow, even decades
Support major powers
Yes
No
Support of NGOs and public
Participation
Limited to states
opinion
Complicated, inconsistent, subject
Rules
Clear, simple and consistent
to interpretation and flexibility
Examples
CCW, CWC
Hague Conventions, Ottawa Treaty
Source: (Rutherford 1999, p.37-41)
3

Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa,
and Switzerland were included in the initial ‘core-group’.
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Table 2-1 shows a comparison of two ways of multilateral treaty making with regard to the ban of
weapons, where “standard” is such as the CCW and many other weapon banning treaties, and
“alternative” as the Hague Conventions and Ottawa Treaty. A Ottawa/Hague model for treaties on
banning any kind of weapons is only possible is states have no real direct need for the weapon for
national security reasons or if weapons do not have a widespread legitimate use (Rutherford 1999,
p.47-49). It was argued that the support of (international) NGOs for the Ottawa Treaty gave the
“international civil society” legitimacy and enforced the “democratization of international law”
(Andersson 2000, p.92).

2.3.5 The Non‐Signing Countries
The U.S., Russia and China, and many Northern African, Middle Eastern and Asian countries have not
signed and ratified the treaty yet (see Appendix 3). For many countries there are obvious reasons:
− China is still placing landmines to protect its borders. China claims that it needs landmines for
self defence. China is a member of the CCW Amended Protocol II (ICBL 2005a: China);
− Finland is the only EU country that did not sign, however Finland does effectively support the
ban of APM. Finland has large minefield at the long border with Russia, as a self defence
system. To replace the landmines with another effective system takes a lot of time and money
and the defence budget is recently decreased (ICBL 2005a: Finland);
− Russian forces are still using APMs in primarily Chechnya, but also Dagestan, Tajikistan and on
the border with Georgia. Russia still sees APMs as useful and does not see good alternative,
although it is investing in research on alternatives. The stockpile of APMs is considerable, and
Russia does not think that it can reduce the stockpile within the time given in the treaty (4
years). Russia did ratify the CCW Amended Protocol II in 2005 (ICBL 2005a: Russia);
− The U.S. has tactical and geopolitical reasons, which they unsuccessfully tried to negotiate into
the Ottawa Process (Rutherford 1999, p.40):
• The U.S. has strategic minefields on the Korean peninsula at the Demilitarized Zone;
• The U.S. wanted a postponement of the date that the treaty enters in force;
• The U.S. wanted a change in definition of the APM, more intensive verification measures,
and a withdrawal clause from the treaty in cases of national emergency.
The U.S. too has the opinion that APMs are needed for defensive purposed and that there in no
good alternative. Research is done on alternatives. APMs without self-destructing or selfdeactivating system can be used until 2010 in Korea, or with presidential authorization only.
The U.S. is a member of the CCW Amended Protocol II (ICBL 2005a: USA).

2.4 HMA
2.4.1 The Funding
The largest contributors for the period 1996-2004 were the U.S., European Commission, Japan,
Norway, Canada and the Netherlands (see Table 2-1).
Table 2-2: Funding of top 10 donors for 1996-2004
Ranking
Donor party
Total funding 1996-2004 Funding 1996-2004 per capita*
1.
United States
$ 571,1 million
$ 1,91
2.
European Union (EC)
$ 249,3 million
$ 0,55
3.
Norway
$ 203,5 million
$ 44,14
4.
Japan
$ 148,0 million
$ 1,16
5.
UK
$ 130,5 million
$ 2,15
6.
Germany
$ 121,3 million
$ 1,47
7.
Canada
$ 119,3 million
$ 3,60
8.
The Netherlands
$115,2 million
$ 6,99
9.
Sweden
$ 101,7 million
$ 11,28
10.
Denmark
$ 90,6 million
$ 16,62
Total
(only top 10)
$ 1.850,5 million
* Number of inhabitants for 2006, actual numbers per annum will probably be slightly higher
Sources: (CIA 2006; ICBL 2005b, p.61-66)
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For the period 1996-2004, the U.S. was by far the largest contributor, the Netherlands was the 8th
largest. If the numbers are looked at per capita, Norway, Denmark and Sweden were the largest
contributors.

Top 10 donors 1996-2004
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Figure 2-1: Top 10 HMA donors for 1996-2004 (ICBL 2005b, p.61-66)
Figure 2-1 shows that the contributions were growing since 1996, from a total of US$ 90,6 million in
1996 to a total of US$ 346,0 million in 2004 for the top 10 donors4. Most money in 2004 was
contributed to Afghanistan, Iraq, Cambodia, Angola, Sri Lanka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Sudan.
Internationally, a totalled amount of US$ 376 million was funded for HMA in 2005, a decrease of
almost 6% compared to 2004 (US$ 399 million, slightly more than the contribution op the top 10
donors), but second highest ever (ICBL 2005b, p.5, 60; ICBL 2006a, p.6; MvBZ 2004e).

2.4.2 The Sector
All activities concerning de-mining and related subjects are called mine action. There was critic in
the mid-1990s on de-mining and mine awareness practices in the field. Emphasize was mainly on
technique and not on the affected population. This led to the Guidelines for Mine Action
Programmes from a Development-Oriented Point of View (Bad Honnef Guidelines) after an
international NGO conference in 1997. After 1997 the sector increasingly professionalized and
standardized (Harpviken 2003, p.777-778).
The HMA sector has its origin in Afghanistan, were de-mining was done for the first time not (only)
by national army forces. The United Nations was the leading actor, and as consequence of the
demand for standardization after success and failures, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was
founded in 1997, after the founding of the Ottawa Treaty. Changes and shifts in HMA procedures,
practices and norms, and the streamlining of HMA in a broader context of sustainable development
and capacity building, made that in 2000 the first edition of the International Mine Action Standards
(IMAS) was published by the UNMAS. Other actors are national organizations, IGOs and NGOs, such as
the Mine Action Support Group (MASG), the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian De-mining (GICHD). The latter is supporting UN with
4

donors are defined here as state parties and the EU, not NGOs and other private organizations

Michiel van Bokhorst (288179)

6

September 28, 2006

Project Report

Evaluation of Embeddedness of HMA Programs by the Netherlands (1996‐2004)

the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). Many countries affected by
landmines, have a national HMA authority, let by the government, to handle with HMA issues. In
most cases a national HMA centre (MAC; in an early phase run by the UN) acts as a national operator
(Brinkert 2003; Danida 2001b, p.6-7, 64; GICHD 2004, p.21-27, 64, 118).
HMA is aimed on reducing the social, economic and environmental impact of landmines and ERW.
HMA consists of five groups of activities (GICHD 2004, p.1; TK 27 162 2000, nr.8 p.5):
1. Mine risk education or mine awareness of the local population;
2. Humanitarian de-mining. The UNMAS sees a minimal of 99,6% accuracy as a norm for de-mining.
According to many actors, this is the most important issue, for some even the only issue;
3. Victim assistance and social rehabilitation;
4. Advocacy to stigmatize the use of landmines and support a total ban on anti-personnel
landmines;
5. Stockpile destruction.
Related are data management, training of mine clearing workers, and technological research on
better detection and clearance techniques (TK 27 162 2000, nr. 8:1).
Humanitarian de-mining refers to the following activities (GICHD 2004, p.64):
1. The research on nature and size of the mine field (survey);
2. Designing of a common action plan;
3. Clearance of landmines and ERW;
4. Marking mine fields;
5. Ex post inspections;
6. Involvement of the local community in de-mining activities;
7. The transfer of de-mined land.
The IMAS function as a framework for the development of national HMA standards (GICHD 2004,
p.2). The most important guidelines are (MvBZ 2004e):
1. The promotion of awareness of the presence of landmines and ERW and lowering the risks
during the interaction between population/users and the area concerned;
2. The research into the location and size of minefields and their marking and clearance;
3. The assistance to casualties and their rehabilitation and reintegration;
4. The stigmatization of the use of landmines, and the support for a total ban on landmines;
5. Local capacity-building through education and training, leading to the transfer of mine
clearance tasks to a national agency (institution building);
6. Quality control of the above-mentioned activities.

2.4.3 Socio‐economic Aspects
In the Danida (2001b, p.125-128) evaluation on HMA the narrowness of the term “humanitarian”
mine action was questioned. The term humanitarian has a short-term meaning. Many other aspects
were relevant for HMA, particularly human rights and freedoms, which was a basis for development
assistance/cooperation (long-term) leading to poverty reduction, economic growth and welfare.
Other socio-economic impacts were (Danida 2001b, p.117-122; UNDP/GICHD 2001, p.23):
− less accidents and casualties;
− feeling of security, strong sense of relief, and reduction of stress;
− improved mobility and trade access, and access to social services such as health and education;
− employment in mine action for local population;
− reuse of land area;
− peace-building and confidence-building;
− for the environment: both positive such as no killed animals and negative such as disposal
through burning or detonation in open;
− spreading of sexually transmitted diseases by de-miners.
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2.5 The Policy of the Netherlands
2.5.1 The Funds
As a donor country for development cooperation, the Netherlands is also funding HMA. The
Netherlands started financially supporting HMA in 1992. Despite a first reserved attitude, the use of
landmines by the Dutch army was banned in 1996 after a major political change in the defensive
policy. A small reserve capacity was kept for research and experiments, and education of de-mining
personnel. Production was forbidden by law since 1996. As stated above, the Netherlands is one of
the larger contributors since 1996. The total governmental budget for Development Cooperation in
the Netherlands for 2005 was €4.2 billion (0,83% of GDP and 3% of governmental expenditure),
where HMA counted for less than 1% of the Dutch Development Cooperation budget. The
Netherlands signed (1997) and ratified (1999) the Ottawa Treaty. The ratification process was
experienced as slow, although the Netherlands had a leading role in the realization of the Ottawa
Treaty (Commissie Draagvlak en Effectiviteit Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 2006, p.8; ICBL 2005b,
p.5, 60-61; TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.1, p.4:1).
Table 2-3: Funding of HMA by the Netherlands
Year
Amount
2006
€12.6 million (planned)
2005
$19.3 million
2004
$10.2 million
2003
$11.0 million
2002
$15.8 million
2001
$12.5 million
2000
$18.5 million
1999
$9.6 million
1998
$22.0 million
1997
$9.6 million
1996
$11.2 million
1992-1995
+/- €6.3 million
Total 1996-2004
$120.4 million*
* The total number differs slightly from Table 2-2, due to data from different sources
Sources: (ICBL 2006a, p.61; TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.1 p.17; TK 30 300 V 2006, nr.117, p.3; UNMAS
2006: The Netherlands)

2.5.2 Policy priorities
The central aim of the Dutch HMA policy is the clearance of landmines and ERW, in order to limit
casualties and advance socio-economic development. Cost-effectiveness (e.g. by priority-setting)
and the use of local labour are the main issues. A quick transfer of the de-mining operation to
national capacity is seen as important. Programs to be funded have to meet the IMAS guidelines.
Dutch priorities with regard to subsidies are (MvBZ 2004e; TK 27 162 2000, nr.8 p.4-6):
− Emphasize on de-mining;
− Countries that have a bilateral aid relation with the Netherlands or where the de-mining
activities support human rights, peace building, and good governance;
− Continuance of already subsidized programs is prefered above new activities, for optimum use
of previous investments;
− Capacity strengthening and training for quickly transferring of de-mining activities to national
governments. The use of local civilians for employment is strongly encouraged, because it
increases employment and the speed of transferring, and makes the funding more sustainable.
Use of expert of the Dutch Ministry of Defence is possible, for establishing or providing
assistance at training facilities;
− Manual de-mining by local labour is preferred above mechanical de-mining, although support of
manual de-mining by mechanical de-mining is favoured if necessary.
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It should be noted that embeddedness of HMA into a broader framework for sustainable
development was not mentioned as top-priority in the Dutch HMA policy. Coherence with existing
plans for the socioeconomic rehabilitation of the post-conflict community (with regard to
healthcare, the return of refugees and displaced persons, education, etc.) was nevertheless strongly
asked for (MvBZ 2004e).

2.5.3 Minimal requirements of recipient country
The Netherlands in principal only funds programs in countries that signed and ratified the Ottawa
Treaty and is being observed (except for Afghanistan that signed and ratified the Ottawa Treaty in
2002). Exceptions on this rule are possible when there are good plausible reasons, e.g. of country is
lacking a recognised central government authority. International organizations that are funded are
a.o. GICHD, HALO Trust, ICRC, UNDP, and UNMAS (ICBL 2004: The Netherlands; MvBZ 2004e).

2.5.4 Funding Channels
The Netherlands only funds NGOs (not commercial), and those who are not involved with illegal
trade of anti-personnel landmines and/or arms. Other expectations are (MvBZ 2004e):
− Subscription to the UNMAS guidelines;
− Demonstration of knowledge of HMA. Allowing certain activities to be performed by other,
qualified organizations is an alternative;
− Participation in mechanisms for international standardization, coordination and cooperation, as
well as in local coordination arrangements.
− If research is funded, information should be made available to the coordinating agencies.

2.5.5 Other important aspects
Other important aspects of the Dutch policy on landmines and ERW throughout the years are:
− The Netherlands is stimulating other countries to sign and ratify the Ottawa Treaty and the
protocol of the CCW (TK 29 200 V 2004-2005, nr.2 p.49);
− Stockpile was reduced to 5,000 landmines (and is still lowering), to be kept for education and
research (TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.15 p.3; TK 26 137 (R 1620) 1998-2000, nr.3 p.5; TK 29 200 V
2004-2005, nr.2 p.49);
− The Netherlands was not in favour of the principal of “the polluter pays” concerning ERW,
which was a common opinion with other countries. Protocol V of the CCW on ERW was ratified
on 25 July 2005 (TK 27 400 V 2001-2002, nr.53 p.6; nr.58 p.3; TK 29 848 (R 1775 2004-2005, nr.3
p.5);
− The Netherlands does not have its own mine clearing NGO. Financing the setting up of a new
HMA NGO is more costly than financing an existing mine clearing NGO. Dutch NGOs are never
funded by the MFA, to avoid unfairness, nepotism etc. The Ministry of Defence has 80 staff
members that can be used for de-mining and mine education (TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.25 p.6);
− In 1999 large funds were reserved for a research project on improving mine clearance
techniques. This was done by the TNO research institute. The objective was to create a
prototype, but the project failed in an early stage. The acquired knowledge is shared with other
research institutes from abroad in such as the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the EC, and with
the International Test and Evaluation for Humanitarian De-mining (ITEP) organization of several
NATO countries with projects on equipment, systems and methods (TK 24 292 1995-2001, nr.18;
nr.20 p.10; nr.24 p.1-3);
− From 2004, funding of HMA activities was placed in a Stability Fund (previously called Peace
Fund), in order to get fast and flexible stability-advancing activities on peace, safety and
development. ATMs also still play an important role (TK 30 075 2005-2006, nr.1 p.17);
− A total of 822 horizontal effect weapons were bought as an alternative for APMs. Those weapons
have advantages concerning defensive purpose, but does not have the humanitarian
disadvantages (TK 26 137 (R 1620) 1998-2000, nr.3 p.2, 5);
− Only ATMs which are detectable, have a self-neutralization and self-deactivating mechanism are
allowed to be purchased by the Dutch army (TK 25 925 (R 1614) 1998-2005, nr.6 p.2).
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3 Problem Analysis
In this chapter the problem of this research is analyzed in further detail. The problem is defined at
first, followed by the aim of the project and the research question.

3.1 Problem Definition
As stated in the previous chapter, the Netherlands was funding HMA programs on a coherent policy
basis from at least since 1996 under certain criteria. The question is how those funds are used and
what the outcomes and impacts are.

3.2 Aim of the Project
The general objective of the whole project is to evaluate the funding by the Netherlands of HMA
programs. This will be based on collected data and also on existing research and literature. My part
of the project at the MFA will be the elaboration of a sub theme within the whole project.
The academic relevance of my project is to get skills on dealing with research in an international
environment, and communicating with professionals in the field of international public management
and policy. The research will add a better insight in the relevance/appropriateness, connectedness,
coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of the funding of HMA in the sub theme.
The practical relevance of my part of the project lies in the information based on the findings of
the research on the specific sub theme. The findings are in the first place important for the policy
makers to be accountable to the higher servants, public and parliament. Secondly it might be
supportive for them, either for assessing current funding and policies and designing future funding
and policies on HMA, especially on the specific aspect of the sub theme.

3.3 Research Question
3.3.1 Main Question of the Ministry’s Research
The overall research question of the whole evaluation research undertaken by the IOB department
of the MFA is about as follows:
Does the Dutch policy on HMA match specific goals on relevance/appropriateness, connectedness,
coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact?
This research questions is very broad. Therefore, it will be specified on a specific sub theme for
thesis master project (partial system evaluation (OECD 1999, p.10)). Possible case studies on sub
themes are:
1. Embeddedness of HMA in the broader development policy: Is the HMA part of a broader
development strategy for a certain area? This raises questions like:
− How was embeddedness defined? Was it necessary to embed HMA in a broader development
strategy? Did it have a positive influence on the effectiveness of HMA?
− Were the HMA programs embedded in framework for sustainable development?
− To which extend was it embedded?
− In which way was it embedded?
− Under which circumstances and conditions?
2. Land use after clearance of the landmines: The work of de-mining organizations is primarily for
clearing land area, and thereby preventing casualties and making the land usable again for the
population. Before the de-mining program starts, a certain priority function was decided for use
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after clearance, e.g. settlement or agriculture. In practice, the actual land use after clearance
is sometimes completely different. In many cases this does not have to be a problem (e.g.
farming in stead of agriculture by the population), but in other cases bribery or nepotism can
cause misuse. Questions to be asked are:
− Was it necessary to stipulate land use priorities before the clearance is undertaken?
− What were the priorities on land use before clearance?
− Is the land use after the clearance the same as it was decided before?
− If the use is different, is this a problem?
3. The choice of which HMA programs to fund: The main question is: What was the best place and
program to fund, and why? To determine this, selection criteria and directives are available. In
practice they are often difficult to apply and/or contradicting. Questions are:
− What criteria and directives were used?
− Which procedures were used?
− Were those procedures consistent and transparent?
4. HMA as a way of peace-building and peace-keeping: Most of the worlds’ HMA takes place in
post-conflict settings, with a high degree of instability. HMA might have a positive effect on the
stability. This gives the following questions:
− How stable was the country just after the conflict?
− What was the extent of HMA taken place?
− Was the peace stable?
− Can the increase in stability be explained by the HMA activities?
5. The Dutch HMA policy compared to that of other important donors: Every country might have
its own way and reasons for funding HMA. Important questions are:
− What were the HMA policies in other donors?
− How much did other donors fund?
− What were the policy arguments in the other donors?
− What were the similarities and differences?

3.3.2 Specific Research Question
The first sub theme attracts by far the most attention and is most interesting too for the MFA. This
sub theme has the most tangent planes with sustainable development. Therefore this sub theme will
be the case study of this research project.
To embed is referred as to as: “To become an integral part of something or to enclose closely” (The
Peak Agents Network 2004), and “place or be placed solidly” (Dictionary MSN Encarta 2006). A
synonym is “to be attached to” (Princeton University 2006).
Landmines and ERW have a direct threat to individuals and communities, but also indirectly by
being a barrier for short-term emergency interventions and long-term development efforts. The
complexity of humanitarian assistance is understood by policy makers. Important issues are
flexibility, innovation, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, safety of both operators and affected
population, and the needs of target groups and beneficiaries. Political interests of donors, receivers
and international organizations might conflict. In the past often incorporation of basic needs for
target groups failed and ineffective use of resources occurred (Kjellman, Harpviken, Millard et al.
2003, p.855-856). The Bad Honnef Guidelines were a logical development (see §2.4.2).
HMA falls under humanitarian assistance, although it has some military influence e.g. the
hierarchical structure, which in potential limits emphasize on broader humanitarian objectives
(Kjellman, Harpviken, Millard et al. 2003, p.860, 862). In the case of HMA, there can be either
emphasize be placed on emergency relief, post-conflict reconstruction, development cooperation,
or on a combination of two or three of those.
Embeddedness should not be confused with coherence (“The need to assess security,
developmental, trade and military policies as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is
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consistency and, in particular, that all policies take into account humanitarian and human-rights
considerations”) and only coordination (“the systematic use of policy instruments to deliver
humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner. Such instruments include strategic
planning, gathering data and managing information, mobilising resources and ensuring
accountability, orchestrating a functional division of labour, negotiating and maintaining a
serviceable framework with host political authorities and providing leadership”). Coherence
focuses on policy level, coordination on operational issues. Embeddedness is supposed to go deeper
and more far-reaching than coherence and sectoral coordination (ALNAP 2006, p.21, 34, 54).
Embeddedness is here defined as follows:
The extent in which other humanitarian objectives and programs are attached, combined or
integrated with HMA programs.
For this master project, the research question will be formulated as follows:
How are the HMA programs embedded in a broader framework for sustainable development?

3.3.3 Sub Questions
The following possible sub questions are derived from the main research question partially based on
the first sub theme:
1. Which HMA programs were funded by the Netherlands (descriptive)?
2. What was the funding compared to other donors (descriptive)?
3. What is the available data for evaluation of HMA programs that are (partially) funded by the
Netherlands (descriptive)?
4. What was the role of the Netherlands as a donor (descriptive)?
5. Were the HMA programs embedded in a broader framework for sustainable development
(descriptive)?
6. To which extend and in which way was it embedded (descriptive)?
7. What were the goals, circumstances and conditions, instruments and resources of the programs
that were embedded (descriptive)?
8. How were those programs to be valued in terms of relevance/appropriateness, connectedness,
coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact, taken into the account the
circumstances, instruments and resources (evaluative)?
9. What were the good and what are the bad practices (evaluative)?
10. Which recommendations can be made based on the conclusions of the research (explanative)?
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4 Research Design
In this chapter the design of this research is discussed. This chapter starts with the theoretical
framework and ends with the methods of inquiry.

4.1 Theoretical Framework
4.1.1 Conceptual Lens
The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD says about evaluation (OECD 2002, p.21-22):
”The systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, programme or
policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and
fulfillment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An
evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of
lessons learned into the decision– making process of both recipients and donors.
Evaluation also refers to the process of determining the worth or significance of an activity, policy
or program. An assessment, as systematic and objective as possible, of a planned, on-going, or
completed development intervention.”.
Evaluation in policy analysis is based on descriptive, normative and meta-ethical theories.
Evaluation produces information about the value or worth of policy outcomes. When policy
outcomes contribute to goals and objectives, they contain value. Compared other policy-analytical
methods, evaluation has a value focus, fact-value interdependence, present and past orientation
and value duality (Dunn 2004, p.356-358).
The functions of evaluations are threefold (Dunn 2004, p.358):
1. Reliable and valid information about policy performance are provided;
2. Values underlying the selecting goals and objectives are clarified and criticized;
3. Encourage the application of other policy-analytic methods in earlier phases.
Types of objectives of policies
Objectives for policies can be distinct between (European Commission 1997, p.15-16):
− Outputs (goods and services funded and directly produced by the program);
− Impacts (socio-economic changes brought about by the program). A further distinction gives:
• Results (initial impact of the policy);
• Outcomes (longer-term impact of the policy).
Type of evaluations
According to Dunn (2004, p.359-363), there are three approaches to evaluation:
− Pseudo-evaluation: Worth or value of outcomes is not questioned;
− Formal evaluation: Outcomes are evaluated on formal policy-program objectives. This type of
evaluation has a sub division:
• Development evaluation (direct and formative): serve day-to-day needs of program staff;
• Retrospective process evaluation (indirect and formative): evaluation after programs have
been in place for some time;
• Experimental evaluation (direct and summative): monitoring and evaluation of outcomes of
direct controls over policy inputs and processes;
• Retrospective outcome evaluation (indirect and summative): monitoring and evaluation of
outcomes, but not with direct controls over policy inputs and processes;
− Decision-theoretic evaluation: Outcomes are explicitly valued by stakeholders;
This evaluation will be a formal, retrospective outcome evaluation.
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Evaluation design
The following characteristics are seen as important for an evaluation (European Commission 1997,
p.9-10):
1. Analytical: based on recognized research techniques;
2. Systematic: careful planning and consistent use of the chosen techniques;
3. Reliable: findings should be reproducible by a different evaluator with access to the same data
and using the same methods of data analysis;
4. Issue-oriented: address important issues relating to the policy, including its relevance,
efficiency and effectiveness;
5. User-driven: successful evaluations should be designed and implemented in ways that provide
useful information to decision-makers, given the political circumstances, policy constraints and
available resources.
Evaluation criteria
There are seven key evaluation criteria identified by the OECD-DAC for humanitarian policy
evaluation (ALNAP 2006, p.10, 20-21; Dunn 2004, p.358; European Commission 1997, p.18; European
Communities 2004, p.75-76; OECD 1999, p.22-23; OECD 2002):
1. Relevance/Appropriateness: Relevance can be defined as to what extent are the policy’s
objectives pertinent in relation to evolving needs and priorities at local (population), national
(government) and international level (donors). Appropriateness can be defined as if desired
outcomes (objectives) are actually worthy or valuable, in terms of increasing ownership,
accountability and cost-effectiveness;
2. Connectedness: The need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried
out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account;
3. Coherence: The need to assess security, developmental, trade and military policies as well as
humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is consistency and, in particular, that all policies
take into account humanitarian and human-rights considerations (Note: this is explicitly defined
in terms of humanitarian assistance);
4. Coverage: Are major population groups reached with the policy or program;
5. Efficiency: How economically are various inputs/resources converted into outputs and results;
6. Effectiveness: How far have the policy’s impacts contributed to achieving its specific and
general objectives, taking into account their relative importance;
7. Impact (or utility): How do the policy’s impacts compare with needs of the target population(s).
The OECD-DAC criteria in the 2006 ALNAP guide are distinct from all other OECD-DAC sources. The
original criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability) are evolved to the
seven abovementioned criteria. All criteria seem to be more or less useful for this research (ALNAP
2006, p.20-21). The OECD-DAC criteria are widely used by agencies similar to the IOB department of
the MFA, such as DANIDA (Denmark), DFID (UK) and SIDA (Sweden).
Other criteria are possible, the following are given by Dunn (2004, p.358):
− Adequacy: To what extend does the achievement of a valued outcome resolve the problem?
− Equity: Are costs and benefits distributed equitably among different groups?
− Responsiveness: Do policy outcomes satisfy the needs, preferences or values of particular
groups?
Other possible criteria are goal-attainment (to what extend have the policy’s objectives been
achieved?), economy, consistency, allocative/distributional effects, and acceptability (see also
Figure 4-1) (European Communities 2004, p.39; Hansen 2005; OECD 1999, p.23).
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Source: (European Communities 2004, p.39)
Figure 4-1: Evaluation issues that are most relevant at different stages of the evaluation cycle
When an evaluation can be undertaken
There are three relevant moments, Figure 4-1 shows which criteria are relevant for what moment
(European Commission 1997, p.15-17, 72-73, 75; European Communities 2004, p.12-13, 74-75):
1. Ex-ante evaluation: before the policy is implemented, in order to get a good insight in the likely
output, results and outcomes, and assess them in relation with the policy objectives;
2. Mid-term evaluation: when the policy is already implemented, in order to see where the policy
has to be adjusted to get the desired or even better output, results and outcomes;
3. Ex-post evaluation: (some time) after the policy ended, in order to get a good insight of the
output, results and outcomes of the policy. The primary interest is accountability, to investigate
what has been achieved and at what cost (= effectiveness and efficiency). The Danish
International Development Agency (Danida) distinguishes between end-evaluations (just after
ending a program and for follow up) and ex-post evaluation (two or five years after termination
of the program, in order to see lasting impacts) (Danida 2001a, p.3).
In this research an ex-post evaluation will be undertaken.
Two main approaches
The logical framework approach
The logical framework (logframe) approach says that are three types of objectives, corresponding to
outputs, results and outcomes (European Commission 1997, p.16):
− Operational objectives ⇒ outputs;
− Specific objectives
⇒ results;
− General objectives
⇒ outcomes.
Figure 4-2 gives the intervention logic of a policy; Figure 4-3 combines the key evaluation issues
with the types of objectives.
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Source: (European Commission 1997, p.17)
Figure 4-2: The intervention logic of a policy

Source: (European Commission 1997, p.20)
Figure 4-3: Key evaluation issues
The logframe approach is often used in evaluation of humanitarian action (EHA) (ALNAP 2006, p.20;
Danida 2001a, p.66). However the weakest points of this approach are the assumptions that the
whole process is very rational, linear, causal links are clear, and there is only one (important) actor,
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in this for example the Netherlands as a financial contributor of programs. In practice, the whole
process is a lot more complicated and has many actors, so more flexible approach is necessary. To
attribute an outcome with a great certainty to an input is in many cases almost impossible. The
approach is not appropriate when looking at overall policy goals, social ideals and higher principles
(OECD 1999, p.13).
Social-constructivist approach
Quite often evaluators are faced by problems arising from no clearly stated goals or objectives.
Therefore objectives for the different actors and interventions should be retrospectively
constructed. Necessary is a framework of understanding, beliefs and assumptions. Inbuilt conflicts
or contradictions in policy objectives are faced. The construction of a narrative history is a powerful
tool to understand situations and structures (OECD 1999, p.13-14, 17-18).
The social-constructivist approach implies that every policy has multi actors and therefore multi
value and beliefs. Causal relations are not always clear and straight forward. Important questions
are if assumptions or theories on the policy are right; what went wrong and why; are we doing the
“good thing”. Especially the last question can be very political controversial and subjective. The
main disadvantage is that this approach is vaguer and less easy to apply.
The approach that is most appropriate is dependant on which data, contexts and tools there will be
available.

4.1.2 Actor Analysis
There are many different actors involved in the whole life cycle of landmines:
1. Weapon industry: the actors in this industry have a financial interest in the existence of use of
landmines and other explosives. Governments can be sensible for the employment they
generate.
2. Armies and rebels: these actors are responsible for the creation of landmine or ERW fields.
Often ex-rebels and ex-soldiers are later used as de-miners, as part of post-conflict
rehabilitation;
3. Local communities: communities are directly affected by landmine fields. Local labour is useful
for HMA activities, and thereby (temporarily) reduces unemployment;
4. National governments of countries with landmines: those countries are faced with landmine
fields on their area (sometimes laid down by there own army), which has socio-economic
consequences for their population. Some countries have their governmental de-mining
organizations (e.g. CMAC in Cambodia). National capacity-building is an important issue of the
Dutch policies;
5. Inter-governmental Organizations (IGOs): mainly the United Nations, under the organization of
UNMAS or UNDP;
6. Research and education centres: important examples are the IMAS by UNMAS, GICHD (Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian De-mining) and MAIC (Mine Action Information Center);
7. (International) Non-governmental Organizations ((I)NGOs): They have a broad spectrum of HMA
activities, e.g. clearance, education and awareness. An important player is the ICBL;
8. Private sector HMA organizations: organizations with clearing landmines as a business activity.
The Netherlands does not fund private companies for HMA activities;
9. National governments of donors: Important are the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and/or
Development Cooperation. For countries that signed and ratified or acceded the treaty, see
Appendix 3. The Mine Action Support Group is an information-sharing forum of donors and the
European Commission.
In Table 4-1 an oversight is given on relations and interaction between actors, both negative and
positive aspects.

Michiel van Bokhorst (288179)

17

September 28, 2006

Project Report

Evaluation of Embeddedness of HMA Programs Funded by the Netherlands (1996‐2004)

Table 4-1: Possible relations and interaction between actors (both negative and positive)
towards
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
delivering
1.
x
lobbying
lobbying
lobbying
landmines
power,
purchasing
power,
2.
x
interests,
landmines
interests
corruption
resistance,
calling for
3.
fear,
x
help,
giving input
giving input
distrusting
distrusting

9.

-

-

lobbying

hassling

hassling

-

cooperating,
giving input

cooperating,
giving input

(indirectly)
cooperating,
giving input
cooperating,
accounting,
giving input,
hassling

x

cooperating,
giving input

cooperating,
giving input,
funding,
hassling

collecting
data and
facts,
informing

x

cooperating
on data and
information

cooperating,
information
sharing

cooperating

cooperating,
information
sharing

collecting
data and
facts

cooperating,
information
sharing,
informing,
educating

cooperating,
giving input,
funding,
hassling

collecting
data and facts

collecting
data and facts

cooperating
on data and
information

x

collecting
data and facts

collecting
data and facts

collecting
data and facts

capacitybuilding,
HMA,
cooperating,
supporting,
informing,
educating,
accounting

capacitybuilding,
HMA,
cooperating,
supporting,
informing,
educating,
accounting

cooperating

cooperating,
giving input

x

cooperating,
distrusting,
opposing

cooperating,
accounting

power,
interests

helping,
hassling, HMA

5.

trying to ban

persuading
not to use
landmines,
informing

6.

trying to ban

from

8.

cooperating,
giving input,
accounting

purchasing
landmines,
trying to ban

4.

7.

7.

trying to ban

persuading
not to use
landmines,
peace
keeping

8.

-

-

HMA,
cooperating

cooperating

cooperating

cooperating

cooperating,
distrusting,
opposing

x

cooperating

9.

employment
concerns,
trying to ban

persuading
not to use
landmines

funding,
supporting

funding,
supporting,

funding,
supporting

funding,
supporting,
giving input

funding,
supporting

funding,
supporting

x
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The relation from 9 towards 7 gives the funding relation between the Netherlands and a HMA NGO.
The relation from 7 towards 9 is for the information/evaluation of the de-mining. The funding also
goes from 9 - 6 and 6 - 7. The information for the evaluation also goes via the relations 7 – 5 and 5 –
9. In case of a governmental HMA organization the relations are successively 9 – 4, 4 - 9 and 4 – 5/5 9. The abovementioned relations are relevant for this research project.
De-mining NGO
Governmental de-mining organization
9–7
9–4
Policy/funding relation
9 – 5 and 5 - 7
9 – 5 and 5 – 4
Information/evaluation
7–9
4–9
relation
7 – 5 and 5 – 9
4 – 5 and 5 – 9
Table 4-2: Relevant relations for this research project

4.1.3 Analytical Framework
Variables of research
For the analytical framework, the following variables are identified in Figure 4-4. Not all variables
will be discusses during this research, dependent on factor such as available data and relevance.
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Areas affected by
mines

-

Amount of landmines
Amount of casualties
Amount of unusable hectares
Hindrance of the mine fields for the socioeconomic life

Dutch humanitarian
de-mining policy

-

Objectives of the Dutch humanitarian de-mining policy
Instruments to reach the objectives of the policy
Starting points of the policy
Embeddedness of humanitarian de-mining in the broader development policy

Selection of demining programs to
support

Execution of de-mining
programs supported by the
Netherlands

- Determining the national need for mine
action in affected country
- Involved actors in the decision making
on assigning subsidies
- Criteria of assigning subsidies
- Criteria for mid-term evaluation
- Coordination with other countries

- Formulation of the objectives
- Fulfillment in national and regional needs and
priorities
- Attention and criteria for national capacity
building for transfer of de-mining tasks
- Obstacles for execution of the program
- Monitoring of the progress of the program
- Goal-attainment
- Progress in solving mine problem (effectiveness)
- Short term effects
- Long term effects (sustainability)

Independent variable:
Area’s affected by
mines

Intermediate variable:

National organization of
de-mining practice in
affected countries
- Formal organization of the de-mining
practice in the affected country
- Existence of a national mine action plan
and/or priority scheme
- Coordination of national priorities and
needs of interest organizations on
execution level

Dependent variables:

Selection of de-mining
programs to support

- Determining the national need for mine
action in affected country

Figure 4-4: Variables of the whole research
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4.2 Methods of Inquiry
In this section, the methods to be used are described. This will be done for either the collection as
the analysis of data.

4.2.1 Data Collection
Data collection takes place by accessing information from on HMA programs funded by the
Netherlands. This data will come from policy documents and papers (such as acts, guidelines,
directives, white papers, project proposals, reports etc.) from the Parliament and mainly the
archives and accounting systems of the MFA.

4.2.2 Data Analysis
Recently the final report of a commission, lead by the former Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs Hans
Dijkstal, was published. The most important conclusion was that it is important for organizations to
be accountable when funded by development aid, but that it is often difficult to measure
effectiveness, which is a hot issue in public administration now for some time. Difficulties are
methodological problem and gathering of reliable and useful information. The report suggest that
organizations should be accountable by showing organizational professionalism by good governance
principles, quality of organization management, and transparent reporting (Commissie Draagvlak en
Effectiviteit Ontwikkelingssamenwerking 2006, p.20, 28-29; Koelé & Velthuis 2006).
Descriptive
Some of the sub research questions have a descriptive nature. Therefore the data will be analyzed
and presented in a descriptive way.
Evaluative
A useful statistical method for the evaluation is a Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA), also called multiattribute utility analysis by Dunn (2004, p.365). This method can be used if enough relevant
numerical data is available.
The following steps have to be take in the Multi-Criteria Analysis evaluation process (Dunn 2004,
p.365-367):
1. Stakeholder identification;
2. Specification of relevant decision issues;
3. Specification of policy outcomes;
4. Identification of attributes of outcomes;
5. Attribute ranking in order of importance;
6. Attribute scaling of importance;
7. Scale standardization;
8. Outcome measurement;
9. Utility calculation: U i = ∑ wi uij :
Ui = the aggregate value of the i’th outcome;
wj = the standardized scale value or weighing factor of the j’th attribute;
uij = the probability of occurrence of the i’th outcome on the j’th attribute.
10. Evaluation and presentation.
For conducting a MCA, at least necessary are (Horstmeier 2003, p.11-1):
1. Criteria to test;
2. Balanced weighing factors;
3. Different programs to test;
4. Valuing in what extend every entity satisfies every criterion.
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Criteria consist of general criteria and detailed criteria (sub criteria). Criteria are measured with
indicators derived from policy outcomes. The weighing factors (attribute ranking) have to be
balanced with relative importance. Afterwards the factors have to be checked, to avoid too much
subjectivity (Horstmeier 2003, p.11-1 - 11-10). Special attention has to be given to a sensitivity
analysis of the weighing factors.
Explanative
Explanative sub research questions will also be descriptive, but they are supported by the
evaluation research outcomes.

4.3 Summary of Choices
The used criteria are the OECD-DAC criteria: relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, coherence,
coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact. The evaluation will be an ex-post, formal,
retrospective outcome evaluation. Both the logframe and social-constructivist approach have their
advantages and disadvantages. The approach that is most appropriate is dependant on which data,
contexts and tools there will be available. The actors that will be used are national governments of
countries with landmines, IGOs, (I)NGOs, and national governments of donors. The research will be
descriptive, evaluative, and explanative. If possible a MCA will be done.

4.4 Reflection on Research Design
In this paragraph this chapter will be reflected on the proposed research design and the actual
research.

4.4.1 Theoretical Framework
Conceptual Lens
The evaluation turned out to be an ex-post, formal, retrospective outcome evaluation. The used
approach is mainly social-constructivist: it was not possible to attributed inputs to outputs in terms
of embeddedness, due to a lack of relevant numerical data. Narrative reports are used to make a
judgment.
Actor analysis
From the following actors information has been used:
− National governments of countries with landmines: National governments for PRSPs, for other
report: BHMAC, CMAC, and UXO Lao;
− IGOs: UNDP, UNICEF, UNMAC, UNOCHA, and WFP;
− (I)NGOs: HALO Trust, HI, MgM, and NPA;
− National governments of donors: The Netherlands.
These are the same actors as mentioned in Table 4-2.
Analytical framework
The following variables are more or less described in this research (in black):
1. Areas affected by landmines:
a. Amount of landmines
b. Amount of casualties;
c. Amount of unusable hectares;
d. Hindrance of the mine fields for the socio-economic life;

Michiel van Bokhorst (288179)

22

September 28, 2006

Project Report

Evaluation of Embeddedness of HMA Programs Funded by the Netherlands (1996‐2004)

2. Dutch HMA policy:
a. Objectives of the Dutch HMA policy;
b. Instruments to reach the objectives of the policy;
c. Starting points of the policy;
d. Embeddedness of HMA in the broader development policy.
3. Selection of HMA programs to support:
a. Determining the national need for HMA in affected country;
b. Involved actors in the decision making on assigning subsidies;
c. Criteria of assigning subsidies;
d. Criteria for mid-term evaluation;
e. Coordination with other countries.
4. National organization of HMA practice in affected countries:
a. Formal organization of the HMA practice in the affected country;
b. Existence of a national HMA plan and/or priority scheme;
c. Coordination of national priorities and needs of interest organizations on execution level;
5. Execution of HMA programs supported by the Netherlands:
a. Formulation of the objectives;
b. Fulfillment in national and regional needs and priorities;
c. Attention and criteria for national capacity building for transfer of HMA tasks;
d. Obstacles for execution of the program;
e. Monitoring of the progress of the program;
f. Goal-attainment;
g. Progress in solving the mine problem (effectiveness);
h. Short term effects;
i. Long term effects (sustainability).
The used criteria are the OECD-DAC criteria: relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, coherence,
coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact.

4.4.2 Methods of inquiry
Data collection and analysis
In the research design, it was assumed that there would be enough numerical information to
undertake a quantitative data analysis for the evaluative part of this research. Unfortunately
necessary data was lacking in the available information, and a MCA could not be done. Therefore
the only option was to do a more qualitative, descriptive and explanative analysis, mainly based on
work plans, policy memorandum and progress/final reports (see also §4.2.1).
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5 Programs Funded by the Netherlands
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the sub questions 1-3 will be answered. This means that the programs, funds,
countries, and involved organizations (NGOs and I(G)Os) of the financed HMA programs will be
discussed.
1. Which HMA programs were funded by the Netherlands (descriptive)?
2. What was the funding compared to other donors (descriptive)?
3. What was the available data for evaluation of HMA programs that are (partially) funded by the
Netherlands (descriptive)?

5.2 Funds
Table 2-3 gave a brief oversight on how much the Netherlands funded on HMA for 1992 onwards
2005, and a planned budget for 2006. In this paragraph more detailed information will be given.
Table 5-1 shows the financial support by the Netherlands according to the information on the
UNMAS Mine Action Investments website. All the countries that were financed are shown, as was
other funding (see also Appendix 4): multilateral funding of the ICBL for monitoring and compliance,
ICRC for victim assistance and UNMAS VTF, funding to HALO Trust for training of Mine Detection
Dogs (MDD), and the program “Humanitair OntMijnen” for research and development of mechanical
de-mining (funds went mainly to the Dutch TNO research institute).
Table 5-1: Financial support on HMA by the Netherlands
Country-related
Total 1996-2004 (US$)
Afghanistan
16.437.779
Albania
177.165
Angola
19.916.200
Azerbaijan
2.240.910
Bosnia and Herzegovina
6.528.745
Cambodia
13.901.174
Congo
252.000
Eritrea
9.797.512
Ethiopia
1.000.000
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
4.331.779
Georgia
1.436.564
Guinea-Bissau
1.000.000
Iraq
4.565.924
Laos
2.421.000
Mozambique
9.261.404
Russian Federation
272.030
Sudan
400.050
Somalia
1.848.925
Sri Lanka
465.987
Yemen
1.578.000
Sub-total
98.527.638
Other
21.901.208
Total
120.428.846
See Appendix 4 for a complete overview.

Ranking
2
20
1
10
6
3
19
4
14
8
13
14
7
9
5
18
17
11
16
12

Years of funding
9
1
9
4
7
9
1
5
1
4
5
2
5
6
8
1
1
5
1
5

n/a

n/a

It is clear that Afghanistan (13,7% of the total funds for 1996-2004), Angola (16,6%), Cambodia
(11,6%), Eritrea (8,2%), and Mozambique (7,7%) were receiving the largest sums.
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Table 5-2 shows the funding per HMA category. Integrated Mine Action (33,6%) and Mine Clearance
(32,9%) represent the main share of the funds.
Table 5-2: Funding by the Netherlands per HMA category in US$
Category
Total 1996-2003* (US$)
Advocacy & Prevention
1.090.440
Coordination
10.347.198
Information
2.297.000
Integrated Mine Action
37.508.235
Mine Awareness
6.183.972
Mine Clearance
36.691.612
Research & Development
10.000.000
Victim Assistance
7.391.862
Total:
111.512.319
* Data for the year 2004 is not available
See Appendix 4 for a complete overview.
Some findings are in line with the Dutch priorities (see §2.5.2 and 2.5.3 for details about the
priorities):
− Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Eritrea, and Mozambique are said to be the most contaminated
countries in the world. It is reasonable that the need in this countries was higher than in others,
and high cost-effectiveness will be easier achievable;
− Mine clearance was the most important priority, and a major share of the funds were used for
that (categories Integrated Mine Action and Mine Clearance in Table 5-2);
− Capacity building was emphasized (categories Integrated Mine Action and Coordination in Table
5-2).
Some findings that are not in line with the Dutch priorities are:
− Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iraq, Laos and Somalia did not sign or ratify the Ottawa Treaty yet, nor did
Azerbaijan, Iraq and Somalia ratify the original or amended Protocol II of the CCW (ICBL 2006b).
For Iraq (since 2002) and Somalia a strong central government was lacking. The humanitarian
situation in Laos and human rights considerations made that Laos is nevertheless funded. Also
Laos suffered from ERW and not landmines, what the Ottawa Treaty is about. For Azerbaijan
and Georgia reasons for funding despite not having signed the Ottawa Treaty or the CCW
Protocol II are unknown (MvBZ 2001b; MvBZ 2005);
− With Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, DR Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kosovo, Laos, Somalia,
Sudan and Yemen, the Netherlands had no bilateral aid relation (according to the new policy
starting from 2003). So this does not mean embeddedness of the donor‘s policy. Reasons for
funding were probably that HMA activities support human rights, peace building, and/or good
governance (MvBZ 2006h, p.47; TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, nr.1, p.32).
It is interesting to see if the funding pattern of recipient countries by the Netherlands is similar to
that of other donors. Figure 5-2 shows that Dutch HMA funds to a specific recipient country differed
strongly per year Angola was the largest receiver of HMA funds until 1999, but faced a huge decline.
The funds for Eritrea changed largely every year, and no country received a stable amount of money
during a couple of years. For the total funds for all donors together (Figure 5-2), there was a bit
more stability. Afghanistan receives a growing amount of money almost every year. Other recipient
countries are showing some fluctuation every year. For more data, see also Appendix 6.
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Figure 5-1: Funds per recipient country for the Netherlands
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Figure 5-2: Funds per recipient country for all donors together

Michiel van Bokhorst (288179)

26

September 28, 2006

Project Report

Evaluation of Embeddedness of HMA Programs Funded by the Netherlands (1996‐2004)

5.3 Countries
Countries where the Netherlands (co-)funded HMA programs are Afghanistan Albania, Angola,
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau,
Iraq, Kosovo (Serbia/FRY), Laos, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen. Every country
has its history concerning (civil) wars, rebels, and landmines and explosives. There are too many
countries to analyze for this specific research project, therefore a selection is made. The countries
that will be used in this research are chosen by the following criteria (see also Table 5-1):
1. The extent of Dutch funding in a specific country;
2. The duration of the funding;
3. Interesting landmine and/or ERW related features of a specific country.
The most appropriate countries regarding 1. and 2. are Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and
Mozambique. In combination with 3., Bosnia and Herzegovina (in Europe, detailed mapping during
the war, and direct start of HMA after the war by entity armies), Eritrea (high amount of money in a
few years, and a sudden withdrawal of foreign organization, forced by the government), and Laos
(mainly, and a lot of, ERW) will also be chosen.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Afghanistan
Laos

Eritrea
Cambodia

Angola

Mozambique

Figure 5-3: Selected countries for further analysis
The countries will be presented in the following subparagraphs. For every country the mine-related
history, some basic key information, the key points from the HMA plans, and the programs funded
by the Netherlands are given.

5.3.1 Afghanistan
Basic information
The population of Afghanistan is growing rapidly, not only because of returning internally displaced
persons (IDPs). This will give pressure on the scarcely available fertile soil; therefore de-mining of
agricultural area gives some relief. The economic growth is quite high. Appendix 5 shows some key
basic indicators about Afghanistan.
Mine/ERW-related history
Afghanistan is one of the heaviest contaminated countries in the world, with both landmines and
ERW. Afghanistan has been involved in several armed conflicts since 1978. In those conflicts all sides
have been using APMs. Most notorious were the Soviet forces and the Afghan government (of the
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) from 1979-1992. Later in the 1990s in the fighting
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between the Taliban and a loose coalition of opposition forces, landmines were also used, although
the Taliban saw the use of landmines as un-Islamic. In 2001 Afghanistan was attacked by the U.S.led coalition. Unexploded U.S. cluster bomblets (UXOs), ammunition scattered from storage depots
hit by air strikes (AXO), and newly laid landmines and booby-traps by Northern Alliance, Taliban,
and Al-Qaeda fighters, posed a new threat to the population. The coalition forces documented their
cluster bomb air raids (ICBL 1999, p.18: Afghanistan; ICBL 2002: Afghanistan; ICBL 2005a:
Afghanistan; Strand 2004).
The size of the landmine problem
Landmines were planted everywhere and on various types or area, urban and rural, and form a
major obstacle to repatriation, relief, rehabilitation, and development activities. In eight years of
intensive mine clearance in the 1990s, 146 km2 (about the 2/3 of the municipality of Amsterdam) of
mined area was cleared, but at least 713 km2 (about halve of the province of Utrecht) remained to
be cleared. Estimations say that landmines and UXO cause about 100 victims per month (both
counting for about 50%), where 150-300 was common in 2000. Casualties have been reported in 33
of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan (ICBL 1999: Afghanistan; ICBL 2002: Afghanistan; ICBL 2003:
Afghanistan; Strand 2004, p.19).
HMA programs
The core issue for Afghanistan was peace-building and reintegration (Strand 2004, p.4-7, 9):
− The basic idea of the Afghan Mine Action for Peace (MAFP) Programme was to incorporate exfighters for training and employment as community-based de-miners (Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)). They did not receive a full payment, but it gave them
a chance for reintegration into their home community with dignity. The Area Mine Action Centre
(AMAC) and Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agency (META) were involved in a pilot.
Important were local support, and after the demining is done the ex-fighters need job security;
− The Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) was a community-based process, and focused on
communal conflicts. Local councils, local authorities and other influential persons were
involved, in order to build local capacity and develop own strategies in dealing with conflicts in
their areas and mobilizing people for peace-building. The local community had to recognize the
value and have to become self-supporting;
− Landmines and weapons were seen as a major threat on lasting peace.
Afghanistan had to reduce its stockpile before March 1 2007, due to the ratification of the Ottawa
Convention. There was no national HMA authority yet, UNMAS’s MAPA and UNMACA are still
responsible for issues involving HMA (ICBL 2005a: Afghanistan).
Funded programs
The Netherlands was a medium contributor for the period 1996-2004 to HMA in Afghanistan,
counting for 5,5% of the total funds (see Table 5-3). The total ODA (official development aid)
provided by Netherlands for the period 2000-2004 is US$ 338,08 million, in the same period the
funds for HMA was US$ 10,34 million, thus counting for about 3%. The Netherlands was funding
humanitarian aid, poverty alleviation, and reconstruction and development projects, were HMA was
an important supporting issue. All donors together provided Afghanistan with US$ 5,5 billion for the
period 2001-2004 (official development assistance and official aid), of which US$ 163,5 million for
HMA, also about 3% (MvBZ 2006a; OECD 2006).
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Table 5-3: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Afghanistan
Country
Total 1996-2004 (US$)
Share
Canada
35.575.906
12,0%
Denmark
8.915.157
3,0%
European Union
21.701.514
7,3%
Finland
8.695.000
2,9%
Germany
29.940.111
10,1%
Japan
68.433.202
23,1%
Netherlands
16.437.779
5,5%
Norway
12.582.435
4,2%
United Kingdom
11.300.939
3,8%
United States
69.809.000
23,6%
Total (all countries)
296.204.870
See Appendix 6 for details.

Ranking
3
9
5
10
4
2
6
7
8
1

Programs funded by the Netherlands were focused on mine and ERW clearance (manual and
mechanical), mine clearance training, mine awareness, mine identification, mine survey, mine
marking, evaluation, monitoring, and logistics (see Appendix 7 for details). The programs had taken
place in nearly all provinces. Funds were channelled mainly via (UN)OCHA/UNMAS (UNMAS took over
the responsibilities concerning HMA of OCHA in 2003), but also to ICRC and HALO Trust. HMA had
been carried out by the MACA (OCHA/UNMAC), ICRC, and HALO Trust.
The UN produced annual appeals for the coordination of aid and assistance for Afghanistan. The
Netherlands was in favour of multilateral funding above bilateral funding (TK 29 234 V 2003-2004,
p.7-8), and the fact that the UN founded and were still responsible for MACA and MAPA, made the
channelling of funds via UNOCHA/UNMAS a logical choice. The Netherlands was often funding
several humanitarian programs from the appeals together. The reason to fund programs in
Afghanistan was the fact that the country hugely suffered for decades from various armed conflicts,
which caused a harrowing humanitarian situated. The communication and coordination for the MFA
was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked for
advice, control and support (MvBZ 1999a).

5.3.2 Angola
Basic information
The population of Angola is growing rapidly, despite the high number of IDPs, and the economic
growth is quite high. The economic growth is varying, from 3 to 19% annually. Appendix 5 shows
some key basic indicators about Angola.
Mine-related history
Angola officially gained independence from Portugal in 1975. The civil war started already in 1974,
official ending in 2002 (despite the earlier 1994 Lusaka Protocols), with some cease-fire periods in
between. It has been one of the real battle field directly related with the Cold War between the
communists and western world. Three groups along racial and ideological lines were involved in the
civil war: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA; links with communists), the
National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA; anti-communist and supported by Zaire/Mobutu and the
U.S. playing a minor role), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA;
supported by apartheid South Africa and the U.S.). Before the independence, the FNLA, UNITA and
MPLA fought against the Portuguese in a colonial war. Cuban, South-Africa and U.S. intervened in
the conflict in different periods (Meredith 2006, p.312-319; MvBZ 2006b).
The size of the landmine problem
Angola had a total of 4,28 million IDPs in 2002, what is more than one quarter of the total
population. Many of them live in the DR Congo and Zambia, and suffered under bad and inhuman
conditions. It was difficult for humanitarian agencies to reach the IDPs, and they were not top
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priority for the authorities. Of all mine accidents, in 75% of the cases IDPs were involved when
entering unfamiliar areas (HRW 2003, p.1-2; ICBL 1999: Angola; ICBL 2002: Angola).
HMA programs
In 2001 the Inter-Sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH) was setup
by the government for the regulation and coordination of HMA, as a successor of the National
Institute for Removal of Explosive Devices (INAROEE), which was reformed and reorganized into the
National Demining Institute (IND) for implementation of HMA. The CNIDAH set three strategic
priorities (ICBL 2005a: Angola):
1. To consolidate CNIDAH as national authority and strengthening coordination with provincial
authorities and decentralizing HMA;
2. To develop capabilities of relevant institutions;
3. To support sustainable expansion of operational capacity.
Funded programs
The Netherlands was the second large contributor to HMA programs in Angola (see Table 5-4), only
the U.S. funded more. The Netherlands provided US$ 100,44 million of ODA for the period 20002004, where US$ 5,84 million was spent on HMA, about 6%. Emergency and humanitarian aid, human
rights and good governance were the other financed issues, where HMA was an important factor.
The official development assistance and official aid for Angola of all donors together was about US$
2,35 billion for the period 2001-2004, with US$ 40,9 million or less than 2% for HMA. An explanation
for the relatively very large contribution to HMA by the Netherlands could be the long civil war with
the use of many landmines which brought a huge humanitarian problem, and the HMA-activities that
made the provision of humanitarian aid easier. The communication and coordination for the MFA
was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked for
advice, control and support (MvBZ 1999b; MvBZ 2001a; MvBZ 2006b; OECD 2006).
Table 5-4: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Angola
Countries
Total 1996-2004 (US$)
Canada
2.474.931
Denmark
3.484.868
European Union
13.085.118
Finland
6.615.728
Germany
17.114.792
Italy
8.179.591
Japan
4.604.855
Netherlands
19.916.200
Norway
16.704.386
United States
25.313.038
Total (all countries)
128.356.578
See Appendix 6 for details.

Share
1,9%
2,7%
10,2%
5,2%
13,3%
6,4%
3,6%
15,9%
13,0%
19,7%

Ranking
10
9
5
7
3
6
8
2
4
1

The programs focused on mine clearance in order to make the return of IDPs and the recovery of
rural infrastructure possible, mine clearance training, mine survey, victim assistance and social
rehabilitation (see Appendix 7 for details). Nearly all provinces are somehow affected by the
programs. The funds are provided mainly to Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and Menschen gegen
Minen (MgM), who were also the executers of most programs. Especially NPA turned out to be a
reliable partner, with a very good record. Others are Handicap International (HI), UNICEF, and the
UN World Food Programme (WFP). The Angolan government was seen as too weak for properly
undertaking HMA activities, therefore only INGOs were funded (MvBZ 2001a).
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5.3.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina
Key basic information
The institutional framework of the country itself was still under development. The HDI and GDP per
capita were much higher and the growth of the population much lower than in the other selected
countries. Appendix 5 shows some key basic indicators about Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Mine-related history
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) collapse after the end of the Cold War, into the
countries Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Macedonia, and recently
Montenegro. This collapse was not without rumours, euphemistically speaking, especially in the case
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country declared independence in March 1992, followed by a war,
officially lasting until December 1995. The facts about the war were nearly 3 million IDPs, over
250.000 people died or missing, and 170.000 wounded (with a population of 3,9 million in 2005!).
The country became contaminated with landmines and UXO, and has a destroyed social
infrastructure. Three armies were involved, the Bosnian Government Army (ARBiH), the Bosnian
Croat Army (HVO), and the Bosnian Serb army (VRS). Landmine skills were widely available, due to
the universally attended military service in the former army of the SFRY, who heavily relied on
landmines (ICBL 1999: Bosnia and Herzegovina).
There was a Bosnia and Herzegovina government for the whole country, there were two (ethnic)
entities formed, the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina (FBiH; Bosnians and Croats), and the
Republika Srpska (RS). The Brčko District (BD) is jointly controlled. A NATO army, the Stabilization
Force (SFOR) arrived in 1996, who was responsible for training and supervising the demining teams
for each entity army. Over 4% of the country and over 1.400 settlements were affected by
landmines (ICBL 1999: Bosnia and Herzegovina; IMF 2004a, p.251).
Figure 5-4: Map with landmine contamination in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Source (The World Bank Group)
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The size of the landmine problem
Landmines and UXO still claim casualties (43 in 2004), both fatal and non-fatal, and numbers are
slowly declining. Some of the victims were de-miners (ICBL 1999: Bosnia and Herzegovina; ICBL
2005a: Bosnia and Herzegovina).
HMA programs
The responsibility for HMA went from the UN to the three governments in Bosnia and Herzegovina on
July 1, 1998. Since then three MACs were operating, two entity MACs (FEDMAC, RSMAC), and the
coordinating BHMAC, but were not un-problematically merged in one MAC later. In 2002 the
Demining Commission was established for state-level responsibility and coordination, as an
international representative and oversight for the BHMAC. The long-term national capacity-building
Integrated Mine Action Programme (IMAP) was initiated in 2004, funded by Canada, the
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. The new Mine Action Strategy for 2005-2009 (and the 2004 PRSP)
emphasizes the link with overall national development, although this interferes with obligations
from the Ottawa Treaty, e.g. the deadline of March 1, 2009 for destructing all APMs. Surveys were
planned to reduce suspected hazardous areas. More than 40 organizations were involved with HMA
activities (ICBL 1999: Bosnia and Herzegovina; ICBL 2005a: Bosnia and Herzegovina; IMF 2004a,
p.251; Kjellman, Harpviken, Millard et al. 2003, p.865).
Funded programs
The Netherlands was a medium contributor to the Bosnian HMA programs with 4,6% of the total for
1996-2004 (see Table 5-5). The Dutch ODA budget information was only available for 2003-2004,
when it was about € 33 million, and in which period HMA counted for US$ 499.500, so less than 2%.
Other funds went to macro-economic support, support for the return of IDPs, and peace
implementation. Especially the latter two subjects benefited from HMA. For the period 2001-2004
the amount of official development assistance and official aid for all donors in Bosnia and
Herzegovina was US$ 2,14 billion, with US$ 37,6 million for HMA which is also less than 2% (MvBZ
2006c; OECD 2006).
Table 5-5: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Country
Total 1996-2004 (US$)
Share
Canada
12.925.180
9,1%
European Union
29.137.218
20,5%
Finland
3.166.242
2,2%
Germany
10.268.620
7,2%
Italy
6.873.614
4,8%
Japan
7.694.665
5,4%
Netherlands
6.528.745
4,6%
Norway
19.696.074
13,9%
Slovenia
2.748.866
1,9%
United States
35.673.000
25,1%
Total (all countries)
141.996.122
See Appendix 6 for details.

Ranking
4
2
9
5
7
6
8
3
10
1

The focus of the programs was on mine/UXO clearance, mine clearance training, mine awareness,
mine information, mine survey and marking, and institution building. Funds were mostly contributed
to BHMAC activities, via UN’s DHA and UNDP. There was also a contribution to NPA (see Appendix 7
for details). The Netherlands Ministry of Defence provided in-kind support at least from October
2002 to June 2004.
The UN produced annual appeals for the coordination of aid and assistance for Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The Netherlands was in favour of multilateral above bilateral funding, and the fact
that the UN founded the MACs, made the channelling of funds via UNDP a logic choice. The
Netherlands was often funding several humanitarian programs from the appeals together. The
reason to fund programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the fact that the country hugely suffered of
the war of 1991-1995, which caused a harrowing humanitarian situated with many IDPs and
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refugees. The communication and coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the
humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked for advice, control and support (MvBZ
1999e).

5.3.4 Cambodia
Basic information
Cambodia has a low growth of population, compared to Angola, Eritrea, and Laos. Appendix 5 shows
some key basic indicators about Cambodia.
Mine-related history
Cambodia gained independence from France in 1954. In 1970 a coup d’état was committed,
followed by a civil war. In 1975 Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge came into power, with a horrible reign
causing the death of many people. In 1978, Vietnam attacked Cambodia and put a communist
government in place. A coalition of Khmer Rouge, the National United Front for an Independent.
Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and others resisted in a guerrilla war. In
1991 the ‘Paris Peace Accords’ were signed. In 1997 there was another coup d’état. Landmines were
laid by all factions. Cambodia also suffered from bombings during the Vietnam War (CMAC 2004,
p.1; ICBL 1999: Cambodia; MvBZ 2006d).
The size of the landmine problem
About 4.446 km2 (slightly smaller than the province of North-Brabant) was suspected to be
contaminated with landmines or UXO, counting for 2,5% of the country. The provinces of
Battambang, Banteay Manchey, Otdar Meanchey and Preah Vihear, and the municipality of Pailin,
were among the most heavily contaminated areas, counting for 61% of the 4.446 km2. It was
estimated that Cambodia had 4-6 million pieces of landmines and over 1 million pieces of UXO.
Landmines and UXO still claim many victims. The rate dropped from 12 casualties per day in 1996 to
two to three per day since 2000. Casualties were related to daily livelihood activities such as
farming, herding, clearing new land, fishing, collecting food and wood (54%), or travelling (26%).
Mine clearance activities also claimed victims (CMAC 2004, p.1; ICBL 2005a: Cambodia; Kingdom of
Cambodia 2002, p.122).
Figure 5-5: Potential UXO Contamination in Cambodia

Source (JMAS 2005)
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HMA programs
In 1992 the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) was established by the Royal Government of
Cambodia as a successor of the HMA activities of the United Nations Transitional Authority of
Cambodia (UNTAC). A joint program of CMAC, UNDP, and UNDHA was launched in 1993. The
coordination and regulation of HMA was transferred from CMAC to Cambodian Mine Action Victim
Assistance Authority (CMAA) in 2000. The CMAA was also responsible for integration of HMA into
development plans and strategies. The CMAA was however not appreciated by the donors, due to its
weakness and ineffectiveness. In 2004 Mine Action Planning Units (MAPU; under auspices of the
Provincial MACs) were created in order to prioritize HMA at local level and integrate HMA with
development priorities. MAPUs were funded by UNDP and UNOPS. The Cambodian HMA standards
were finished by CMAA in 2004 (CMAC 1996a, p.1; ICBL 2005a: Cambodia).
Funded programs
With the Dutch contribution to HMA in Cambodia it was the third largest contributor, after Japan
and the U.S. (see Table 5-6). The total ODA provided by the Netherlands to Cambodia was US$ 40,71
million for the period 2000-2004, when HMA was US$ 2,50 million or about 6%. Cambodia was on
the Dutch funding list for democratization, good governance, and human rights, where the removal
of landmines plays an important role. For all donors world wide, the total provided sum was US$
1,89 billion for the period 2001-2004 and HMA counted for US$ 65,8 million or about 3%. Reasons for
this relatively high contribution for HMA by the Netherlands can be the very severe threat that
landmines cause for the development of Cambodia and the IDPs. The communication and
coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the
embassy was asked for advice, control and support (MvBZ 1996; MvBZ 2004c; OECD 2006).
Table 5-6: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Cambodia
Country
Total 1996-2004 (US$)
Share
Australia
8.571.000
5,6%
Canada
9.945.627
6,5%
European Union
9.457.000
6,2%
Finland
12.092.428
7,9%
Germany
7.559.287
4,9%
Japan
51.926.840
33,8%
Netherlands
13.901.174
9,1%
Norway
5.988.793
3,9%
United Kingdom
5.409.076
3,5%
United States
18.241.500
11,9%
Total (all countries)
153.550.561
See Appendix 6 for details.

Ranking
7
5
6
4
8
1
3
9
10
2

The main focus of the programs was mine and ERW clearance, besides mine awareness (see
Appendix 7 for details). Funds were provided to CMAC, first via UNDP and later via NPA, due to
problems at CMAC and problems with the supervision of the UNDP. NPA and HALO Trust also
undertook activities themselves. Activities took place in a.o. Kampong Cham (3), Kratié (11), Svay
Reang (23), Prey Veng (19), Banteay Meanchey (1), Battambang (2), Kampot (7) and Kampong Thom
(6) by CMAC, Oddar Meanchey (13), Banteay Meanchey (1) and Siem Reap (21) provinces by HALO
Trust, and the Banteay Meanchey (1) province by NPA (see Figure 5-6). The Netherlands Ministry of
Defence provided in-kind support from November 1993 until at least the beginning of 1998.
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Source: (Wikipedia 2006a)
Figure 5-6: Map with the provinces of Cambodia

5.3.5 Eritrea
Basic information
The economic growth is the lowest of all countries discussed in this chapter. The HDI is among the
lowest of the world. The growth of the population is quite high. The economic growth is low, 3% or
less. Appendix 5 shows some key basic indicators about Eritrea.
Mine-related history
Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after thirty years of war, led by the Eritrean
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), in which landmines were used by both sides. There was a war
between Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000, where both sides used landmines again, at
least Eritrea confessed (ICBL 1999: Eritrea; ICBL 2000: Eritrea).
The size of the landmine problem
There were many IDPs that used to live in the area that is now the TCZ5, which was contaminated
with landmines. The number of casualties was between 30 and 90 per year (ICBL 2004: Eritrea; ICBL
2005a: Eritrea).
HMA programs
In 2000 the UNMEE Mine Action Coordination Centre was established, which supported the Eritrean
Mine Action Plan (EMAP). The EMAP was one-sided, and without discussion with donors and UNMEE,
replaced by the Eritrean government with the Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA) in 2002. The
international HMA activities in Eritrea were two times taken to a halt by the Eritrean government
and restructured, in July 2002 and in April 2005. After the first time the UN continued operating in
2004, but the second time Eritrea indicated that the help of the UN was not needed anymore.
Equipment was confiscated, and almost all foreign technical advisors were forced by the EDA to
leave the country. An evaluation of the HMA in Eritrea was undertaken. Problems were encountered
with mandates, and peace-keeping in combination with the development of HMA capacity seemed
5

UN Temporary Security Zone, 25 km wide and 1000 km long, between Eritrea and Ethiopia
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not always appreciated by the Eritrean government (GICHD 2005, p.vi, 69-73; ICBL 2003: Eritrea;
ICBL 2004: Eritrea).
Funded programs
The Netherlands has been the large contributor to HMA in Eritrea in the period 1996-2004, counting
for over two-fifth of the total funds (see Table 5-7). The other large contributor was U.S., this
contribution was halve of that of the Netherlands. Eritrea received US$ 61,08 million from the
Netherlands in the period 2000-2004, where HMA counted for US$ 9,75 million, which counted for
about 16%. The Netherlands supported humanitarian aid and peace-building via unilateral channels
and NGOs. Both subjects took advantages of HMA. Official development assistance and official aid
for all donors provided to Eritrea was US$ 1,09 billion in the period 2001-2004, HMA for the same
period was US$ 17,0 million or only about 1,6%. The Netherlands sent troops to Eritrea in 2000
under the UNMEE peace-keeping mission. UNMEE set up the MACC. The Netherlands had a wish for a
more flanking policy to help the refugees and IDPs of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The
presence of landmines was seen as a major threat for their save return, therefore HMA was seen as
an important factor. The communication and coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The
Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked for advice, control and
support (MvBZ 2000c; MvBZ 2006e; OECD 2006).
Table 5-7: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Eritrea
Country
Total 1996-2004 (US$)
Canada
1.607.692
Denmark
2.199.000
European Union
1.551.228
Germany
1.112.826
Italy
114.610
Japan
563.385
Netherlands
9.747.512
Norway
333.333
Switzerland
1.175.500
United States
5.182.000
Total (all countries)
23.686.086
See Appendix 6 for details.

Share
6,8%
9,3%
6,5%
4,7%
0,5%
2,4%
41,2%
1,4%
5,0%
21,9%

Ranking
4
3
5
7
10
8
1
9
6
2

Mine clearance, mine awareness, capacity building and evaluation were the undertaken activities of
the programs that were funded (see Appendix 7 for details). Funds were provided to HALO Trust,
UNDP, and UNMAS/GICHD for the evaluation. The HALO Trust was the largest NGO working on HMA
in Eritrea. The activities took place in the TSZ and adjacent areas in Eritrea. The communication
and coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where
the embassy was asked for advice, control and support (ICBL 2004: Eritrea; MvBZ 2000a).

5.3.6 Laos
Basic information
Laos has a one-party rule as one of the last five communist countries in the world. The UXO
contamination and rapid growth of the population and economy give pressure on the available land,
blocking development and causing poverty. In Appendix 5 there are some key basic indicators on
Laos (IMF/World Bank 2001, p.31).
Mine-related history
Laos gained independence in 1954. A coup d’état was committed by the army in 1959. The
communists (Pathet Lao) started a guerrilla. Laos also suffered from the Vietnam or Indo-Chino War
from 1964 until 1973, with heavy bombings by the U.S. on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The communist
party (renamed in Lao People’s Revolutionary Party) came into power in 1975 and founded the Lao
People’s Democratic Republic (MvBZ 2006f).
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The Americans dropped a large amount of bombs. Two million tons of bombs were dropt in 580.344
bombing missions, which are more bombs than has been dropped on Germany, Italy and Japan
together in WW II. This was the equivalent of a full B52 (31,5 tons), every 8 minutes for 9 years. It
was estimated by experts that an average of 30% of the bombs failed, and became UXO. Bombs
were dropt on infrastructure such as roads, rivers and paths, and as economic repercussion on
valuable areas for farming or settlement. A part of the bombs were not directly meant for Laos, but
were dropped on Laos as remainder after bombing in Vietnam, before returning to airbases in
Thailand. The U.S. still keep the details of some bombs secret. (Lovering 2000; UXO Lao 2003a:
sheet 3 & 4)
The size of the UXO problem
Landmines only count for 4% of the problem. In the most heavily bombed provinces three tons of
bombs per capita were thrown. The most used bomb was the anti-personnel cluster bomb, which
detonates sending high-velocity fragments. The UXO casualty numbers were as follows: over 200
victims per year, some figures claim that 45% of the victims are children (mistaking the bombies6 for
toys), other figures claim that 61% of the victims are men, 23% is boys, 12% is women, and 3% is
girls. Of the accidents 52% is deadly. An area of 87.213 km2 (12.427 km2 high risk, 74.786 km2
moderate risk) was contaminated by UXO, what is about 38% of the country and more than two
times the Netherlands (Government of Lao PDR 1995; HI 1997; Lovering 2000).
Figure 5-7: UXO contamination in Laos

Source: (Sisavath 2006)
HMA programs
In 2001 all HMA activities were nationalized. The primary responsibility for mine and UXO clearance
laid with the national Lao Uxo program (UXO Lao). Until 2004 UXO Lao was also responsible for the
coordination of all mine/UXO action, but that was transferred to the newly established National
Regulatory Authority (NRA). There have been some troubles with the NRA in the beginning. The goal
was to bring mine/UXO action in line with the National Growth and Poverty Eradication Strategy
(NGPES). In the National Strategic Plan of 2003-2013 objectives and priorities were set for the
coming years (ICBL 2005a: Laos).
Funded programs
The Netherlands was one of the medium contributors with a share of 5,8% of the total funds
provided in the period 1996-2004 (see

6

Bombies is the word that the Lao use for the unexploded fragments of the cluster bombs
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Table 5-8). Programs focused on UXO clearance, UXO awareness, and training and capacity building
(see Appendix 7 for details). The funds were channelled through the UNDP towards UXO Lao, which
was the only real option of funding HMA in Laos.
Table 5-8: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Laos
Country
Total 1996-2004 (US$)
Australia
2.528.000
Belgium
2.566.074
Canada
1.418.565
European Union
6.316.000
Finland
1.607.250
Germany
7.008.124
Japan
958.730
Netherlands
2.421.000
Norway
2.731.770
United States
12.321.000
Total (all countries)
42.048.879
See Appendix 6 for details.

Share
6,0%
6,1%
3,4%
15,0%
3,8%
16,7%
2,3%
5,8%
6,5%
29,3%

Ranking
6
5
9
3
8
2
10
7
4
1

For Laos the Netherlands provided US$ 9,96 million of ODA in the period 2000-2004, and US$ 1,85
million of HMA funds, which is about 19%. Funds were also used for sustainable forest management
and human rights programs. The total official development assistance and official aid for Laos for
the period 2001-2004 was US$ 1,09 billion, and total HMA funds were US$ 10,77 million for the same
period, which is about only about 1%. The Dutch funding of HMA is not high compared to other
donors, but the total ODA for Laos is low compared to other donors. The communication and
coordination for the MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the
embassy was asked for advice, control and support (MvBZ 2004b; MvBZ 2006f; OECD 2006).
Activities took mainly place in the provinces of Luang Prabang (8), Xieng Khouang (18), Houaphan
(5), Khammouane (6), Savannakhet (12), Sekong (17), Attapeu (1), and Champassak (4) (see also
Figure 5-8).

Source: (Wikipedia 2006c)
Figure 5-8: Map with the provinces of the Laos where HMA programs were undertaken
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5.3.7 Mozambique
Basic information
Mozambique has a low growth of population in relation with the HDI, if compared to Angola, Eritrea,
and Laos. The HDI is the lowest of the selected countries, and among the lowest of the world. The
economic growth is high, 7-10%. Appendix 5 shows some key basic indicators about Mozambique.
Mine-related history
A guerrilla war was started in 1964 by Frelimo, who used ATMs. The Portuguese decided in 1974 to
hand over power exclusively to Frelimo. Before the independence in 1975, a white exodus removed
Mozambique of its existing civil machinery. Frelimo had a Marxist-Leninist ideology causing widespread resistance, which was fuelled by Renamo. Renamo was backed first by Rhodesia and later by
South Africa, and used landmines on airstrips, for route denial and ambushes. Rhodesia and South
African forces laid landmines in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as did Tanzanian, Malawian, and
Zimbabwean forces on moments. The Frelimo government defensively used landmines along the
borders with Rhodesia and South Africa. Mozambique has been an important place for the South
African ANC for a long time. A rapprochement to South Africa was made by Mozambique in 1984.
Despite the halted support to ANC by Mozambique, South Africa kept on secretly supporting
Renamo. More than 1 million of people died and 5 million became IDPs in the civil war (where the
total population was estimated to be 19,6 million in 2005) which ended in 1992 (ICBL 1999:
Mozambique; Meredith 2006, p.311-312, 426-428, 609-610).
The size of the landmine problem
It was estimated that landmines claimed 50-60 victims per month in 1995. Rates dropped enormous
to 30 casualties for 2004. People enter unfamiliar area because of the need for enlarging farming
land and resettlement (ICBL 1999; ICBL 2005a).
HMA programs
In 1999 the Mozambican MFA set up the National Demining Institute (IND), to replace the low
trusted National Mine Clearance Commission (CND). NGOs and commercial companies were the
executers of the HMA. The target for a mine impact-free country was changed from 2012 to 2009.
After a lobby by the IND and UNDP, HMA became a cross cutting issue in the final version of the
2005 PRSP. Technical survey clearance of high and medium impact areas, and civic education and
support for victim assistance programs became the priorities for the IND in 2005 (ICBL 2005a:
Mozambique; IND 2001).
Funded programs
The Netherlands was the third largest contributor with 11,7% for the period 1996-2004, just after
the U.S. and Norway (Table 5-9). The Netherlands funded US$ 302,18 million of ODA for the period
2000-2004, and US$ 5,48 million of HMA, counting for about 2%. Other funds were used for programs
on education, health, HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation, and poverty alleviation. Especially poverty
alleviation can take advantages of HMA. The total official development assistance and official aid
for Mozambique for the period 2001-2004 was US$ 5,40 billion, where HMA counted for US$ 25,36
million or less than 1%. Mozambique was one of the 36 partner countries of the Netherlands,
therefore Mozambique receives a large amount of funding (MvBZ 2006g; OECD 2006).
Mine clearance (manual, mechanical, and MDD) and capacity building were the core businesses of
the funded programs (see Appendix 7 for details). The funds are mainly received by the HALO Trust
and NPA, who were also the executors, and one mine survey program of Handicap International (HI).
The HALO Trust was seen as an NGO with much experience in Mozambique, and their presence in
the Nampula province was beneficial for other humanitarian programs funded by the Netherlands.
NPA was seen as very well organized and professional. The communication and coordination for the
MFA was mainly done in The Hague at the humanitarian aid division, where the embassy was asked
for advice, control and support (MvBZ 1997b; MvBZ 2000b).
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Table 5-9: Top 10 donors that funded HMA programs in Mozambique
Country
Total 1996-2004 (US$)
Share
Australia
3.492.000
4,3%
Canada
8.257.114
10,2%
Denmark
4.053.475
5,0%
Finland
6.852.300
8,4%
Germany
6.944.968
8,6%
Japan
4.149.153
5,1%
Netherlands
9.456.394
11,7%
Norway
10.718.670
13,2%
Switzerland
4.749.000
5,9%
United States
12.101.999
14,9%
Total (all countries)
81.110.582
See Appendix 6 for details.

Ranking
10
4
9
6
5
8
3
2
7
1

Affected provinces by HMA are Zambezia (11), Niassa (8), Nampula (7) and Cabo Delgado (1) by
HALO Trust, and Tete (10), Manica (4) and Sofala (9) by NPA (see Figure 5-9). In the southern
provinces no HMA activities were undertaken by the programs financed by the Netherlands.

Source: (Wikipedia 2006b)
Figure 5-9: Map with the provinces of Mozambique with HMA programs

5.4 Funding Channels
According to the Dutch Policy Framework for HMA, the following organizations are seen as reliable
partners: the various UN Mine Action Centres, the HALO Trust, Handicap International (HI), the
Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA). Organizations that were funded
were all non-commercial, and not involved with illegal trade of anti-personnel landmines and/or
arms, as was strictly demanded in the policy framework. The other expectation from the framework
were more or less met by the organization, and never violated (see also §2.5.4) (MvBZ 2004e).

5.4.1 Non‐governmental Organizations (NGOs)
In this sub paragraph only the NGOs that were in at least involved in two or more funded programs
are discussed, in alphabetic order. Only Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) was not on the list of the
Dutch HMA policy framework.
HALO Trust
The HALO Trust (Hazardous Area Life-support Organisation Trust) was an American/British NGO,
specialized in the removal of the remnants of war. The HALO Trust undertakes HMA in the following
countries and areas: Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia,
Central African Republic, Chechnya, Croatia, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kosovo, Laos, Lebanon,
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Nagorno Karabakh, Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland), Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Vietnam.
The activities that were provided are mine clearance (manual, mechanical and MDD), mine survey,
mine awareness and mine risk education, local capacity building, casualty evacuation, and medical
training. Donors are governments, Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, UK, Ireland, Japan,
The Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, U.S., other donors include the European Commission,
Fondation Pro Victimis, The Association to Aid Refugees (Japan), Tokyo Broadcasting Services, The
Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, United Nations, and numerous private donators (HALO Trust
2006).
Handicap International
Handicap International (HI) is a French NGO with sections in Belgium, Canada, Germany,
Luxemburg, Switzerland, UK, and U.S. HI is specialized in prevention, rehabilitation, and
(re)integration of the disabled, and does useful work in the field of HMA in developing countries:
provision of support to landmine survivors through orthopaedic and rehabilitation programs;
implementation of mine risk education and humanitarian demining programs; participation in
landmine impact surveys; and advocacy and research. This is done in a.o. Angola, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Cambodia, DR Congo, and Mozambique. Donors are for a large share public, from IGOs,
Australia, Belgium, EU, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, The Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, U.S.,
and the rest private (a.o. the Dutch NGO Stichting Vluchteling) (HI 2005; HI 2006a; HI 2006b).
Menschen gegen Minen
Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) is a German NGO, founded in January 1996. Mine clearance (manual,
mechanical, and MDD) is the only activity, which takes place in Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia.
Donors are public, E.U., WFP, Germany, The Netherlands and U.S., and private (MgM 2006).
Mine Advisory Group
The Mine Advisory Group (MAG) is a British NGO, and has the following HMA activities: mine risk
education, mine clearance, explosive ordnance disposal, mine & explosive detection dogs, peace
building, and community liaison. Activities are undertaken in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad,
Cyprus, DR Congo, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Vietnam, and in the past in Azerbaijan,
Kosovo and Somaliland. The donor are a.o. Australia, U.S. (MAG 2006a, p.2-11; MAG 2006b).
Norwegian People’s Aid
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA; Norsk Folkehjelp) is a Norwegian NGO, known for its rights-based
approach. The NPA has also activities besides HMA activities. NPA has activities with regard to
partnership policy, landmines, land and resource rights, indigenous people, democratic rights,
violence against women, and HIV/AIDS. The HMA activities are mine survey, mine clearance, and
mine risk education. Affected countries are Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia,
Ethiopia, Iran, Laos, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Mozambique, Northern Iraq and Sudan. Public sources
count for about 90% of the funds, 45% by Norway (via NORAD), the rest by UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF,
EU, and the governments of Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden and U.S. (Bottomley 2005, p.3, 7; NPA
2006).

5.4.2 International Organizations
International Committee of Red Cross
The International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) is an international umbrella organization with
national based sections. The HMA activities were HMA in general, mine clearance, mine risk
education, and landmine stockpile destruction. The focus is on preventive HMA operations since
2005, not primarily on awareness anymore. The countries that are affected by ICRC activities are
nearly all mine and/or UXO contaminated countries in the world. Activities are mine clearance
(indirectly) and mine risk education through National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in 25
countries around the world. Donors are many national governments, E.U., WHO, WFP, UN, (I)NGOs,
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a few Swiss cantons and municipalities, individual donations, and in-kind contributions (ICRC 2004,
p.378-385; ICRC 2006a; ICRC 2006b).
United Nations
Several departments and missions of the UN are involved in HMA. Most important are:
− UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA; reorganized into OCHA in 1998);
− United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA);
− United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), taking care of several Trust Funds, for the
channelling of funds;
− United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the main responsible for HMA in the UN
organization and the coordinator of HMA world wide (see also §2.4.2). Afghanistan, Burundi,
Cyprus, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kosovo (Serbia), Lebanon and Sudan are directly supported
by UNMAS (UNMAS 2005, p.19);
− United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), for landmine awareness;
− World Food Programme (WFP). Aid programs are obstructed by the presence of landmines.
The UN makes annual portfolios on HMA programs worldwide, and annual appeals for certain
countries (e.g. Afghanistan, and Bosnia and Herzegovina) for a broad range of humanitarian
programs. The influence that donors can put on the programs of their interest is not strong,
compared to programs at NGOs.

5.5 Available Information
The archives and accounting systems contain dossiers and files about the funded programs. The
dossiers contain at least the following documents:
− A work plan, appeal or proposal from the NGOs, UN, and MACs, with information about
objectives, targets, planned activities, duration, budget etc.;
− A policy memorandum (beoordelingsmemorandum), made by the responsible civil servant at the
MFA;
− Progress reports and final reports with achievements and indicators.

5.6 Conclusions
The funded programs were mainly in line with the Dutch HMA policy priorities. Mine/ERW clearance
and institution/capacity building have been massively undertaken, and many programs were funded
for a couple of years. Mine clearance was often done manually, although also mechanical devices
and MDD were used in several programs. The Netherlands funded HMA programs in 20 countries
during the period 1996-2004. Some findings that are not in line with the Dutch priorities are:
− Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iraq, Laos and Somalia did not signed the Ottawa Treaty yet, nor did
Azerbaijan, Iraq and Somalia ratified (the original or amended Protocol II of) the CCW;
− With Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, DR Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kosovo, Laos, Somalia,
Sudan and Yemen, the Netherlands had no bilateral aid relation.
The funded programs in the selected countries (Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Cambodia, Eritrea, Laos, and Mozambique) contained mine and ERW clearance (manual,
mechanical, and MDD), mine and ERW clearance training, mine and ERW awareness, mine
information, mine identification, mine survey, mine marking, institution and capacity building,
victim assistance and social rehabilitation, evaluation, monitoring, and logistics. Funds were
provided to DHA, HALO Trust, HI, ICRC, MgM, NPA, OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF, UNMAS, and WFP. HMA
activities have been carried out by BHMAC, CMAC, HALO Trust, HI, ICRC, MACA, MgM, NPA, UNICEF,
UNMAS/GICHD, UXO Lao, UNOPS, and WFP. The Netherlands Ministry of Defence provided in-kind
support in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Eritrea (sub question 1).
Table 5-10 gives the Dutch funding for the period 1996-2004 per recipient country, the share of this
funding for all the HMA funds in the recipient country and the ranking, and the share of the Dutch
HMA funding compared to the total Dutch ODA funding in the recipient country. There was a (though
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not very strong) relation of being a partner country and HMA being a small share of the ODA, except
for Eritrea. Eritrea was a partner country, but HMA is an important share of the ODA (16%), which
means that there are less funds for activities besides HMA compared to the other countries (2-3% is
HMA there). For Angola and Cambodia too there was relatively much money spent on other
activities, although they were not a partner country.
Table 5-10: Qualitative comparison of the recipient countries
Official
Share NL of
Dutch funding
Recipient
partner aid
total HMA
1996-2004
country
relation
donor funds
(US$)
(‘36’)
1996-2004
Afghanistan*
16.437.779
yes
5,5%
Angola
19.916.200
no
15,9%
Bosnia and
6.528.745
yes
4,6%
Herzegovina*
Cambodia
13.901.174
no
9,1%
Eritrea*
9.747.512
yes
41,2%
Laos
2.421.000
no
5,8%
Mozambique*
9.456.394
yes
11,7%
Total
78.408.804
* partner country

Ranking of
total HMA
funds 19962004
6
2

Share HMA of
total Dutch
ODA 20002004
3%
6%

8

2%

3
1
7
3

6%
16%
19%
2%

In Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Laos the Netherlands was a medium contributor, in
Angola (huge humanitarian problems and solving problems with delivering of humanitarian aid),
Cambodia and Mozambique (partner country of the Netherlands) the Netherlands was among the
largest and in Eritrea (flanking policy to help the refugees and IDPs) the Netherlands was the largest
of all. The Netherlands spent a relatively large share of its ODA to HMA in Eritrea and Laos
(relatively low funding besides HMA). Other large contributors (where the Netherlands was among
the largest) were the U.S. for Angola, Japan and the U.S. for Cambodia, U.S. for Eritrea, and U.S.
and Norway for Mozambique. Overall, the U.S. was the largest contributor of HMA, but this country
was also involved in many of the mine/ERW-related conflicts in the selected countries. The Dutch
funding was not stable at all over there years, but this is also the case for other donors (sub
question 2).
The accounting system of the MFA gives information about which programs were funded, what the
HMA activities of the program were, and what the payments were. For every funded program, a
work plan/appeal/proposal, memorandum of judgment, and a progress and/or final report exists
(sub question 3).
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6 Embeddedness of HMA
6.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the embeddedness of HMA into a broader framework for sustainable
development. The definition of embeddedness is given in §3.3.2. The basis of the information comes
for a major share from the programs, because this was the only source with enough information and
easy access. Also the PRSPs of countries, if existent, are discussed. The difficulty with the PRSPs
was that they are quite recent, so their information is not always about (at least a part of) the
period 1996-2004.
It was not possible to make two clear separated groups, one of programs without embeddedness,
and another with clear embeddedness. It would have been interesting to compare those two groups
and test the hypothesis that programs with embeddedness do perform better. Every program had
more of less a degree of embeddedness, and it was difficult to assess the exact social benefits of
embeddedness. Therefore it is chosen to assess how embeddedness works in practice. The criteria
are applied to the programs, but with emphasize on the embeddedness of the programs.
This chapter will provide the answers on the sub questions 4-9.
4. What was the role of the Netherlands as a donor (descriptive)?
5. Were the HMA programs embedded in a broader framework for sustainable development
(descriptive)?
6. To which extend and in which way was it embedded (descriptive)?
7. What were the goals, circumstances and conditions, instruments and resources of the programs
that are embedded (descriptive)?
8. How are those programs to be valued in terms of relevance/appropriateness, connectedness,
coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact, taken into the account the
circumstances, instruments and resources (evaluative)?
9. What were the good and what are the bad practices (evaluative)?
For every country, if relevant, in §6.3-6.9 are applied:
− Development policies of the recipient country are assessed on HMA issues, mostly this is the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia,
Eritrea, Laos and Mozambique have made an (I)PRSP-like document until now. It should be
noted that most documents are quite recent, so newly proposed strategies did not always affect
the period 1996-2004;
− The funded programs with emphasize on broader development. Not all programs of §0 could be
discussed due to lacking information;
− Achievements of the funded programs;
− How are those programs to be valued, with regard to the criteria relevance/appropriateness,
connectedness, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact. This is done by the
use of the ALNAP (2006) guide for evaluating HMA using the OECD-DAC criteria and the OECDDAC (2002) “Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management”.

6.2 Embeddedness in Donors’ HMA policies
The Netherlands is of course discussed in this paragraph. Denmark, the European Union and Sweden
see HMA as very important too (see Table 2-2), and those countries have widely available
information on their HMA policy.
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6.2.1 The Netherlands
As already stated in §2.5.2, embeddedness of HMA into a broader framework for sustainable
development was not seen as top-priority, but coherence with existing plans for the socioeconomic
rehabilitation of the post-conflict community was requested.
In 2003, the new macro policy on development cooperation was formulated under the name “Aan
elkaar verplicht, Ontwikkelingssamenwerking op weg naar 2015”, by the Minister of Development
Cooperation Agnes van Ardenne-van der Hoeven. HMA was not mentioned in this policy report.
Indirectly HMA can be brought in relation with several issues of the policy (TK 29 234 V 2003-2004,
p.9-10, 24-25):
− Integrated foreign policy. The Stability Fund was found recently, which objective is fast and
flexible support of activities on the intersection of peace, security and development. Examples
are support to peace processes and dialogues (conflict prevention), reintegration of
combatants, destruction of small arms, and sending of Dutch experts;
− Coherence in development policies;
− Poverty alleviation and sustainable development. The economic and social aspect are definitely
incorporated in HMA, the environmental aspect is quite neutral;
− The PRSPs and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) are seen as important guidelines.

6.2.2 Denmark
The Danish policy paper on HMA formulated in 2001 was far more detailed than the official Dutch
HMA policy. The paper had not a specific emphasize on embeddedness though. Nevertheless
attention was given in some other subjects (Danida 2001b, p.19-22):
− Concerning general objectives, HMA activities will be where the most acute need is for
humanitarian assistance, and geographically where there are possibilities for synergy with other
Danish activities. For new activities in-depth socio-economic analyses have to be done, in order
to identify priority areas with highest cost-effectiveness and greatest benefit to the local
population;
− Great importance is put on partnership with the recipient countries, and planning of HMA with
national priorities;
− Cooperation with local actors with long-term involvement: where economic, environmental and
development plans exist in a certain area, and where established developmental priorities for
cleared land in cooperation with the recipient country exist. Both are seen as necessary;
− Bilateral sector programs can be used in countries where landmines pose a serious barrier to
development;
− When landmines cause serious environmental problems the Environment, Peace and Stability
(MIfresta) budget can be used for HMA;
− Under the subjects cooperation, quality and effectiveness there is nothing found related to
embeddedness.
The relevance of HMA for the local population is without any doubt, but as the policy paper says:
“The problem here is that immediately measurable results, e.g. the number of mines or the extent
of the area cleared, are not in themselves an indication of the usefulness of the activities for the
local population.” (Danida 2001b, p.14).

6.2.3 European Union
Also the EU HMA policy paper is more detailed than the Dutch one. The paper states that a broad
range of humanitarian, economic, developmental, technical, legal, social and political instruments
is required. A broad strategy takes into account the local populations in the context, the most
pressing and immediate needs in full coherence with a long term approach. There are specific
priorities on embeddedness (European Commission 2004, p.18, 22, 23):
− In moderately to lightly affected countries/territories socioeconomic development needs to be
fully integrated into national development programs;
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Long term sustainability and coherence with wider assistance program are requested, i.e. HMA
should form part of long term, sustainable solutions to the local landmine problems, coherence
with national HMA frameworks, and integration into wider long term geographic and horizontal
socio-economic development and rehabilitation programs.

6.2.4 Sweden
Sida concluded in the 2002 policy paper on HMA that in the 1990s HMA was developing into a new
responsibility for the donor community. A small number of specialists implemented the programs,
isolated from other forms of development cooperation. Sida defined the mine issue as a
rehabilitation and development problem after a conflict. Embeddedness was an important issue in
the policy paper. Priorities concerning embeddedness were (Sida 2002, p.1-6):
− Integration of the HMA programs in all other development cooperation activities in the partner
country;
− Integration of the HMA programs in existing national structures and development plans as far as
possible;
− The coordination function has to be secured for the integration of HMA programs with other
activities. This is both about coordination between parties within the HMA sector and
coordination between HMA and other sectors within development cooperation;
− Focus lies on integrating HMA with other development cooperation programs. HMA is seen as a
method to eliminate a serious obstacle to development.

6.2.5 Millennium Development Goals
The development cooperation policy of many donors is directly linked to the Millenium Development
Goals (MDG) (TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.3). HMA itself is not part of a MDG. But HMA can directly and
indirectly be linked to several MDGs:
MDG 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger: The contamination of landmines and UXO blocks
access to agricultural areas, which lowers the possibilities to raise crops. Also access to
nearby markets can be blocked, thus no food can be bought, or commodities can not be sold
to raise income and escape poverty;
MDG 2. Achieve universal primary education: Access to school buildings can be blocked by
landmines and UXO, which hampers education;
MDG 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases: HMA personnel can spread the HIV virus, this
needs special attention;
MDG 7. Ensure environmental sustainability: The HMA procedures have to be designed as
environmental friendly as possible. Development programs, followed after de-mining has
taken place, need to contain the principles of sustainable development. Access to drink
water can improve after removal of landmines and UXO from water wells and pumps;

6.3 Afghanistan
The Netherlands had an intensive aid relation with Afghanistan. Afghanistan is one of the 36 partner
countries for development cooperation. The priorities of the Netherlands in humanitarian and
development aid were put on the repatriation of refugees and IDPs (in conjunction with Denmark
and the UK), channelling funds through multilateral channels, and humanitarian aid through the UN
and ICRC (Danida 2005, p.1-2; TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.32).

6.3.1 Development policy
The only important document on development is the 2006 Interim Afghanistan National
Development Strategy (I-ANDS), which is published after the period 1996-2004 and is therefore not
relevant for this research.
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6.3.2 The HMA Programs
HALO Trust
The WW165531 program for 2000/2001 by HALO Trust aimed at clearing residential and agricultural
areas. Farming is essential for the local population and the sustainable return of refugees and IDPs.
The post-9/11 events had a very negative effect on the HMA activities. Land that was cleared was
put to productive use (HALO Trust 2000b; HALO Trust 2002c, p.4-5).
UNOCHA
The AF006301 program for 1997 and WW135107 program for 1998 were part of broader program of
UNOCHA. The HMA was undertaken to improve the delivery of humanitarian aid and the process of
urban and rural rehabilitation and development. This was done to be supportive to other
international agencies, NGOs, and local communities working on the repatriation of displaced
persons, provision of food security poverty eradication, and poppy eradication. Immediate socioeconomic benefits for the local population were seen as important. The mine clearance activities
were undertaken in agricultural fields, roads, residential and commercial areas, irrigation canals
and grazing areas. There were many troubles is in 1998 with humanitarian aid programs, due to a.o.
restrictions posed by the Taliban authorities and an earthquake. Though the HMA achievements
were mainly above target (UNOCHA 1998, p.1, 11, 13; UNOCHA 1999, p.5-8, 13).
The WW152709 program for 1999 was the successor of the previous programs. Mine awareness was
linked here with the return of refugees (UNHCR), the health sector (WHO, ICRC and medical NGOs),
the education sector (variety of NGOs) and other activities ran by the UN and other organizations.
This program was funded in combination with six other humanitarian programs for Afghanistan
(MvBZ 1999a).
The WW165511 (for 2000) and WW185802/WW185518 (for 2001/2002) programs were again
successors, and again part of multiple programs for Afghanistan co-financed by the Netherlands.
The overall objectives of this combination of programs were relief of human suffering, improvement
of the human rights situation, provision of elementary social facilities, empowerment for the
creation of fundamental resources, and support for the return of refugees. The latter program was
hindered by the post-9/11 events, which caused a.o. stolen and destroyed equipment. Socioeconomic pressure occurred on all sources of land and infrastructure. More funds were used for
emergency clearing (MAPA 2003; MvBZ 2002, p.8-9).
The 6411 (2003) and 9768 (2004) programs were successor under the control of UNMAS, again from a
portfolio. The programs were undertaken after a 2002 initiated new strategy in order to accelerate
the mine and UXO clearance. The 2003 Progress Report argued that HMA facilitates agriculture,
household food security, farming and grazing, post-conflict reconstruction effort, and access to
education and healthcare. The use of demobilized soldiers as de-miners was beneficiary to the
peace-building process. HMA was associated with almost every ministry in Afghanistan, and
effective inter-ministerial consultation and cooperation was necessary (Kenny 2004, p.4; MAPA
2004, p.8, 18-19; MvBZ 2003a).
The Study of the Socio-economic Impact of Mine Action in Afghanistan (SIMAA) estimated the net
socio-economic benefits of the 1999 MAPA mine clearance about US$ 40 million at a cost of about 28
million. A Danida/DFID assessment in 2002 of MACA and MAPA stated that “MACA is well integrated
to UN agencies working in HMA, in particular UNHCR. Links to other agencies and development
NGOs are less well developed, though this must change as Afghanistan moves from emergency to the
development phase. There is currently minimal integration of strategic planning.” (Baric
(Consultants) Ltd 2003, p.2; World Bank/UNDP 2001, p.58-62).
The programs in Afghanistan were to a large extent embedded in a broader UN program for
humanitarian assistance, in order to improve aid delivery, rehabilitation, repatriation, and
development. The situation in Afghanistan deteriorated due to restriction by the Taliban
authorities, an earthquake, and the US-led invasion.
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6.3.3 Achievements
In programs co-funded by the Netherlands during the period 1996-2004, a huge amount of square
meters (according to the data over 690 km2 or about 100.000 football fields), landmines and UXO
were cleared (over four million pieces), and area surveyed (723 km2) and marked (68 km2 or about
10.000 football fields). Mine awareness and education reached over 9 million persons. As far as
could have been reconstructed, the achievements were often exceeded the prior set targets (see
Appendix 8). The OCHA programs were for about 4-16% co-financed by the Netherlands. There were
no indicators on achievements concerning embeddedness.

6.3.4 Value
Relevance/appropriateness: The HALO Trust tried to get its operations in line with the needs of the
local population. The operations funded via UNOCHA had a focus on the immediate socio-economic
benefits for the local population. Large areas were cleared and can now safely be used by the
population. The operations were also well in line with the Dutch donor policy. Emphasize was
placed on mine clearance and institution building, and a clear embeddedness into broader
humanitarian and development framework stimulated by UN agencies. Ownership, accountability,
and cost-effectiveness were not especially emphasized. Overcoming the landmine and UXO problem
was seen as an enormous undertaking and was a part of the National Security Policy.
Connectedness: Both relief and recovery were relevant here. The clearance of residential,
commercial and agricultural areas, and (social) infrastructure made that in the future landmines
can no longer cause a threat to the population, and delivery of humanitarian assistance. It removed
a barrier for sustainable (post-conflict) development, and returning IDPs and refugees. The existing
UN presence and structures stimulated the connectedness. Capacity was not specifically build on
the local level, and there was still a high dependency on donors and UN agencies.
Coherence: The humanitarian considerations of HMA were without any doubt, as were the human
rights considerations (e.g. safe repatriation of refugees/IDPs, removing the serious threat of getting
disabled, peace-building). This counts for every country and will not be repeated in the next
paragraphs. The invasion of the US-led coalition negatively influenced coherence, but might have a
positive effect in the long-term. The integrated appeals of UN agencies make that coherence were
more easily carried out. Links to other agencies and development NGOs were said to be less well
developed.
Coverage: Afghanistan was the second largest receiver of Dutch HMA funds, and for worldwide funds
the largest receiver for the period 1996-2004. This was legitimate when taking into account the
magnitude of the problem. HMA was undertaken in nearly all provinces, due to the fact that mine
and UXO contamination exist throughout the country. There was not much information on the exact
local impact. There was no evidence suggesting that some groups were left out or neglected of HMA
or development programs. Both refugees and IDPs were positively affected by the program.
Efficiency: Only the economic efficiency of the HMA can be assessed here. The cost of clearance per
m2 was calculated by MACA to be about US$ 0,60 which is very low compared to other countries.
This number was brought down during several years and became stable. This was due to a strong
organization of HMA. The efficiency on embeddedness is very difficult to assess, firstly due to lack
of information. The net socio-economic benefits of the 1999 MAPA mine clearance were estimated
to be about US$ 40 million at a cost of about 28 million. A good survey made that priority-setting
and mine clearance with a great socio-economic impact went considerably smooth (Kjellman,
Harpviken, Millard et al. 2003, p.863).
Effectiveness: Often the direct HMA achievements were exceeding the targets, due to good survey
information and strong organization. The achievement of other and indirect (socio-economic)
objectives were more difficult to measure. The post-9/11 events had a negative influence on the
effectiveness of the program in 2001 and 2002. Coordination was the core-business of MACA (and
the UN), both intra and cross sectional, in order to increase effectiveness.
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Impact: HMA and development programs stimulated the safe and sustainable return of refugees and
IDPs. They stimulated renewed development opportunities in order to get an increase the socioeconomic situation of the population and level of human rights, and a decrease of dependency on
aid. The post-9/11 events had a (temporal?) negative impact. A study estimated that socioeconomic benefits outweighed costs.

6.4 Angola
Angola was not one of the partner 36 countries for development cooperation. First local
organizations were funded, but those organizations were weak and the government was unreliable.
Therefore international NGOs were funded later. Emphasize was laid on clearance, and the
humanitarian relevance was taking into account (MvBZ 1999b, p.2; TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.32). No
documents on a development policy by the government of Angola could be found.

6.4.1 The HMA Programs
MgM
The AO006803 program emphasized the safe return of IDPs, and stimulation of resettlement and
cultivation of arable land by clearance of roads, bridges, water wells etc. It also stated the
enablement for implementation of administrative structures by the government and NGOs. It was
reported that the MgM mine clearance activities were not always followed by infrastructural
projects in order to make the road accessibility sustainable. The WW152705 program was the
successor and was also aiming at enabling private transport and trade. Despite a from time to time
less stable environment caused by the temporal up rise of the civil war, the mine clearance
activities had a very positive effect, a.o. the safe return of about 50.000 IDPs. Via MgM, in
cooperation with Johanniter International, also basic medical equipment was provided. Expertise of
(supporting) staff of de-miners is educated to local young people (MgM 1997, p.7-9; MgM 1998, p.4;
MgM 1999a, p.2; MgM 1999b; MvBZ 1997a; MvBZ 1999b).
NPA
The AO005904 program and the 1997/1998 AO006802 program for the establishment of a MDDcapacity were undertaken to clear mines on request of development NGOs. Refugee repatriation
and emergency relief work was obstructed by the presence of landmines. NPA cleared roads and
bridges to facilitate reconstruction work. Agricultural area, schools, hospitals, water wells and the
surroundings of population concentrations were cleared for development, in order to achieve
independence from external aid delivery and to establish a strengthen the local infrastructure. The
AO006801 mine survey program provided useful information for supporting the clearance. The
WW135102 program for 1998 was a survey in order to support priority setting of most necessary,
efficient en effective clearance in social and economic terms. Continued was with the WW152703
and WW152704 programs, both for 1999. Agricultural areas and grazing land, resettlement for IDPs,
a landing strip, water sources, and secondary roads were cleared. WW165518 program for 2000
delivered socio-economic benefits to about 21.000 people, especially women, by providing them
access to agricultural land, grazing area and schools, drinking water supply, and suitable
accommodation. Mine clearance priorities were set in participation with local authorities and
humanitarian organizations. The WW185801 program for 2001 mentions that NPA cooperates with
about 20 partner organizations, clearing bridges, roads, airports, agricultural, grazing land, paths
and secondary roads, residential homes and urban communal areas. Demining was undertaken for
providing access for the humanitarian support of WFP to a camp of 17.600 IDPs. Almost 32.000 local
residents and IDPs were able to resume agricultural activities, coal production, reconstruction of
infrastructure and business, in order to become self-sufficient, which is often still difficult. For the
4423 program for 2003, NPA stated that demining will facilitate the development of the local and
regional economy, popular movement and political engagement, which causes stability. Also
HIV/AIDS and gender awareness was seen as important (MvBZ 1998a; MvBZ 1999b, p.1; NPA 1996;
NPA 1997a, p.4; NPA 1998a, p.4; NPA 1998b, p.8; NPA 1999a, p.8; NPA 2000c, p.4, 8-10; NPA 2000e,
p.4, 6; NPA 2001b, p.4, 8, 13-14; NPA 2002b, p.6-9; NPA 2002c).
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UNICEF
The AO005903 mine awareness program incorporated the training of teachers for primary education,
thereby also contributing to the overall education system of Angola (UNICEF 1998, p.12).
WFP
The AO005906 program was in cooperation with CMAO and INAROEE, executed by HALO Trust and
NPA. The program is quite similar to the NPA’s AO005904 program: rehabilitation of roads and
bridges, return and resettlement of IDPs, access to basic services, humanitarian assistance, and
provision of food aid are the objectives. Good results were reported: at least 15.000 IDPs returned
and started agricultural production, due to MgM activities. WFP was working together with
Swedrelief (bridge construction and road rehabilitation), NPA, and Santa Barbara Foundation
(bridges and spot tasks). The succeeding program WW165516 in 2000 was undertaken by MgM. A
social impact study concluded that cleared roads are suffering from the strain of vehicles and an
extended wet season, making it difficult for the local population to reach the market, deforestation
caused problems with coffee crops, and medical support collapsed after the de-miners left. Due to
the politico-military situation, it made no sense to de-mine in order to let IDPs return, so other
priorities were set (MgM 2000, p.2.0-3.2, 4.2; NPA 1999b, p.4; WFP 1998, p.3; WFP 2000; WFP n/a).

6.4.2 Achievements
A considerable area was cleared by the programs that were funded by the Netherlands, mainly
bilateral. Area was cleared (8,0 km2, or over 1.100 football fields) of landmines and UXO (over
150.000 pieces), surveyed (1.000 km), verified (2,4 km2, or about 350 football fields), and at least
333.000 persons were positively affected by the programs (see Appendix 8). A few data shows that
target were accomplished for only about 70-80%.

6.4.3 Value
Relevance/appropriateness: The programs heavily emphasized on the safe return of IDPs,
emergency relief work, and development of the local population, especially women, and
administration. Mine clearance priorities were set in participation with local authorities and
humanitarian organizations. Large areas and roads were cleared and can now safely be used by the
population. The operations were partly in line with the Dutch donor policy: emphasize was placed
on mine clearance, but not on institution building. Cost-effectiveness was achieved by priority
setting of most necessary, efficient and effective clearance in social and economic terms.
Connectedness: Both relief and recovery were relevant. The clearance of agricultural area, roads,
bridges and social infrastructure, and rehabilitation of roads and bridges had a very positive effect
on the return and resettlement of IDPs, access to basic services, humanitarian assistance, and
provision of food aid. No long-term national capacity was built. Close cooperation existed between
WFP and NPA/MgM, and MgM and NPA with other development NGOs.
Coherence: There was a very close cooperation between WFP and NPA and MgM, and WFP, MgM and
NPA with other development NGOs.
Coverage: Angola was the largest receiver of Dutch HMA funds for the period 1996-2004, and one of
the greater receivers worldwide. HMA was undertaken in nearly all provinces, due to the fact that
mine contamination exists throughout the country. There was evidence of a positive impact on local
level. There was an emphasize on HIV/AIDS and gender awareness. Both refugees and IDPs were
positively affected by the program.
Efficiency: The cost of clearance per m2 was calculated by MgM to be about US$ 1,55. Mine
clearance activities were not always followed by infrastructural projects in order to make the road
accessibility sustainable, so multiplier effects were not always reached. A survey was undertaken by
NPA in order to make socio-economic priority-setting possible.
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Effectiveness: A few data show that target were accomplished for only about 70-80%. Coordination
went though WFP, both intra and cross sectional, in order to increase effectiveness. A social impact
study concluded that cleared roads are suffering from the strain of vehicles and an extended wet
season, making it difficult for the local population to reach the market, deforestation caused
problems with coffee crops, and that medical support collapsed after the de-miners left. The
instability that occurred from time to time, had a negative effect on the effectiveness of the
programs, and disturbs the development of the population.
Impact: HMA and development programs stimulated the safe and sustainable return of refugees and
IDPs, and renewed development opportunities in order to get an increase the socio-economic
situation of the population and level of human rights. The unstable politico-military situation had a
negative impact. A social impact study concluded some severe negative impacts.

6.5 Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the 36 partner countries of the Netherlands in development
cooperation since 2003 (TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.32).

6.5.1 Development policy
The Bosnia and Herzegovina PRSP was published in 2004, thus it does not cover much of the period
1996-2004. The three goals were: create conditions for sustainable and balanced economic
development; reduce poverty; and accelerate EU integrations. HMA is not an important issues in the
paper, despite the fact that 4,2% of the country’s area is still inaccessible due to the landmines.
The landmine and UXO threat was linked with IDPs, health sector (injuries), agricultural sector, and
the forestry sector (rehabilitation) (IMF 2004a, p.10, 158, 174, 193, 196, 251-253).
The following problems for the current operations were identified (IMF 2004a, p.251-252, quoted):
1. Gap between real needs of BiH and limited resources;
2. Weak cooperation with other sectors in vertical and horizontal line;
3. Weak response of authorities at all levels of administration;
4. Financial problems.
HMA is a factor in the development policy, but does not have high priority. HMA fits in the first two
goals of the PRSP.

6.5.2 The HMA Programs
DHA/UNDP
The BA007101 (1997), the WW135106 (1998), the WW152707 (1999-2002), the WW185811 (20012003), and the 9685 (2004) programs were undertaken to let refugees and IDPs return and for
reconstruction. DHA provided coordination support with humanitarian programs, within a broader
UN program (known as post Dayton programs) for social-economic development on the long term,
emergency aid, and peace building and reconciliation. The Netherlands also funded some of the
other programs. It was underscored that HMA could be an important factor in rehabilitation and
redevelopment of the population. Activities were a.o. the clearance of houses for returning
refugees and IDPs, and land for agriculture reconstruction and development activities. The 2004
Integrated Mine Action Programme (IMAP) of UNDP focused particularly on the restoration of socioeconomic activities, and embeddedness of HMA in the PRSP (ICRC/UNHCR 1997, p.5-6; MvBZ 1998b;
MvBZ 1999c; MvBZ 2001c; MvBZ 2004a; UN 1996, p.41-42; UNDP 2001; UNDP 2004, p.4-5).

6.5.3 Achievements
In Bosnia and Herzegovina a huge area was cleared, due to significant contributions of the
Netherlands during at least the period 1996-2004. The cost-effectiveness of mine clearance differed
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between US$1,33 and US$ 1,93 depending on the type of HMA organization (see Appendix 8).
Massive surveys (573 km2 or over 1% of Bosnia and Herzegovina) were undertaken in order to reduce
suspected area, and area (21,6 km2 or over 3.000 football fields) was cleared of landmines and UXO
(over 62.000 pieces).

6.5.4 Value
Relevance/appropriateness: The entities used to have their own MAC. The operations were also well
in line with the Dutch donor policy: emphasize was placed on mine clearance and institution
building, and a clear embeddedness into broader humanitarian and development framework
stimulated by UN agencies. The cost-effectiveness of mine clearance differed between US$ 1,33 and
US$ 1,93 depending on the type of HMA organization. HMA was one of the issues in the PRSP, in
combination with IDPs, injuries from landmines and UXO, agriculture, and forest rehabilitation.
Connectedness: Both relief and recovery were relevant here. The clearance of residential,
commercial and agricultural areas, and (social) infrastructure made that in the future landmines
can no longer cause a threat to the population, and delivery of humanitarian assistance, and
removed a barrier for sustainable (post-conflict) development, and returning IDPs and refugees. The
existing UN presence and structures stimulat the connectedness. Capacity was not specifically build
on the local level, and there is still a high dependency on donors and UN agencies. The IMAP focused
particularly on the restoration of socio-economic activities, and embeddedness of HMA in the PRSP.
Coherence: The entities used to have their own MACs, and the entity armies were used for mine
clearance. Cooperation was the responsibility of the BHMAC. The humanitarian considerations of
HMA were without any doubt, as are the human rights considerations (e.g. safe repatriation of
refugees/IDPs, removing the serious threat of getting disabled, peace-building). The PRSP identified
weak cooperation with other sectors in vertical and horizontal line, and weak response of
authorities at all levels of administration. The integrated appeals of UN agencies made that
coherence should be more easily carried out.
Coverage: HMA was undertaken in both entities. There was no information on the exact local
impact. There was no evidence suggesting that some (ethnic) groups were left out or neglected of
HMA or development programs. Both refugees and IDPs were positively affected by the program.
Efficiency: The cost-effectiveness of mine clearance differed depending on the type of HMA
organization. Massive surveys were undertaken in order to reduce suspected area, which greatly
increased efficiency. Due to lacking information, few can be said about the efficiency of
embeddedness.
Effectiveness: There was a gap between real needs of BiH and limited resources. Massive surveys
were undertaken in order to reduce suspected area. The achievements of other and indirect (socioeconomic) objectives were more difficult to measure. Intra sectional coordination was the corebusiness of BHMAC, UN coordinates cross sectional coordination.
Impact: HMA and development programs stimulated the safe and sustainable return of refugees and
IDPs, and renewed development opportunities in order to get an increase the socio-economic
situation of the population and level of human rights, and a decrease of dependency on aid.

6.6 Cambodia
Cambodia was not among the 36 partner countries for development cooperation (TK 29 234 V 20032004, p.32).

6.6.1 Development policy
Cambodia published an IPRSP in 2000, a PRSP in 2002, and a PRSP Progress Report. In the IPRSP the
presence of landmines was identified as one of the factors for poverty, disability and insecurity.
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Mine clearance was seen as top priority of the national policy in improving security. Important HMA
activities were the clearance of agricultural areas, awareness, mine disposal training, and increased
victim assistance (Royal Government of Cambodia 2000, p.9, 11, 33, 35).
After the 1998 elections, the new Prime Minister Hun Sen launched “The Triangle Strategy” for the
sustainable development of Cambodia (Kingdom of Cambodia 2002, p.ii; quoted):
− The building of peace, stability and security;
− Cambodia’s full integration into regional and international relations; and
− The promotion of economic and social development through the implementation of various
reform programmes within the environment created by these policies.
The priority poverty reduction actions in the PRSP were (Kingdom of Cambodia 2002, p.iv; quoted):
− maintaining macroeconomic stability;
− improving rural livelihoods;
− expanding job opportunities;
− improving capabilities;
− strengthening institutions and improving governance;
− reducing vulnerability and strengthening social inclusion;
− promoting gender equity;
− priority focus on population.
In the PRSP the landmine and UXO contamination was seen as one of the factors for vulnerability of
people, which can cause poverty: discussed were that the people living in contaminated areas are
vulnerable, the obstruction of landmines and vulnerability of people living in rural areas, the
disabled due to mine/UXO-related accidents, and the return of IDPs to contaminated areas. The
HMA activities to be undertaken were mine and UXO clearance, awareness education and victim
assistance. The estimated costs were about US$ 30 million annually, in order to clear about 30
million m2 (over 4.000 football fields) annually (Kingdom of Cambodia 2002, p.26, 29, 31, 41, 122).
Priorities in HMA, in order to reduce poverty, were (Kingdom of Cambodia 2002, p.123, quoted):
1. reducing the number of casualties which have negative economic consequences on affected
families;
2. providing access for the worst-affected communities to essential services and infrastructure
such as water resources, schools, hospitals and roads;
3. distributing safe land for settlement and agricultural purposes, contributing to the economic
reintegration of landless populations in rural areas;
4. marking contaminated areas and educating and raising awareness on the dangers of land mines
and UXO’s among the populations of suspected areas;
5. ensuring that the prioritisation and distribution of cleared land are monitored in a participatory,
equitable and pro-poor manner at the provincial level;
6. providing assistance to the reintegration and rehabilitation of victims of land mines and UXO's
and their affected communities.
The Five Year Mine Action Strategic Plan of 2003-2007 is supported, which contained the following
objectives, with regard to poverty reduction (Kingdom of Cambodia 2002, p.123-124):
− Reducing poverty by providing safe access to productive resources and social services, clearing
landmines and UXOs, and educating awareness by the population on the risks of landmines and
UXOs;
− The CMAA will help to achieve national development goals to contribute to sustainable
economic growth by reducing the negative impact of landmines/UXO;
− The CMAA will institute a specific unit essentially dedicated to the poverty reduction, on
national and provincial level;
− The adoption of new standards and technical regulations will improve HMA’s efficiency and
effectiveness. Those standard are to be finalized in 2002 and to be applied as of 2003;
− With the help of the national database on HMA, the prioritization of suspected mined areas with
the highest risks will be done;
− In order to decrease the number of UXO casualties, mine risk education will be developed;
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The ministry of Social Affairs, Labour, Vocational Training & Youth Rehabilitation is made
responsible to carry out specific interventions for victims and affected communities and to
continue to build on the work in victim assistance, in co-operation with all relevant NGOs.

The relation of “The Triangle Strategy” with HMA is the building of peace, stability and security and
the promotion of economic and social development through the implementation of various reform
programs within the environment created by these policies. In the PRSP the following priority
poverty reduction actions are related to HMA: improving rural livelihoods; reducing vulnerability and
strengthening social inclusion; strengthening institutions and improving governance; and priority
focus on population. HMA and the landmine and UXO threat did not play an important role in the
PRSP.

6.6.2 The HMA Programs
CMAC/UNDP
Repatriation of IDPs, national reconstruction and development, maximizing the socio-economic
impact of demining, and a constant dialogue with NGOs were important issues. CMAC had four
demining priorities: land for resettlement of IDPs or settled land with casualty rates; land for
agriculture, land for humanitarian community development; and land for reconstruction and
infrastructural development. The KH006801 (1996) program, the KH009201 (1997/1998) program,
the WW135108 (1998/1999) program and the WW152711 (1999) program were undertaken with
these priorities. Nevertheless the embeddedness of CMAC’s activities in development was
questioned by donors. Besides that, in 1999 there were accuses of corruption and nepotism, which
were not fully proved, and financial administrative and managerial weaknesses. Also the supervising
of UNDP was lacking. A reorganization of CMAC and the responsible UNDP team followed (see also
§5.3.4). Despite these development the funding via UNDP was stopped (CMAC 1996b, p.5, 7-8; MvBZ
1999d; MvBZ 1999e).
HALO Trust
In the WW165532 program for 2001, HALO Trust supported 19 development NGOs and IGOs by
clearing specific areas (e.g. for housing and agriculture), roads (e.g. for rehabilitation and health
care), schools, hospitals etc., and by building roads and bridges. Development priorities were
embedded in the demining priorities, and are in cooperation with the newly established Land Use
Planning Units (LUPUs). The population greatly benefited, agricultural production, transport
communications and water availability improved, and a health care and hygiene development
project of the NGO CARE could be undertaken (HALO Trust 2000a, p.6-7, 9; HALO Trust 2002b, p.2,
6; MvBZ 2003b).
NPA/CMAC
For the WW165534 (2001/2002) program, the WW192401 (2002/2004) program, and the 6476
(2003/2005) program, NPA hired a CMAC de-miners platoon. In cooperation with CMAC, relevant
provincial authorities and development NGOs, sustainable development of new communities was set
as top priority. NPA also had its own community development activities. In the CMAC Strategic Plan
for the period of 2003-2007 the most important objective was the development objective to
stimulat reconstruction, re-integration and development activities, by a.o. providing access for the
worst-affected communities to essential services and infrastructure and safe land for settlement
and agriculture. NPA phased out its own development activities since 2003, and put emphasize on
mine clearance for the local population and other development organizations (CMAC 2002, p.8;
MvBZ 2004d; NPA 2000a, p.6-9, 11; NPA 2001a, p.5, Annex 12: p. 2-3; NPA 2002a, p.5).

6.6.3 Achievements
In Cambodia a huge area has been cleared during the period 1996-2004 and before, where the
Netherlands was one of the more important contributors. Most of the work undertaken was on
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clearance (69 km2 or almost 10.000 football fields) of mines and UXO (almost 92.000), and
awareness/education (over 22.000 participants) (see Appendix 8).

6.6.4 Value
Relevance/appropriateness: The embeddedness of CMAC’s activities in development was
questioned. There were accuses of malpractices, financial administrative and managerial
weaknesses, and a lack in supervising by the UNDP. Later funding via NPA strongly improved the
situation and a stronger emphasize on development issues occurred. The presence of landmines
became one of the most important issues in the PRSP and national policy. The proposed operations
in the PRSP are in line with the Dutch donor policy: emphasize on mine clearance and institution
building, and a better embeddedness into broader humanitarian and development framework is.
Connectedness: Repatriation of IDPs, reintegration and reconstruction were relevant for the long
term sustainable development. The population greatly benefited from development projects
possible due to HMA. The PRSP focused on clearance of agricultural areas, awareness, mine disposal
training, and increased victim assistance.
Coherence: The embeddedness of CMAC’s activities in development was questioned by donors. Later
programs emphasized the need for better embeddedness of development priorities in demining
priorities. Mine clearance was seen as top priority of the national policy in improving security in the
PRSP. The CMAA will institute a specific unit essentially dedicated to the poverty reduction. The
ministry of Social Affairs, Labour, Vocational Training & Youth Rehabilitation was made responsible
to carry out specific interventions for victims and affected communities and to continue to build on
the work in victim assistance, in co-operation with all relevant NGOs.
Coverage: HMA was undertaken throughout the country. There was not much information on the
exact local impact. There was no evidence suggesting that some (ethnic) groups were left out or
neglected of HMA or development programs. IDPs and landmine victims were positively affected by
the programs.
Efficiency: The PRSP aimed at the adoption of new standards and technical regulations in order to
improve HMA efficiency. Due to lacking information, few can be said about the efficiency of
embeddedness. The PRSP aimed at about US$ 1 per m2 cleared area.
Effectiveness: The PRSP aimed at the adoption of new standards and technical regulations in order
to improve HMA effectiveness. Financial administrative and managerial weaknesses could have
undermined effectiveness. The achievements of other and indirect (socio-economic) objectives
were more difficult to measure.
Impact: HMA and development programs helped declining poverty, improve the situation of the
disabled, stimulated the safe and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs, and renewed
development opportunities in order to get an increase the socio-economic situation of the
population and level of human rights, and a decrease of dependency on aid.

6.7 Eritrea
Eritrea was one of the 36 partner countries, and was already a partner country before the 2003
policy change. Eritrea received € 16,3 million for all humanitarian programs, were HMA consisted
for the mayor share (about € 10 million, see §5.3.5) (MvBZ 2006h, p.48; TK 29 234 V 2003-2004,
p.32).

6.7.1 Development policy
The 2004 IPRSP of Eritrea said little about the threat of landmines. The border war with Ethiopia
with the use of landmines was seen as one of the many determinants of poverty. Many of sections
fertile land were contaminated and with the drought of 2002/2003 this became very clear. No
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policy on HMA or whatsoever was mentioned in the IPRSP (Government of the State of Eritrea 2004,
p.11, 19).

6.7.2 The HMA Programs
HALO Trust
For the WW165535 program (2001/2002) the HALO Trust was a partner of the Eritrean Humanitarian
Demining Programme (EHDP). The objective was to let refugees and IDPs return to their homes. The
need for a broader humanitarian policy was understood by the Netherlands MFA, UN organizations
and NGOs. Communication and coordination was often failing at the time of 2000, due to the
political and strategic agenda of the Eritrean government (HALO Trust 2002a, p.2; MvBZ 2000a;
MvBZ 2000c).

6.7.3 Achievements
A considerable area was cleared (5,6 km2 and over 8.000 pieces of explosives) in Eritrea by the
WW165535 program financed by the Netherlands (see Appendix 8). Unfortunately there was no
information available on other programs that were heavily funded by the Netherlands.

6.7.4 Value
The information on Eritrea was scarce, therefore it is impossible and inappropriate to give a full
judgment.
Relevance/appropriateness: The objective was to let refugees and IDPs return to their homes. Mine
clearance was undertaken, which is in line with the Dutch donor policy. A clear embeddedness into
broader humanitarian and development framework was stimulated by UN organizations and NGOs.
Connectedness: A clear embeddedness into broader humanitarian and development framework was
stimulated by UN organizations and NGOs.
Coherence: The need for a broader humanitarian policy was understood. Communication and
coordination was often failing at the time of 2000.
Coverage: There is no information on coverage.
Efficiency: There is no information on efficiency.
Effectiveness: Communication and coordination was often failing at the time of 2000, which might
have reduced effectiveness.
Impact: There is no information on impact.

6.8 Laos
Laos was not among the 36 bilateral partner countries of the Dutch development cooperation policy
(TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.32).

6.8.1 Development policy
In the IPRSP UXO contamination was seen as one of the important causes of poverty: UXO caused
great human suffering for the victims and their families; agricultural production was blocked there
by UXO contamination, preventing a sustainable living for the population of villages, which was an
important cause of poverty and food shortages. UXO community education awareness was seen as
successful in improving child protection. UXO decontamination was one of the major national
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priorities for alleviating poverty, and was one of the criteria for risk assessment of rural areas.
Infrastructure was also affected by the presence of UXO, causing substantial extra cost and time for
essential services to contaminated communities. The need for co-ordination with development plans
and the optimal use of resources was stressed. The UXO Decontamination Programme was seen as
an important program (IMF/World Bank 2001, p.13, 16, 25, 28, 30-31, 47), which had the following
long-term need for UXO clearance and awareness (IMF/World Bank 2001, p.46-47, quoted):
1. Emergency response units, similar to the current roving teams as an “on call” service for
reported or discovered UXO;
2. Humanitarian clearance for life saving, high risk areas where accidents are likely to, or have
occurred;
3. Development clearance for community development where no other sources of funding are
available;
4. Commercial, private clearance, in support of gem/mineral mines, commercial factories,
tourism, and electricity supplies; and
5. Risk reduction education, to raise awareness of risks associated with UXO.
The UXO Decontamination program was one of the three most important poverty-related subjects in
the PRSP/NGPES, with the National Drugs Control program and the National Action Plan for
HIV/AIDS/STD. The UXO problem was seen as a cause of poverty, as a source of vulnerability and as
a threat. UXO awareness is incorporated with standard teaching schedules. Related with UXO
decontamination were road construction in affected areas and gender issues. Coordination and
capacity-building were seen as important (IMF 2004b, p.7, 9-10, 29-30, 37, 52, 78, 115, 122, 125,
131, 146).
As main challenge was seen the incorporation of UXO decontamination into development
programming, in order to (IMF 2004b, p.125, quoted):
− Ensure that the planning of operations relates closely to national priorities such as poverty
reduction, phasing out shifting cultivation and opium elimination.
− Increase the pace of clearance, thereby opening land for agricultural production.
− Mobilise resources required for humanitarian UXO action programming.
The goal of the PRSP/NGPES was to leave the group of Least Developed Countries by 2020 through
sustained equitable economic growth and social development. The country’s social, cultural,
economic and political identity must be protected. This is and will be done by the following ways
(IMF 2004b, p.1):
− Moving consistently towards a market-oriented economy;
− Building-up the needed infrastructure throughout the country;
− Improving the well-being of the people through greater food security, extension of social
services and environment conservation, while enhancing the spiritual and cultural life of the Lao
multi-ethnic population.
The UXO problem was an important component of the Lao development policy. The UXO
Decontamination Programme will sharply improve the well-being of the people.

6.8.2 The HMA Programs
UNDP/UXO Lao
The LA001302 (1997/1998) program, the WW165509 (2000/2001) program, the WW185806 (2001)
program, the WW192406 (2002) program and the 9686 (2004) program were financed via the
UNDP/UNICEF/LAO PDR Trust Fund to UXO Lao, who contracts demining capacity from a.o. the
NGOs Gerbera, HI, MAG, NPA, and WVI. UXO Lao emphasized community-oriented projects clearing
housing and agricultural area, clearance of land needed for sustainable development projects (e.g.
construction of roads, schools, temples hospitals, airports, irrigation works, clean water,
communication, national forest protection and conservation), assistance with provincial and district
health services, and food security or income-generation assistance (e.g. markets, reduce slash-andburn farming by giving alternatives, tree plantations, tourism, industrial and handicraft
development). UXO Lao supported the overall development goals of Laos and the broader socioeconomic development requirements of villages, districts and provinces, in a bottom up planning
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process. The National UXO Steering Committee (NSC) was the policy-making body for UXO Lao and
consists of members from the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Security, UNDP, UNICEF, and representatives of 9 provinces. Donors
and Implementing Partners can attend biannually. NGOs such as CARE, ACF and OXFAM, and Red
Cross and WFP provide sustainable development programs. UXO Lao was recognized by the
government as strategic support program, and the government identified four sectors for poverty
alleviation, agriculture and forestry, education, road infrastructure, and health. Especially disabled
are recognized as relatively benefiting very little. UXO clearance in Laos was one of the initiatives
mentioned in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for Lao PDR for the period
2002-2006. In the National Strategic Plan 2003 – 2013 three priorities were set, high, medium and
low. Despite already existing cooperation with development NGOs, the degree of cooperation was
less than desired by donors (MvBZ 2004f; UNDP 1995, p.4; UXO Lao 1996, p.4; UXO Lao 1999, p.1517; UXO Lao 2000, p.4, 14, 16-17, 19, 23; UXO Lao 2001, p.11, 20-28; UXO Lao 2002a, p.6, 19; UXO
Lao 2002b, p.8, 11, 14-15; UXO Lao 2003b, p.8; UXO Lao 2003c, p.7-12, 19; UXO Lao 2003d, p.17).

6.8.3 Achievements
Laos had massive programs on UXO clearance (almost 39 km2 and at least 256.000 pieces of
explosives) and awareness (838 students and over 540.000 attendants). The Netherlands was a
smaller contributor. UXO Lao was able to reach a price of US$ 0,34 per m2 and US$ 11,94 per
beneficiary, which is very low (see Appendix 8).

6.8.4 Value
Relevance/appropriateness: UXO Lao emphasized community-oriented projects and a bottom up
planning process. UXO Lao supported the overall development goals of Laos and the broader socioeconomic development. Especially disabled were recognized as benefiting very little. The
operations were in line with the Dutch donor policy: emphasize is placed on UXO clearance and
institution building, and a clear embeddedness into broader humanitarian and development. The
degree of cooperation was lower than desired by donors. The National UXO Steering Committee was
constructed for accountability. In the PRSP UXO contamination was identified as one of the aspects
causing poverty and UXO decontamination was seen as one of the major national priorities.
Connectedness: Both relief and sustainable development were relevant here. The clearance of
housing and agricultural area, clearance of land needed for sustainable development projects,
assistance with provincial and district health services, and food security or income-generation
assistance made that in the future landmines can no longer cause a threat to the population, and
delivery of humanitarian assistance, and removed a barrier for sustainable development. Capacity
was built on the local, provincial and national level. There was still a high dependency on donors
despite the already long period of programs and financial assistance.
Coherence: UXO Lao emphasized community-oriented projects and supports the overall
development goals of Laos and the broader socio-economic development. In order to stimulate
coherence, the National UXO Steering Committee was set up as the policy-making body for UXO Lao.
UXO Lao was recognized by the government as strategic support program. UXO clearance in Laos
was one of the initiatives of the UN for the period 2002-2006, thus the clearance programs were not
independent from other programs. The degree of cooperation was lower than requested by donors.
Coverage: Especially disabled were recognized as relatively benefiting very little and are in focus.
UXO Lao tried to reach all groups in society and let them participate by a bottom-up planning
process. The PRSP saw UXO community education awareness as successful in improving child
protection. There was not much numerical information on the exact local impact.
Efficiency: The cost of clearance was very low compared to other countries. The efficiency on
embeddedness was more difficult to assess, a clue was given by the fact that the degree of
cooperation was lower than requested by donors. The PRSP saw as one of the main issues the
increase the pace of clearance.
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Effectiveness: Often the direct HMA achievements were exceeding the targets. Information on the
achievement on other and indirect (socio-economic) objectives was not widely available. Also here
the low level coordination can be an indication of lack of effectiveness.
Impact: HMA and development programs increased the socio-economic situation of the population
and level of human rights, and a decrease of dependency on aid. Lives were saved due to clearance
and awareness activities.

6.9 Mozambique
Mozambique was a partner country in the list of 36 (TK 29 234 V 2003-2004, p.32).

6.9.1 Development policy
The central objective in the PRSP of 2001 was substantial reduction of absolute poverty. As
fundamental areas were seen: education; health; agriculture and rural development; basic
infrastructure; good governance; macro-economic and financial management (Republic of
Mozambique 2001, p.1, 3).
For Mozambique, HMA is just sparsely mentioned in the PRPS documents. The Review of the 2003
Economic and Social Plan mentions the completed demining undertaken by the defence sector (IMF
2004c, p.107). In the Economic and Social Plan Evaluation 2004 the outcome of a summit for HMA
was an important issue (IMF 2005b, p.84).
In the PRSP there was no link with HMA at all.

6.9.2 The HMA Programs
HALO Trust
The MZ014501 program for 1998-1999 was undertaken in Nampula (in cooperation with World Vision
International), where the Netherlands already funded projects on sustainable development in
sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure, and market development. The clearance activities will
strengthen those programs, and are part of the Preliminary Prioritised Provincial Work Plan (PPPWP)
framework, containing 10 key sites including bridges, village centres, roads, power lines and water
pipelines. Spin-off was increased mobility of the population, improved provision of services and aid.
Not all projects were completely finished during the time of the program, and were finished in the
WW165502 program for 2000. This program also supports the District Demining Initiative. A socioeconomic land use study on the period 1994-1999 shows that in the Nampula province areas were
cleared, boosting agriculture, rehabilitation, transportation, and trade, but the handover of some
areas to local communities was not always done well. The study concludes that HMA can boost
development (HALO Trust 1997, p.8; HALO Trust 1998, p.4; HALO Trust 1999a, p.2; HALO Trust
1999b, p.3; HALO Trust 1999c, p.104-113, 124; MvBZ 1997b).
HI
The 1996-1998 MZ003315 was about mine survey and mine clearance (although HI had other
paramedic and social programs in Mozambique). The aim was to clear for villages and rural
population to boost the daily economic and social activities (HI 1996, p.1, 7).
NPA
In the MZ003314 program for 1996-1997, NPA worked together with two NGOs providing food, and
with other HMA organizations. The WW135105 program for 1998-1999, the WW165508 program for
2000, WW185813 program for 2001, WW192405 program for 2002, and the 5809 program for 20032004, took into account sustainable improvement of the socio-economic, political and democratic
living conditions by clearing surroundings of rural communities, water supplies and path and road
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clearance, provision of primary health awareness (HIV/AIDS awareness and basic courses on
construction of improved traditional latrines) and educational programs, access to education, skills
training and commercial opportunities. Some activities were only facilitated to stimulate ownership
and sustainability. Women were seen as an important vulnerable group. NPA was also beware of
environmental impacts of the activities, and tried to keep them as low as possible. NPA was
reviewed for the period 1993-1998 (WW152103). Concluded was that the impact of the community
services was difficult to measure and not necessary per se. The 2003 NORAD review of the NPA
activities emphasized that communities should not become too dependent on the community
services provided. That also counts in overall, the presence of de-miners gives a temporal boost to
the local economy. NPA itself should not get involved in long term development actions. It was
believed that phasing out demining should be accompanied with a development program (Agenda
Utredning & Utvikling 1999, p.65-66; NPA 1997b; NPA 1997c, p.1; NPA 1999c, p.13; NPA 2000b; NPA
2000d, p.12, 15; NPA 2001c, p.14-15; NPA 2004, p.10-12; Scanteam 2003, p.16, 18, 20).
UNDP
The UNDP Trust Fund funded the setup of the mine clearance policy and strategy by CND. Part of
the strategy was the determination of the impact of landmines on socio-economic development.
The ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation, Education, Agriculture, Health,
Social Welfare, and Police were involved. CND turned out to be a weak partner (UNDP 1997, p.8;
UNDP 1999, p.6).

6.9.3 Achievements
During the period 1996-2004 an area of 14 km2 and over 220.000 pieces of explosives were cleared
in Mozambique. The programs were over 10% co-financed by the Netherlands. There were no
indicators on achievements concerning embeddedness. The cost per m2 was estimated to be US$
1,89 at an NPA program, which was a higher than other countries (except clearance by NGOs in
Bosnia and Herzegovina) (see Appendix 8).

6.9.4 Value
Relevance/appropriateness: The HALO Trust programs took into account sustainable improvement
of the socio-economic, political and democratic living conditions. Some activities of NPA were
facilitated to stimulate ownership and sustainability. The impact of the community services
provided by NPA to the local population was difficult to measure and not necessary per se. The
population should not become too dependent on the community services (lack of ownership). Large
areas were cleared and can now safely be used by the population. The operations were also well in
line with the Dutch donor policy: emphasize was placed on mine clearance and institution building.
Some programs were undertaken in Nampula, where the Netherlands already funded projects on
sustainable development. The PRSP hardly mentioned the subject landmines.
Connectedness: The clearance of the PPPWP framework sites, clearance surroundings of rural
communities, water supplies and path and road clearance, provision of primary health awareness
and educational programs, access to education, skills training and commercial opportunities made
that in the future landmines can no longer cause a threat to the population, delivery of
humanitarian assistance, and removed a barrier for sustainable (post-conflict) development. The
link with other humanitarian programs funded by the Netherlands and the HMA program of HALO
Trust in Nampula improved the connectedness.
Coherence: In Nampula programs were undertaken in cooperation with WVI, and where the
Netherlands already funded development projects on sustainable development in sectors such as
agriculture, infrastructure, and market development. NPA worked together with two NGOs providing
food, and with other HMA organizations. The PPPWP framework was launched to improve
coherence. The UNDP Trust Fund funded the setup of the mine clearance policy and strategy by
CND. Part of the strategy is the determination of the impact of landmines on socio-economic
development. CND turned out to be a weak partner.
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Coverage: Women were seen as an important vulnerable group. Primary health awareness was
provided, e.g. HIV/AIDS awareness. There was not much information on the exact local impact.
There was no evidence suggesting that some groups were left out or neglected of HMA or
development programs.
Efficiency: The estimated cost at a NPA program was quite high. The efficiency on embeddedness
was again very difficult to assess, due to lack of information. The PPPWP framework, containing 10
key sites, helped improving efficiency.
Effectiveness: The handover of some areas to local communities was not always done well. The
UNDP Trust Fund funded the setup of the mine clearance policy and strategy by CND, but the CND
turned out to be a weak partner. Spin-off of the PPPWP framework was increased mobility of the
population, improved provision of services and aid. Sometimes the HMA achievements did not
achieve the objectives that were set beforehand. On the socio-economic achievements there was
little information.
Impact: Spin-off was increased mobility of the population, improved provision of services and aid.
NPA tried to keep environmental impacts of their activities as low as possible. The impact of NPA’s
community services was difficult to measure and not necessary per se. The presence of de-miners
gave a temporal boost to the local economy, but made communities to dependent on them.

6.10 Overview of Achievements of the HMA programs
Table 6-1 gives an overview of the achievements of the programs. The extent in which the
Netherlands funded the programs differ, some information is incomplete or non-existing and local
differences in circumstances are not known. Thus straight conclusions can not always be drawn. The
complete data can be found in Appendix 8.
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Table 6-1: Overview of the achievements of the HMA programs in the recipient countries for
1996-2004
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6.11 Conclusions
Some of the information were the conclusions are based on, comes from chapter 5.
The Netherlands as a donor country
The Netherlands did not see embeddedness of HMA in a broader framework for sustainable
development as top-priority in the HMA policy. HMA was even not mentioned in the 2003 macro
policy paper on development cooperation at all. Only indirectly it can be brought in relation with
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several issues from the macro policy: integrated foreign policy on the field of peace, security and
development (Stability Fund); coherence in development policies; poverty alleviation and
sustainable development; and the PRSPs and the MDG as guidelines. To compare with other similar
donors: Denmark’s policy and the MDGs can only be very indirectly linked with HMA within a broader
framework. Embeddedness was more clearly incorporated in the HMA policy of the European Union
and Sweden. In the Danish policy it was stated that the usefulness of HMA for local population was
difficult to measure (sub question 4).
Recipient countries
For many of the programs that the Netherlands funded in the selected countries, embeddedness in a
broader framework for sustainable development was an issue in different extents. Socio-economic
data of outcomes were hard to find, therefore the criteria are assessed in a qualitative way.
Afghanistan
The Netherlands had an intensive aid relation with Afghanistan. Most programs in Afghanistan were
to a large extent embedded in a broader UN program for humanitarian assistance, in order to
improve aid delivery, rehabilitation, repatriation, and development. The situation in Afghanistan
deteriorated due to restriction by the Taliban authorities, an earthquake, and the US-led invasion.
The goal was to clear residential, commercial and agricultural areas, roads, irrigation canals, and
grazing areas. Mine/ERW clearance, mine clearance training, mine identification, survey and
marking, and mine awareness and education were undertaken. Afghanistan was a large receiver in
the world of humanitarian funds, and the largest concerning HMA in the period 1996-2004 (sub
questions 4-7).
Angola
The Netherlands had no bilateral aid relation with Angola. Clearance programs facilitated
emergency relief work, access to basic services, humanitarian assistance, safe return of refugees
and IDPs, resettlement and cultivation of arable land, development, private transport and trade.
Basic medical equipment and education were provided too. First local organizations were funded,
but those organizations were weak and the government was unreliable. Therefore international
NGOs were funded later. Emphasize was laid on clearance, and the humanitarian relevance was
taking into account. The politico-military situation was not always prosperous during the period
1996-2004. The programs focused on mine/ERW clearance (manual, mechanical, MDD, EOD), priority
setting, mine clearance training, mine survey, victim assistance and social rehabilitation. Angola
was a larger receiver of HMA funds (sub questions 4-7).
Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Netherlands had an intensive aid relation with Bosnia and Herzegovina. The HMA programs were
part of a broader UN program. HMA was seen as an important factor in rehabilitation and
redevelopment of the population. HMA was a factor in the development policy, but did not have
high priority. Activities were clearance of houses for returning refugees and IDPs, and land for
agriculture reconstruction and development activities. Mine/UXO clearance, mine clearance
training, mine awareness, mine information, mine survey and marking, and institution building was
undertaken. Bosnia and Herzegovina was a large receiver of HMA and other ODA (sub questions 4-7).
Cambodia
Cambodia was not among the 36 partner countries. HMA and the landmine and UXO threat did not
play an important role in the PRSP. Repatriation of IDPs, national reconstruction and development,
maximizing the socio-economic impact of demining, and a constant dialogue with NGOs were
important issues. The embeddedness of CMAC’s activities in development was questioned by donors.
HALO Trust programs had development priorities embedded in the demining priorities. Sustainable
development of new communities was set as top priority with the NPA/CMAC programs. The main
focus of the programs was mine and ERW clearance (manual and mechanical). Cambodia received a
large amount of HMA and humanitarian funds (sub questions 4-7).
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Eritrea
Eritrea was one of the 36 partner countries, and the Netherlands has been by far the large
contributor on HMA in Eritrea. There was nothing on HMA in development policy. There was a need
for a broader humanitarian policy. Communication and coordination was often failing at the time of
2000. Mine clearance, mine awareness, capacity building and evaluation were the undertaken
activities (sub questions 4-7).
Laos
Laos was not among the 36 bilateral partner countries. Dutch ODA funds were also used for
sustainable forest management and human rights programs. The UXO problem was an important
component of the Lao development policy. UXO Lao emphasized community-oriented projects
clearing housing and agricultural area, clearance of land needed for sustainable development
projects, assistance with provincial and district health services, and food security or incomegeneration assistance. UXO Lao was recognized by the government as strategic support program.
Programs focused on UXO and mine clearance, UXO survey, UXO awareness, and training and
capacity building. Laos received a small amount of HMA funds compared to other donors (sub
questions 4-7).
Mozambique
Mozambique was one of the partner countries. The Netherlands funded much on ODA, other funds
were used for programs on education, health, HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation, and poverty
alleviation. There was nothing on HMA in the development policy. HMA activities took place in the
Nampula province, where they had positive effects on other programs funded by the Netherlands.
Most important in the HMA programs were mine clearance (manual, mechanical), mine survey and
capacity building (sub questions 4-7).
Overall
The available information gives a clue that embeddedness became more important during the years,
for both donors as recipient countries and NGOs. Exact information on socio-economic outcome and
impact of the programs was usually not available, thus the valuing on the criteria was very
qualitative and reliant on the smart reports of NGOs and UN organizations. Countries with a
partnership with the Netherlands had some humanitarian programs funded that benefit from the
HMA activities.
Criteria
In most countries the HMA programs were more or less in line with Dutch HMA policy. Embeddedness
was quite clear in most countries on paper, but not always in practice. UN programs showed a
higher degree of embeddedness. Most embeddedness of HMA was on relief, recovery, repatriation,
rehabilitation and sustainable development. IDPs and refugees benefited most from HMA. As far as
could be assessed, no groups were left out of the HMA program and some vulnerable groups
received extra attention. Efficiency and effectiveness were not always satisfactory. The impact of
HMA was safe and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs, and renewed development opportunities,
but the exact socio-economic numbers are often unknown (sub question 8).
Good and bad practices
Due to lack on good qualitative information it is difficult to give a fair judgement on good and bad
practices. The relevance of HMA for the local population is without any doubt, since the removal of
the threat of landmines and UXOs (sub question 9).
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7 Discussion of Findings on Embeddedness
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter the findings of the previous chapter will be compared with research by Denmark,
Sweden, UNDP, and with two articles published in the magazine “Third World Quarterly” from a
special thematic number about HMA. Other donors are more or less looking on the embeddedness of
their HMA programs into the broader development framework. For Denmark and Sweden an
evaluation of HMA activities has taken place. The term coordination (with other sectors) is often
used, although embeddedness is more than just coordination (see also § 3.3.2).

7.2 Denmark
The Danish view from the 2005 Danida7 evaluation is that the HMA sector’s interaction (dialogue,
co-ordination and collaboration) with other sectors stayed on a poor level, and HMA was an isolated
sector. A couple of reasons were given (Danida 2003, p.62-63):
− Insufficient understanding of aid policies, structures and practices among many HMA staff;
− HMA is seen as highly specialized “add-on” by the rest, and is considered to be slow;
− HMA is not appreciated despite the high importance of HMA assessments. The sector did not try
hard enough to be understood by the aid community.
The lack of coordination and collaboration between the HMA sector and the aid community caused a
loss of resources and possible impact. Joint strategic planning should take place, e.g. in the United
Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and
other development planning strategies. National governing structures were providing overall policy
guidance to HMA in some countries, but did not have enough influence or did not shown enough
interest to integrate HMA to get synergic effects. Organizations with a broader mandate on HMA,
humanitarian aid and development assistance (such as UNDP, UNICEF, DanChurchAid and the World
Bank) can stimulate strategic planning, but in practice it was minimal. Even within Danida HMA was
not strongly connected at all to other development program (Danida 2003, p.63-64).
The Danida policy described in §6.2.2 did not have a specific emphasize on embeddedness. Synergy
and bilateral sector programs were emphasized, but this was not what was done in practice.

7.3 Sweden
The Sida8 evaluation of 2001 concluded that within the HMA sector, as in other fields of
humanitarian aid, a common understanding of the most important goals and the best way in which
to achieve objectives became more important. HMA is highly specialized and often includes large
numbers of actors, while it is part of an integrated overall humanitarian effort. A larger
coordination effort should improve HMA and humanitarian assistance (Sida 2001, p.41).
Existing coordination between HMA and other humanitarian sectors was nonetheless not seen as
satisfactory. Several reasons are given (Sida 2001, p.54):
− The predominance of military expertise, personnel and organizational culture within the HMA
sector is seen as a problem;
− The type of imposed coordination within HMA may be a hindrance to coordination with non-HMA
actors;
− Focus on coordination within the HMA sector is stronger, since non-HMA actors can not sanction
actors within the HMA-sector;
− Coordination is far stronger with policy and strategic planning, compared to day-to-day
operations in the field;
7
8

Danida is the Danish International Development Agency at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Sida is the Swedish International Development Agency at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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UNMACs cause a difficult starting-point for the transfer of responsibility to national institutions.

The policy paper in §6.2.4 was made later than evaluation where abovementioned information
comes from. In the policy paper there was a clear wish for more embeddedness.

7.4 Third World Quarterly
In §3.3.2 the article of Kjellman, Harpviken, Millard et al. (2003) was already used to explain the
term embeddedness. The UN-led MACs had a rigid approach towards coordination. This article
concluded too that embeddedness gained increasingly interest, among policy makers and
governmental officials. The predominance of military expertise, personnel and organizational
culture was seen as a threat for embeddedness in a broader institutional context/cross-sectoral
coordination with non-HMA actors. Coordination inside the HMA sector was seen as smoother than
cross-sectoral coordination. Flexibility and innovation had to be encouraged and facilitated. The
sector must be aware that competition inside the sector can have negative side-effects in
coordination. It can bring increasing hierarchy and authority. Another threat can be the pressure of
donors or politicians on decisions, instead of decisions based on adequate information (Kjellman,
Harpviken, Millard et al. 2003, p.855, 868-869).
Impact-assessment practices (Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), economic analysis, and community
study) were seen as necessary in the article of Harpviken, Millard, Kjellman et al. (2003) for HMA to
get a better notion on broader impact issues. Although becoming more accepted, impact is still see
as an event and not as integral part of HMA (Harpviken, Millard, Kjellman et al. 2003, p.889).

7.5 UNDP /GICHD study
The 2001 Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action by the UNDP/GICHD also signalized
improvements during the years in the pursuit for more and better embeddedness in HMA programs.
Focus was not only on numbers of cleared square meters or explosive devices, but on HMA output
such as types of land cleared, reductions in accident rates, return of IDPs and refugees, and the
number of development projects assisted, in order to get positive socio-economic outcomes. It was
found that actors from the non-HMA development actors have to guide HMA actors to ensure
embeddedness of HMA in broader development objectives, but also HMA actors have to be proactive to have HMA activities incorporated into the planning of development actors. When a country
turns from conflict to normal development, national authorities have to incorporate socio and
economic goals into their development strategy and plan. In practice many problems arise in the
transition between post-conflict to normal development. It is better to work together with other
willing development actors, than operating independently (UNDP/GICHD 2001, p.3-10).

7.6 Comparison
As in the Netherlands, embeddedness became more important in Denmark and Sweden. Also the
article of Kjellberg et al. and the UNDP/GICHD study saw the increasing interest of embeddedness
of HMA in a broader development framework. The evaluations of Denmark and Sweden emphasized
on that embeddedness/coordination between sectors failed, and possible solutions, and why. In this
research on the Netherlands it was found that embeddedness was quite clear in most recipient
countries on paper, but not always in practice. One reason was that socio-economic data of
achievements was hard to find. Therefore it was difficult to give reasons for the lack of
embeddedness. All sources saw problems and threats for a smooth cross-sectoral co-ordination.
Both the Sida evaluation as Kjellberg et al. pointed out the distinct military background of HMA and
the strong role of the MACs, which made embeddedness with other development sectors difficult.
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8 Conclusions and Recommendations
8.1 Conclusions Based on the Research
In this paragraph the main conclusions of this research will be drawn. The conclusions answer the
main research question:
How are the HMA programs embedded in a broader framework for sustainable development?
The most important findings are:
− Embeddedness was not seen as top-priority in the Dutch HMA policy, but coherence with
existing plans for the socioeconomic rehabilitation of the post-conflict community was
requested;
− HMA and its embedding were not mentioned in the 2003 Dutch macro policy paper on
development cooperation. Only indirectly it can be brought in relation with several issues;
− Embeddedness became more important during the years, for both donors, as recipient countries
and NGOs. This was also found in other research;
− Embeddedness was quite clear in most countries on paper, but not always in practice;
− Most embeddedness of HMA was on relief, recovery, repatriation, rehabilitation and sustainable
development;
− The impact of HMA was often safe and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs, and renewed
development opportunities. The exact socio-economic numbers are often unknown, which was
also found in Danish research;
− Therefore it was not possible to give a genuine judgment on the value of the embeddedness;
− Other research concluded that embeddedness has failed to some extent.

8.2 Recommendations for Future Policy
From the conclusions, recommendations for future HMA policy are drawn. This answers the last sub
question 10:
10. Which recommendations can be made based on the conclusions of the research (explanative)?
The conclusions show that there is uncertainty on the utility of embeddedness. Therefore no wellgrounded recommendations can be made. The only recommendation therefore is:
It is necessary to get better insight into the socio-economic impact of HMA activities. A good
strategy and/or method should be sought in cooperation with other donors, relevant UN
organizations, and NGOs.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Abbreviations and Acronyms
APM
ATM
AVM
AXO
BHMAC
BiH
CCW
CMAA
CMAC
CMAO
CND
CNIDAH
CPAU
CWC
DAC
Danida
DDI/ST
DDR
DFID
DGIS
DHA
DMV
EC
EDA
EHDP
EMAP
EOD
ERW
EU
FEDMAC
GDP
GICHD
HALO
Trust
HDI
HI
HMA
HOM
HRW
ICBL
ICRC
IDP
IGO
IMAP
IMAS
IMSMA
INAROEE

Anti-personnel mine
Anti-tank mine (synonym of ATM)
Anti-vehicle mine (synonym for ATM)
Abandoned Explosive Ordnance
Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority
Cambodian Mine Action Centre
Central Mine Action Office
Commissão Nacional de Desminagem, International De-mining Commission of
Mozambique
Inter-Sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance
Cooperation for Peace and Unity
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
Danish International Development Agency, part of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dienst Documentaire Informatievoorziening/Semi-statisch archief, Documentary
Information Systems Department/Semi-current Records Division
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
UK Department for International Development
Directoraat-Generaal
Internationale
Samenwerking,
Directorate-General
for
International Cooperation
Department of Humanitarian Affairs (changed into OCHA)
Directie Mensenrechten en Vredesopbouw, Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department
European Commission
Eritrean Demining Agency
Eritrean Humanitarian Demining Programme
Eritrean Mine Action Programme
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Explosive Remnants of War. ERW is UXO plus AXO.
European Union
Federation Mine Action Center (BiH)
Gross Domestic Product
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
Hazardous Area Life-support Organisation Trust
Human Development Index
Handicap International
Humanitarian Mine Action
Humanitair Ontmijnen, humanitarian de-mining
Human Rights Watch
International Campaign to Ban Landmines
International Committee of the Red Cross
Internally Displaced Person
Inter Governmental Organization
Integrated Mine Action Programme
International Mine Action Standards
Information Management System for Mine Action
Instituto Nacional de Remocao de Obstaculor e Engenhos Explosivos, Angolan National
Institute for the Removal of Obstacles and Explosive Ordnance
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IND
IOB
ITF
KZA
LM
LUMU
LUPU
MAC
MACA
MACC
MAFP
MAG
MAPA
MASG
MDD
META
MFA
MgM
MMT
MvBZ
NGO
NORAD
NPA
NRA
OCHA
(UNOCHA)
ODA
OECD
Ottawa
Treaty
PPP
RSMAC
SAA
SIDA
St Vl.
TK
TMF
TNO
TSZ
UN
UNDHA
UNDP
UNICEF
UNMAC
UNMACA
UNMAS
UNMEE
UNOPS
UXO
UXO Lao
VTF
WFP
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Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, International De-mining Institute of Mozambique
Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie, Policy and Operations
Evaluation Department of the Directorate-General for International Co-operation of the
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims
Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika (Committee for Southern Africa)
Landmine Monitor
Land Use Management Unit
Land Use Planning Unit
Mine Action Capacity
Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan
Mine Action Coordination Centre
Mine Action for Peace
Mine Advisory Group
Mine Action Program for Afghanistan
Mine Action Support Group
Mine Detection Dog
Mine Evaluation and Training Agency (Kabul)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Menschen gegen Minen
Mine Marking Team
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Non-Governmental Organization
Norwegian Agency for Development Coorperation
Norwegian People's Aid
National Regulatory Authority
United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance
Official Development Assistance
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction
Purchasing Power Parity
Republika Srpska Mine Action Center (BiH)
Small Arms Ammunitions
Swedish Development Agency
Stichting Vluchtelingenwerk
Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Dutch lower house parliament
Thematische Medefinanciering, thematic co-financing
Nederlandse Organisatie voor toegepast-natuurwetenschappelijk onderzoek, Dutch
organization for applied natural science research
Temporary Security Zone
United Nations
United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Children’s Fund
United Nations Mine Action Centre (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan
United Nations Mine Action Service
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
United Nations Office for Project Services
Unexploded Ordnance
Lao National UXO Programme
Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (United Nations)
World Food Programme
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Appendix 2: Definitions
Term
Abandoned
explosive
ordnance

Abbr
AXO

Anti-handling
device
Anti-personnel
mine

APM

Blinding Laser
Weapons
Existing
explosive
remnants of war
Explosive
ordnance
Explosive
remnants of war

Definition
Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict,
that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict,
and which is no longer under control of the party that left it behind or
dumped it. Abandoned explosive ordnance may or may not have been
primed, fused, armed or otherwise prepared for use.
A device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to,
attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an
attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the
mine.
A mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact
of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more
persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or
contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with
anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a
result of being so equipped.
Laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or
as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to
unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with
corrective eyesight devices.
Means unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance that
existed prior to the entry into force of this Protocol for the High
Contracting Party on whose territory it exists
Conventional munitions containing explosives, with the exception of
mines, booby traps and other devices as defined in Amended Protocol
II of the CCW

ERW

Mine
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Unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance.

A munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or
other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or

X

Source
(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects 2003: Article 2)
(Ottawa Convention 1997: Article 2)

(Ottawa Convention 1997: Article 2)

(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects 1995: Article 1)
(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects 2003: Article 2)
(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects 2003: Article 2)
(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects 2003: Article 2)
(Ottawa Convention 1997: Article 2)
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contact of a person or a vehicle.
A mine not directly emplaced but delivered by artillery, missile,
rocket, mortar, or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft. Mines
delivered from a land-based system from less than 500 metres are not
considered to be "remotely delivered".
Automatically rendering a munition inoperable by means of the
irreversible exhaustion of a component, for example, a battery, that is
essential to the operation of the munition.

Remotelydelivered mine
Self-deactivating

Self-destruction
mechanism

An incorporated or externally attached automatically-functioning
mechanism which secures the destruction of the munition into which it
is incorporated or to which it is attached.

Selfneutralization
mechanism

An incorporated automatically-functioning mechanism which renders
inoperable the munition into which it is incorporated.

Unexploded
ordnance

UXO

Mine survey:
General mine
action
assessment (IMAS
8.10; previously
called Level One:
General Survey)
Technical survey
(IMAS 8.20;
previously called
Level Two:
Technical
Survey)
Post-clearance
documentation
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Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed, or otherwise
prepared for use and used in an armed conflict. It may have been
fired, dropped, launched or projected and should have exploded but
failed to do so.

(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects 1996: Article 2)
(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects 1996: Article 2)
(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects 1996: Article 2)
(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects 1996: Article 2)
(Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects 2003: Article 2)

Aims are: assess the scale and impact of the landmine problem on the
country and individual communities; investigate all reported and/or
suspected areas of mine or UXO contamination, quantities and types of
explosive hazards; and collect general information such as the security
situation, terrain, soil characteristics, climate, routes, infrastructure
and local support facilities, to assist the planning of future mine
action projects.
The primary aim of a technical survey is to collect sufficient
information to enable the clearance requirement to be more
accurately defined, including the areas to be cleared, the depth of
clearance, local soil conditions and the vegetation characteristics.

(GICHD 2006, p.48)

All post-clearance inspections should be completed and any corrective
action carried out. Permanent survey markers should be put down and

(GICHD 2006, p.54)

XI

(GICHD 2006, p.51)
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(IMAS 8.30;
previously called
Level Three:
Completion
Survey)
Land use Transport
Land use Communal
Infrastructure
Land use Agriculture
Land use Settlement
Land use - Other
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accurately recorded for future reference. And all necessary
information such as monitoring and inspection reports should be
collated and made available for the formal handover.
Actual land use after clearance is for transport infrastructure, such as
roads, bridges, railways or airstrips.
Actual land use after clearance is for communal infrastructure, such as
schools, health centres, churches or wells.

(HALO Trust 1999c, p.8-11)

Actual land use after clearance is for agriculture, including crops such
as cassava, maize, rice and fruit. Excluded are smaller scale gardens
inside any housing plots.
Actual land use after clearance is for housing plots, including smaller
scale gardens inside the plots.
Actual land use after clearance is for does not fall into any other
definition.

(HALO Trust 1999c, p.8-11)

XII

(HALO Trust 1999c, p.8-11)

(HALO Trust 1999c, p.8-11)
(HALO Trust 1999c, p.8-11)
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Appendix 3: States Parties of the Ottawa Treaty

Source: (ICBL 2006a)
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Appendix 4: Overview of the Financial Support on HMA by the Netherlands
Table 0-1: Amount of the financial support by the Netherlands
Country-related
Afghanistan
Albania
Angola
Azerbaijan*1
BiH
Cambodia
Congo
Eritrea
Ethiopia
FRY*2
Georgia
Guinea-Bissau
Iraq
Laos
Mozambique
Russian Federation
Sudan
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Yemen
Other
HALO Trust
ICBL
ICRC
HOM*3
UNMAS VTF
Total
%

1996
750.000

1997
2.500.000

1998
1.500.000

1999
1.350.000

4.670.500

4.008.815

4.101.000

1.800.000

250.000
2.553.000

500.000
2.450.000

2.100.000
2.502.000

1.179.245
300.000

2.892.948
190.101

2.433.928
272.030

470.000
1.343.000

2001
2.000.000

2002
2.090.000

2003
1.468.561

2004
1.345.038

1.143.170

500.000
518.181

1.096.631
650.000

2.912.810

675.489

4.200.000

500.000
1.000.000
376.761

3.500.000

1.547.512

2.000.076
500.307
499.500
1.165.435
252.000
50.000

697.072
300.000

123.543

364.998
446.905

1.000.000
565.654

500.000
1.230.862

159.776

535.000

80.000
2000

500.000
2001

1.600.000

2.153.846

120.000
454.000

500.000
2002
570.000
120.000
454.000

454.000

198.000
2004
200.000
120.000
n/a. TMF*4

9.607.284
8,0

1.730.770
18.500.457
15,4

1.500.000
12.516.492
10,4

1.500.000
15.806.868
13,1

600.000
10.985.857
9,1

n/a. TMF*4
10.231.527
8,5

194.990

692.249
500.000
1.275.628

100.000
1996

1997

1998

376.015
500.000

500.000
997.587
500.000
1.199.544

276.088
100.000

2000
3.434.180
177.165
1.095.508
572.422
1.000.000
776.786

1999

975.000
973.568
457.445
465.987
300.000
2003
324.592

10.000.000
11.205.546
9,3

9.558.815
7,9

22.016.000
18,3

1.625.000
351.000
804.874
400.050
596.704

Total
16.437.779
177.165
19.916.200
2.240.910
6.528.745
13.901.174
252.000
9.797.512
1.000.000
4.331.779
1.436.564
1.000.000
4.565.924
2.421.000
9.261.404
272.030
400.050
1.848.925
465.987
1.578.000
Total
1.094.592
360.000
5.115.846
10.000.000
5.330.770
120.428.846
100

%
13,7
0,1
16,6
1,9
5,5
11,6
0,2
8,2
0,8
3,6
1,2
0,8
3,8
2,0
7,7
0,2
0,3
1,5
0,4
1,3

R*5
2
20
1
10
6
3
19
4
14
8
13
14
7
9
5
18
17
11
16
12

Y*6
9
1
9
4
7
9
1
5
1
4
5
2
5
6
8
1
1
5
1
5

0,9
0,3
4,3
8,4
4,5
100

*1 In Azerbaijan the program was undertaken in the Nagorno-Karabkh region
*2 In the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) the program was undertaken in the Kosovo province, in nowadays Serbia
*3 HOM = Humanitair OntMijnen (humanitarian de-mining). This fund was largely spent on research of the TNO research institute on mechanical mine
clearance
*4 TMF = Thematische Mede-Financiering (thematic co-financing)
= ranking of countries
*5 R
= number of years that programs were funded in the specific country
*6 Y
Sums in US$
Source: (UNMAS 2006: The Netherlands)
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Table 0-2: Funding by the Netherlands per HMA category
Category
Advocacy & Prevention:
Campaign Support
Conference Support
General / Unspecified
Coordination
General / Unspecified
Mine Action Centre Core Support
Multilateral / Regional Core Support
Information
Surveys
Integrated Mine Action
Mine Awareness
General / Unspecified
Training
Mine Clearance
De-mining
Dogs
Equipment
General / Unspecified
Training
Research & Development
Equipment Development
Victim Assistance
General / Unspecified
Prosthetics / Orthotics
Total:

1996

1997

1998

1999

110.000
50.000

1.050.000
1.050.000

246.428

5.053.000

1.297.000
5.550.000

647.500
166.088
2.873.000

5.978.000

4.229.245

175.000

1.510.598
1.201.217

2.177.000

2000

2001

100.000
295.275
177.165

120.000

1.730.770

1.500.000
1.500.000

9.314.749

3.528.951

1.000.000
5.883.241

120.000

1.500.000

300.000
1.470.000

1.500.000
4.518.181

1.801.735

5.913.825
570.000

324.592

1.230.862

9.307.265

711.516

454.000

454.000

12.516.492

15.806.868

11.975.857

364.998

1.150.000
687.500

2003

120.000

677.203

4.050.069

2002

10.000.000

10.933.516

9.608.815

1.761.000

1.600.000

22.191.000

9.879.314

2.153.846
257.500
18.600.457

Total
1.090.440
450.000
345.275
297.165
10.347.198
1.350.000
7.497.198
1.500.000
2.297.000
2.297.000
37.508.235
6.183.972
6.017.884
166.088
36.691.612
21.855.178
2.095.809
364.998
11.688.127
687.500
10.000.000
10.000.000
7.391.862
7.134.362
257.500
111.512.319

%
1,0
0,4
0,3
0,3
9,3
1,2
6,7
1,3
2,1
2,1
33,6
5,5
5,4
0,1
32,9
19,6
1,9
0,3
10,5
0,6
9,0
9,0
6,6
6,4
0,2
100

PS: This table is without data for the year 2004. Total numbers differ slightly from the previous table.
Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: The Netherlands)
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Appendix 5: Basic Key Indicators for the Analyzed Countries
Table 0-3: Some key basic indicators about Afghanistan
Subject
Value
Continent
Asia
Official name
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Capital
Kabul
Type of government
Islamic republic
Population
inhabitants
31,1 million
Growth of population
2,67%
647.500 (15,6x NL)
Area
km2
48,0
Density
inhabitants/km2
Development
HDI
n/a
Life expectancy at
years
43,34
birth
Income
GDP (PPP) per capita
$800
Economy
Real GDP growth/year
8,0-28,6%
Sources: (CIA 2006: Afghanistan; EIU 2006a: Afghanistan)
Table 0-4: Some key basic indicators about Angola
Subject
Value
Continent
Africa
Official name
Republic of Angola
Capital
Luanda
Type of government
Unitary republic
Population
inhabitants
12,1 million
Growth of population
2,45%
1.246.700 (30,0x NL)
Area
km2
9,7
Density
inhabitants/km2
Development
HDI
0,445 (160th/177)
Life expectancy at
years
38,62
birth
Income
GDP (PPP) per capita
$3.200
Economy
Real GDP growth/year
3,2-19,1%
Sources: (CIA 2006: Angola; EIU 2006a: Angola; UNDP 2005, p.222)

Year

2006
2006
2006
2006
2004
2002-2005

Year

2006
2006
2006
2003
2006
2005
2001-2005

Table 0-5: Some key basic indicators about Bosnia and Herzegovina
Subject
Value
Year
Continent
Europe
Official name
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Capital
Sarajevo
Emerging federal democratic
Type of government
republic
Population
inhabitants
4,5 million
2006
Growth of population
1,35%
2006
51.129 (1,2x NL)
Area
km2
88,0
2006
Density
inhabitants/km2
2003
Development
HDI
0,786 (68th/177)
Life expectancy at
years
78
2006
birth
Income
GDP (PPP) per capita
$6.800
2005
Economy
Real GDP growth/year
4,0-5,7%
2001-2005
Sources: (CIA 2006: Bosnia and Herzegovina; EIU 2006a: Bosnia and Herzegovina; UNDP 2005, p.220)
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Table 0-6: Some key basic indicators about Cambodia
Subject
Value
Continent
Asia
Official name
Cambodia
Capital
Phnom Penh
Type of government
Constitutional monarchy
Population
inhabitants
13,9 million
Growth of population
1,35%
176.520 (4,3x NL)
Area
km2
78,6
Density
inhabitants/km2
Development
HDI
0,571 (130th/177)
Life expectancy at
years
59,29
birth
Income
GDP (PPP) per capita
$2.200
Economy
Real GDP growth/year
5,2-7,7%
Sources: (CIA 2006: Cambodia; EIU 2006b: Cambodia; UNDP 2005, p.221)
Table 0-7: Some key basic indicators about Eritrea
Subject
Value
Continent
Africa
Official name
Eritrea
Capital
Asmara
Type of government
Unitary state
Population
inhabitants
4,8 million
Growth of population
2,47%
121.320 (2,9x NL)
Area
km2
39,5
Density
inhabitants/km2
Development
HDI
0,444 (161st/177)
Life expectancy at
years
59,03
birth
Income
GDP (PPP) per capita
$1.000
Economy
Real GDP growth/year
0,7-3,0%
Sources: (CIA 2006: Eritrea; EIU 2006a: Eritrea; UNDP 2005, p.222)
Table 0-8: Some key basic indicators about Laos
Subject
Continent
Official name

Value
Asia
Lao People’s Democratic
Republic
Vientiane
One-party rule
6,4 million
2,39%
230.800 (5,6x NL)
27,6
0,545 (133rd/177)

Capital
Type of government
Population
inhabitants
Growth of population
Area
km2
Density
inhabitants/km2
Development
HDI
Life expectancy at
years
55,49
birth
Income
GDP (PPP) per capita
$1.900
Economy
Real GDP growth/year
5,0-10,6%
Sources: (CIA 2006: Laos; EIU 2006b: Laos; UNDP 2005, p.221)
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Table 0-9: Some key basic indicators about Mozambique
Subject
Value
Continent
Africa
Official name
Republic of Mozambique
Capital
Maputo
Type of government
Unitary republic
Population
inhabitants
19,7 million
Growth of population
1,38%
784.090 (18,9x NL)
Area
km2
25,1
Density
inhabitants/km2
Development
HDI
0,379 (168th/177)
Life expectancy at
years
39,82
birth
Income
GDP (PPP) per capita
$1.300
Economy
Real GDP growth/year
7,2-13,0%
Sources: (CIA 2006: Mozambique; EIU 2006b: Mozambique; UNDP 2005, p.222)
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Appendix 6: HMA Funding by the Different Donors
The tables in this appendix show the funds that different countries provided in the years 1996-2004 for HMA per recipient country. This data comes from
the UNMAS Mine Action Investments website, which is an important database, which is annually updated by many HMA donors, including the Netherlands.
Table 0-10: Donors that funded HMA programs in Afghanistan
Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
European Union
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Korea, Republic
of
Lithuania
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Total

1996

1997

24.386

250.000
1.492.426

14.000.000
435.000

367.000
135.250
2.639.464
1.000.000

1998
700.000

1999

337.150
1.748.000
500.000

984.599
350.000
564.000
541.000

2.999.999
855.818
210.000

2.715.000
545.786
1.500.740

750.000
706.212

2.500.000
1.375.000

1.500.000
4.258.500

1.640.000

3.200.000

17.555.598

12.959.140

1.744.000
2.200.000
17.053.467

1.350.000
1.362.500
2.100.000
4.615.000
16.628.625

2000
300.000
200.000

2001

2002

2003

2004

200.000

1.238.324

104.453

622.837

5.939.500

7.296.780

7.822.356
3.290.913

488.000

3.811.910
2.460.000
5.389.514
458.000

1.000.000

1.108.333

1.222.500

2.107.000
778.792
1.031.460

1.641.708
2.280.000
799.477

6.444.530
1.003.500
24.169.044

3.509.661

3.825.470
114.610
13.220.632

94.262

3.434.180
705.654

3.000.000
12.139.348

2.000.000
1.264.700

2.800.000
23.105.309

10.501.849

2.090.000

1.468.561

1.345.038

101.000

75.000

174.500

41.985.898

24.064.637

42.794.000
74.432.856

Total
1.000.000
2.365.614
250.000
35.575.906
8.915.157
21.701.514
8.695.000
135.250
29.940.111
6.206.963
68.433.202

Share
0,3%
0,8%
0,1%
12,0%
3,0%
7,3%
2,9%
0,0%
10,1%
2,1%
23,1%

75.000

0,0%

100.000
16.437.779
12.582.435
2.100.000
581.000
11.300.939
69.809.000
296.204.870

0,0%
5,5%
4,2%
0,7%
0,2%
3,8%
23,6%

Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Afghanistan)

Michiel van Bokhorst (288179)

XIX

September 28, 2006

Project Report

Evaluation of Embeddedness of HMA Programs Funded by the Netherlands (1996‐2004)

Table 0-11: Donors that funded HMA programs in Angola
Countries
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
European Union
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Total

1996

1997

1998
750.000

13.201

1.370.000
654.314

140.000
168.575

7.240.000
98.000
600.370

1.400.000
4.670.500
2.150.077

16.172.148

1.607.000
500.000

367.000
1.237.123
1.531.122

2.531.391

400.000
4.008.815
852.200
3.067.977

4.101.000
362.800
1.396.262
2.417.038
13.974.066

13.488.551

1999

2000
62.000

2001

208.630
1.250.000
4.060.000
541.000

168.325

1.105.000
266.099
3.550.873
82.412
1.800.000
159.150
2.714.500

326.000

518.111

1.095.508

130.000
1.143.170

1.750.939

2.259.999

3.033.000
18.770.664

178.118

3.096.000
6.676.890

2002

2003

158.180

147.583

129.164

401.592

342.549

152.597
993.262

422.000

833.200
239.400
1.628.969

1.108.333

1.222.500

2.784.300

4.188.806

500.000

869.120
1.351.354
1.096.631

954.398
1.241.089
2.000.076

400.000

320.000

658.000

3.844.000
8.446.444

6.966.541

8.019.870

6.100.000
17.510.728

2.805.200

2004

Total
812.000
305.763
1.510.000
2.474.931
3.484.868
13.085.118
6.615.728
2.076.893
17.114.792
266.099
8.179.591
4.604.855
19.916.200
1.374.150
16.704.386
2.016.000
2.002.666
25.313.038
128.356.578

Share
0,6%
0,2%
1,2%
1,9%
2,7%
10,2%
5,2%
1,6%
13,3%
0,2%
6,4%
3,6%
15,9%
1,1%
13,0%
1,6%
1,6%
19,7%

Total
2.180.010
710.000
12.925.180
800.000
29.137.218
3.166.242
549.832
10.268.620
229.618
6.873.614
7.694.665

Share
1,5%
0,5%
9,1%
0,6%
20,5%
2,2%
0,4%
7,2%
0,2%
4,8%
5,4%

Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Angola)
Table 0-12: Donors that funded HMA programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Country
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
European Union
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea, Republic
of
Netherlands
Norway
Slovenia
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Total

1996

1997

11.184

710.000
1.184.986

12.290.000
457.000

274.916
450.371

1998

1999
518.171

2000
474.743

2001
130.658

2002
115.544

2003
481.654

2004
459.240

1.665.521
400.000
2.583.000
196.000
274.916
724.136

2.421.358
400.000
5.640.000
541.000

1.158.076

1.168.059

979.146

1.330.618

1.983.947

3.330.806
327.000

5.293.412
540.000

709.000

188.417

207.825

577.500
229.618

911.500

748.825

1.692.937

1.386.528

1.736.823

3.100.000

1.829.587
171.180

682.200

1.095.750

420.000
832.061

496.640

1.195.644
2.100.000
3.734.463
1.300.000

1.179.245
2.629.375
298.042
1.120.000

1.000.000
3.015.716
102.087
398.000

1.000.000
1.663.241
225.346
345.000

171.168
267.070

222.296
120.000

156.299
135.000

9.400.000
23.573.680

7.739.000
24.389.059

5.500.000
19.377.928

5.661.000
18.027.602

5.935.632

4.226.153

3.500.000
9.360.834

3.445.187
1.300.030

60.000
250.000
4.882.250

500.000
2.936.030

24.000
19.214.464

9.501.490

499.500

60.000

0,0%

6.528.745
19.696.074
2.748.866
2.706.070
48.368
35.673.000
141.996.122

4,6%
13,9%
1,9%
1,9%
0,0%
25,1%

Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Bosnia and Herzegovina)
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Table 0-13: Donors that funded HMA programs in Cambodia
Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
European Union
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea, Republic
of
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
United Kingdom
United States
Total

1996

537.766
3.666.000
218.000
796.592

1997

1998
2.900.000

850.000
529.553
2.298.000

2.025.000
664.492
4.889.000
757.000

443.616

321.839

1999
3.648.000
546.166
1.159.210
535.708
902.000
751.200

2000
2.023.000
133.300
284.000
1.599.761

2001

2002

2003

2004

71.283
337.931
1.409.164

690.208

1.188.485

2.790.490

3.150.600
754.426
1.535.000

1.328.000
323.669
1.383.695

1.109.900
1.104.603
1.018.489

1.232.778

1.246.950

697.248

884.400

9.494.634

3.242.891

18.312.675

1.726.921

1.275.000
128.963
485.143
7.446.881

5.893.396

3.030.932

50.000

25.000

25.000

80.000

70.000

2.553.000
75.000
1.216.602
1.693.920

2.450.000
376.550
1.607.732
1.103.497

300.000
283.500
562.500

776.786
861.557

565.654
120.000
107.777

13.535.390

9.708.948

2.502.000
275.500
1.632.625
2.611.659
2.900.000
23.231.036

3.000.000
21.049.271

3.119.500
20.211.326

4.591.000
13.339.105

2.778.510

2.912.810
40.000

675.489
37.000

16.370.644

7.073.891

1.165.435

4.631.000
29.030.950

Total
8.571.000
750.749
4.656.141
9.945.627
9.457.000
12.092.428
2.979.290
7.559.287
128.963
485.143
51.926.840

Share
5,6%
0,5%
3,0%
6,5%
6,2%
7,9%
1,9%
4,9%
0,1%
0,3%
33,8%

250.000

0,2%

13.901.174
1.207.550
5.988.793
5.409.076
18.241.500
153.550.561

9,1%
0,8%
3,9%
3,5%
11,9%

Total
1.607.692
2.199.000
1.551.228
99.000
1.112.826
114.610
563.385
9.747.512
333.333
1.175.500
5.182.000
23.686.086

Share
6,8%
9,3%
6,5%
0,4%
4,7%
0,5%
2,4%
41,2%
1,4%
5,0%
21,9%

Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Cambodia)
Table 0-14: Donors that funded HMA programs in Eritrea
Country
Canada
Denmark
European Union
Finland
Germany
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Norway
Switzerland
United States
Total

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001
1.072.063
2.199.000
1.551.228
99.000
727.851

4.200.000

0

0

2.025.000
2.025.000

0

500.000
4.700.000

500.000
333.333
75.000
1.205.000
7.762.475

2002
68.175

2003
150.000

99.989

2004
317.454

284.986
114.610

563.385
3.500.000

1.547.512

488.000

287.500

4.719.549

1.985.012

325.000
1.452.000
2.494.050

Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Eritrea)
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Table 0-15: Donors that funded HMA programs in Lao PDR
Country
Australia
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
European Union
Finland
Germany
Italy
Japan
Korea, Republic
of
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
United Kingdom
United States
Total

1996

1997

10.719

425.000
10.555
360.000

3.271.000

1998
630.000
810.000
306.807

1999
1.008.000
417.500
100.950

2000
890.000
417.500
100.995

2001

2002

2003

2004

496.074
228.621

173.650

171.593

314.675

827.967

300.000
745.212
150.225
200.000

332.500
705.734

366.750
585.009

3.045.000
283.000
991.294

1.183.908

1.085.000

325.000
884.000

250.000

33.582

200.000

75.148

237.291

100.000
239.250
187.500
101.250

3.519.010

2.947.849

470.000
232.250
312.500
528.000
4.630.000
12.182.047

200.000

50.000

50.000

500.000

500.000

224.100
687.500

877.605

666.665

3.300.000
7.023.050

1.486.000
5.606.248

993.000
3.762.327

2.069.087

1.409.827

1.912.000
3.529.434

2000
700.000
373.300
2.212.417
2.000.000

2001

2002

2003

2004

1.066.661

270.389
1.317.342

400.000
873.600

500.000

351.000

Total
2.528.000
2.566.074
1.418.565
360.000
6.316.000
1.607.250
7.008.124
150.225
958.730

Share
6,0%
6,1%
3,4%
0,9%
15,0%
3,8%
16,7%
0,4%
2,3%

100.000

0,2%

2.421.000
695.600
2.731.770
866.541
12.321.000
42.048.879

5,8%
1,7%
6,5%
2,1%
29,3%

Total
3.492.000
1.043.689
8.257.114
4.053.475
2.952.000
6.852.300
3.339.996
6.944.968
903.150
4.149.153

Share
4,3%
1,3%
10,2%
5,0%
3,6%
8,4%
4,1%
8,6%
1,1%
5,1%

Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Laos)
Table 0-16: Donors that funded HMA programs in Mozambique
Country
Australia
Austria
Canada
Denmark
European Union
Finland
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Korea, Republic
of
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Slovenia
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Total

1996

1997

1998
140.000

1999
2.652.000

18.335

25.277

438.296

1.000.000
41.234
416.051

2.802.000
2.611.522
1.628.063

1.728.937
2.000.000
81.000
1.351.000

2.871.000
98.000

195.000

1.070.000

525.000

986.000

1.277.287

1.000.000

264.000

600.000

932.402

1.343.000
195.750
1.966.375

194.990
162.500
937.500

1.275.628

336.300
687.240
912.007
903.150

576.249
53.475

1.004.560

196.000

690.273

662.478

50.000
2.433.928
2.546.000

254.250
1.974.125
780.000

7.967.263

4.490.937

580.000
2.600.000
15.305.006

82.000

1.628.004
20.174
1.124.000

3.000.000
12.978.927

3.839.999
15.004.522

1.199.544
54.000
1.666.666

1.230.862

973.568

804.874

950.000

1.160.000

705.000

728.000

2.480.000
10.696.560

6.817.290

4.647.001

182.000
3.203.076

50.000

0,1%

9.456.394
666.500
10.718.670
20.174
4.749.000
1.360.000
12.101.999
81.110.582

11,7%
0,8%
13,2%
0,0%
5,9%
1,7%
14,9%

Sums in US$; Source: (UNMAS 2006: Mozambique)
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Appendix 7: Programs Funded by the Netherlands
The tables in this appendix shows activities funded by the Netherlands. The numbers of the tables in this and previous appendix may differ, due to the
difference in Euro (guilder) and US$ rate, and difficulties finding certain information from archives and databases.

WW135107
WW152709
WW165511

Mine clearance
Mine awareness, mine clearance training,
minefield survey and marking, and mine
clearance
Mine and ERW clearance, mine survey,
evaluation and training, mine awareness
Mine clearance, mine identification and
marking, mine awareness, and mine
clearance training

WW165531

Mine clearance

WW185802

Mine clearance

WW185818

Mine and ERW clearance

6411

Mine and ERW clearance

9768

Mine and ERW clearance, mine survey and
marking, and mine awareness

Total

OCHA

1.361.341

1.361.341

01/01
/1997

31/12
/1998

ICRC

ICRC

453.780

453.780

01/01
/1998

31/12
/1999

OCHA

OCHA

01/01
/1999

31/12
/2000

OCHA

OCHA

01/01
/2000

30/06
/2001

OCHA

OCHA

3.176.462

01/10
/2000
01/01
/2001
01/01
/2001
01/01
/2003
01/01
/2004

31/12
/2001
31/12
/2001
31/12
/2002
31/12
/2003
31/12
/2005

HALO
Trust

HALO
Trust

434.784

OCHA

OCHA

1.123.028

OCHA

OCHA

1.132.567

UNMAS

UNMAS

UNMAS

UNMAS

907.560

907.560
1.361.341

1.361.341
3.176.462
129.685

125.611

690.080
1.123.028

1.135.912

2.268.479
600.000

600.000
499.500

0

3.063.017

907.560

Total 19962004

OCHA

2004

31/12
/1998

2003

01/01
/1997

2002

1.247.896

2001

1.247.896

2000

OCHA

1999

DHA

1998

31/12
/1998

1997

01/01
/1997

1996

Executive
organization

WW131501

Supervising
organization

AF006301

Mine clearance, management support, and
co-ordination of OCHA activities
Mine awareness, mine clearance training,
mine identification, mine survey, mine
clearance (manual and mechanical), and
support for management, monitoring and
logistics of the Mine Action Plan.

End

AF005601

Start

HMA
activities*

MFA program
number

Table 0-17: Funded programs in Afghanistan

1361.341

3.611.246

2385.280

1.261.523

600.000

499.500

499.500 13.689.467

* see §2.4; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases)
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AO005904
AO005906
AO006801
AO006802
AO006803

Mine clearance, to make
humanitarian aid programs
possible
Mine clearance, to make the
return of IDPs and the recovery of
rural infrastructure possible
Mine survey, priority setting for
mine clearance
Mine clearance training, and mine
clearance with MDDs
Mine clearance, to make the
return of IDPs and the recovery of
rural infrastructure possible

WW135102

Mine survey

WW152703

Mechanical mine clearance, to
make the return of IDPs possible

WW152704

ERW clearance

WW152705
WW165516
WW165517
WW165518

WW185801

Mine clearance, to make the
return of IDPs and the recovery of
rural infrastructure possible
Mine clearance to support
humanitarian programs of WFP
programs
Victim assistance and social
rehabilitation
EOD and mechanical mine
clearance
De-mining of infrastructure
(bridges, roads) in order to make
the population more mobile,
facilitating humanitarian
programs, clear agricultural area
in order to increase ability to live,
rebuild social infrastructure

Michiel van Bokhorst (288179)

Total 1996-2004

2004

587.645

2003

1996

UNICEF

2002

Executive
organization

UNICEF

2001

Supervising
organization

31/12
/1998

2000

End

01/06
/1996

1999

Start

Mine awareness

1998

HMA activities*

AO005903

1997

MFA program
number

Table 0-18: Funded programs in Angola

587.645

01/10
/1996

30/09
/1998

KZA

NPA

1.211.593

01/08
/1996

31/10
/1999

WFP

WFP

1.043.920

01/01
/1997
01/07
/1997

31/12
/1997
30/06
/1998

NPA

NPA

928.199

NPA

NPA

537.485

01/10
/1997

30/06
/1998

MgM

MgM

1.224.768

01/01
/1998
01/01
/1999
01/01
/1999

31/12
/1998
31/12
/1999
31/12
/1999

NPA

NPA

NPA

NPA

278.418

40.893

319.311

NPA

NPA

175.658

45.223

220.881

01/01
/1999

31/12
/1999

MgM

MgM

869.636

41.811

911.447

01/01
/2000

31/12
/2001

WFP

MgM

595.085

01/01
/2000
01/01
/2000

30/09
/2001
31/12
/2000

St Vl.

HI NL

229.023

44.198

273.220

NPA

NPA

368.350

52.306

420.656

01/01
/2001

31/12
/2001

NPA

NPA

340.335

1.007.392

84.071

2.643.392
1.043.920

119.556

1.047.755

329.882

213.008

1.080.375

71.725

51.873

1.348.365

720.403

188.250

908.652

595.085

608.792

XXIV

608.792

September 28, 2006

Project Report

Evaluation of Embeddedness of HMA Programs Funded by the Netherlands (1996‐2004)

WW185810

De-mining

WW192402

De-mining

WW207102

De-mining

4423

De-mining

6466

De-mining

6478

De-mining

01/01
/2001
01/01
/2002
01jan-03
01/01
/2003
01/01
/2001
01/01
/2002

31/12
/2001
31/12
/2002
31dec-04
31/12
/2004
31/12
/2004
31/12
/2004

HALO
Trust

HALO
Trust

NPA

NPA

NPA

NPA

372.000

NPA

NPA

400.000

NPA

NPA

129.426

129.426

NPA

NPA

100.000

100.000

428.541

95.657

524.198

408.000

408.000

2.845.154 3.030.787 2.129.402 1.980.470 1.192.458 1.037.333 728.008 1.001.426

Total

372.000
49.674

49.674

449.674

13.994.712

* see §2.4; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases)

WW152707
WW185811
9685

De-mining
Mine awareness, mine information and
minefield marking, mine/UXO clearance.
training

Total

UNMAC

UNDP

UNDP

UNDP

UNDP

UNDP

UNDP

01/01/ 31/12/
2004
2004

17.205

198.717
453.780

952.938

952.938
1.118.825

1.118.825
688.787

635.292

Total 1996-2004

UNDP

01/01/ 31/12/
1998
1998
01/01/ 31/12/
1999
2002
01/06/ 31/05/
2001
2003

2004

453.780

2003

DHA

2002

DHA

2001

01/01/ 31/12/
1997
1997

2000

181.512

1999

NPA

1998

NPA

1997

01/05/ 30/04/
1996
1997

End

1996

WW135106

Executive
organization

BA007101

Set up a school for mine clearance training
for demobilized soldiers, mine clearance
Mine awareness, mine information and
minefield marking, mine/UXO clearance.
training
Mine survey and marking, mine awareness,
mine clearance, training
De-mining, institution building of national
MAC

Supervising
organization

BA002801

Start

MFA program
number

HMA activities*

Table 0-19: Funded programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina

0

952.938

1.136.030

0

688.787

389.937

389.937

1.078.724

0

499.500

499.500

499.500

4.302.484

* see §2.4; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases)
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WW152711
WW165532
WW165534
WW192401
WW207101
6476

De-mining
De-mining for safety of civilians,
facilitating the return of IDPs and
recovery of agriculture
Mine clearance aimed at IDPs and
landless, agriculture, rehabilitation
and social infrastructure
De-mining, ERW clearance, and mine
awareness
Mechanical mine clearance, mine risk
education
De-mining

Total

Total 1996-2004

UNDP

CMAC

31/12
/2001

HALO
Trust

HALO
Trust

300.667

16.648

59.007

376.322

01/03
/2001

30/04
/2002

NPA

CMAC

424.937

579.106

47.281

1.051.324

01/05
/2002
01/01
/2003
01/05
/2003

30/04
/2004
31/12
/2004
31/12
/2005

NPA

NPA

681.607

681.607

NPA

NPA

372.000

NPA

NPA

969.093

01/12
/2000

2004

CMAC

2003

UNDP

2002

CMAC

2001

UNDP

2000

2.317.361

1999

CMAC

31/12
/1996
31/03
/1998
30/06
/1999
31/12
/1999

1998

De-mining

UNDP

01/07
/1996
01/10
/1997
01/10
/1998
01/07
/1999

1997

WW135108

1996

De-mining

Executive
organization

KH009201

Supervising
organization

De-mining

End

HMA activities*

KH006801

Start

MFA program
number

Table 0-20: Funded programs in Cambodia

2.317.361
2.217.103

2.217.103
1.089.164

1.181.406

2.270.570

292.688

292.688

2.317.361 2.217.103 1.089.164 1.474.094 725.604

595.754

787.895

1.341.093

372.000
189.435

1.158.528

189.435 10.737.503

* see §2.4; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases)
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WW192404

Mine awareness

6323

Mine clearance

10093

Evaluation of HMA

Total

216.203

4.671.559

559.754

559.754
3.570.000

3.570.000
1.547.512

0

0

0

0

2.918.678

2.096.433

Total 1996-2004

1.536.679

2004

2.918.678

2003

GICHD

2002

UNMAS

2001

HALO
Trust
HALO
Trust

2000

UNOPS

HALO
Trust
HALO
Trust

1999

UNDP

1998

HALO
Trust

1997

HALO
Trust

1996

31/12/
2001
31/12/
2002
31/12/
2002
31/12/
2005
31/12/
2004

Executive
organization

WW185819

Mine action centre core support, mine
awareness

01/12/
2000
01/01/
2001
01/01/
2002
01/01/
2003
01/01/
2004

Supervising
organization

Mine clearance

End

WW165535

Start

MFA program
number

HMA activities*

Table 0-21: Funded programs in Eritrea

3.786.203

1.547.512

1.547.512

50.000

50.000

50.000

10.398.825

* see §2.4; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases)
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WW185806
WW192406
9686

UXO clearance
UXO clearance
UXO awareness, training and capacity
building, mine clearance

Total

UNDP

01/04
/1998
01/04
/2000
01/04
/2001
01/01
/2002
01/01
/2004

31/03
/2000
31/03
/2001
31/12
/2001
31/12
/2002
31/12
/2004

UNDP

UNDP

UNDP

UNDP

UNDP

UNDP

UNDP

UNDP

UNDP

UNDP

265.129
88.487

88.487
426.553

426.553
555.881

555.881
540.161

540.161
514.060

265.129

Total 1996-2004

UNDP

2004

31/03
/1998

2003

01/01
/1997

2002

265.129

2001

UNDP

2000

UNDP

1999

31/12
/1996

1998

01/01
/1996

1997

1996

WW165509

Executive
organization

WW135109*2

Supervising
organization

LA001302

UXO awareness, training and capacity
building for mine and UXO clearance and
UXO survey
UXO awareness, training and capacity
building for mine and UXO clearance and
UXO survey
UXO awareness, training and capacity
building, mine clearance
UXO awareness, training and capacity
building, mine clearance

End

LA001301*2

Start

MFA program
number

HMA*1 activities

Table 0-22: Funded programs in Laos

88.487

426.553

0

555.881

540.161

514.060

514.060

0

390.000

390.000

390.000

2.780.271

*1 see §2.4; *2 information is derived from other sources and could not be fully verified; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and
Piramide databases)
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WW152103
WW152706
WW152718
WW165502

Review of de-mining activities
Manual and mechanical mine
clearance
Manual and mechanical mine
clearance
Manual, MDD and mechanical mine
clearance

WW165508

Mine clearance

WW165513

Mine survey

WW185807

De-mining

WW185813

De-mining

WW192404

De-mining

WW192405

De-mining

5809

De-mining

6323

De-mining

6607

De-mining

6608

De-mining

Total

UNDP

UNDP

246.428?

HALO
Trust

HALO
Trust

NPA

NPA

* see §2.4; *

2

1.488.347
194.218

428.382
246.428

249.179

83.794
459.887

7.245

340.218

82.967

542.854

HALO
Trust
HALO
Trust
HALO
Trust

Agenda
*2
HALO
Trust
HALO
Trust
HALO
Trust

NPA

NPA

474.524

35.726

510.250

147.313

35.795

183.108

137.719

745.588

DGIS

12.388

12.388

147.235

147.235
19.613
373.017

19.613
226.983

600.000

HI FR

HI FR

HALO
Trust

HALO
Trust

607.869

NPA

NPA

459.856

HALO
Trust

HALO
Trust

614.170

NPA

NPA

408.000

NPA

NPA

HALO
Trust
HALO
Trust

HALO
Trust
HALO
Trust

NPA

NPA

25.651

485.507
614.170

88.933
240.000

496.933
26.529

673.568

1.238.405
1

Total 19962004

234.164

2004

HI FR

2003

HI FR

2002

730.534

2001

757.813

2000

NPA

1999

NPA

1998

1997

WW135105

1996

MZ014501

31/12
/1997
31/08
/1999
31/12
/1997
31/12
/1999
31/12
/1999
30/04
/1999
31/12
/1999
31/12
/1999
31/01
/2001
31/12
/2000
30/04
/2001
31/01
/2002
31/12
/2001
31/12
/2002
31/12
/2002
31/12
/2004
31/12
/2005
31/12
/2008
31/12
/2008

Executive
organization

MZ006306

01/01
/1996
01/09
/1996
01/01
/1996
01/01
/1998
01/01
/1998
01/02
/1999
01/01
/1999
01/01
/1999
01/01
/2000
01/01
/2000
01/05
/2000
01/02
/2001
01/01
/2001
01/01
/2002
01/01
/2002
01/01
/2003
01/01
/2003
01/09
/2003
01/09
/2003

Supervising
organization

MZ003315

De-mining, creating de-mining
capacity
De-mining, creating de-mining
capacity
Capacity building, development of a
national mine action plan
De-mining, creating de-mining
capacity
De-mining, creating de-mining
capacity

End

MZ003314

Start

MFA
program
number

HMA
activities*1

Table 0-23: Funded programs in Mozambique

730.534 249.179 437.635 1.474.354 1.384.920 1.231.410 1.028.152

266.529
673.568

454.387

454.387

270.000

270.000

750.916

8.525.505

Agenda Utredning & Utvikling AS; Sums in €; Sources: (MFA: DMV and DDI/ST archives, and MIDAS and Piramide databases)
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Appendix 8: Achievements of the HMA Programs
Table 0-24: Achievements in Afghanistan
General information
Activity
AF006301
DHA/OCHA
Clearance
01/01/1997
31/12/1997
Netherlands:
Total:

€ 1.361.341
$ 20.166.000

WW135107
01/01/1998

OCHA
31/12/1999

Netherlands:
Total:
WW152709
01/01/1999

$ 1.087.000
$ 25.644.282
OCHA
31/12/2002

Netherlands:
Total:

€ 1.361.341
$ 24.000.000

WW165511
01/01/2000

OCHA
30/06/2001

Netherlands:
Total:

€ 3.176.462
$ 22.782.013

Survey
Survey/clearing
Marking
Awareness
Clearance
Survey
Awareness
Clearance

Survey

Awareness
Clearance

Survey

WW185802/
WW185818
01/01/2001

OCHA

Awareness
Manual
clearance
Landmines
UXO
Mechanical
clearance
Landmines
UXO
Survey
Landmines
UXO
Clearance

31/12/2002

Survey

Netherlands:

€ 2.268.479

Awareness
Total
Mine/UXO*1
APM*2
ATM*2
UXO*2
Clearance

WW165531

HALO Trust

01/10/2000

31/12/2001

Netherlands:

$ 634.180

Total:

6411

UMNAS

Michiel van Bokhorst (288179)

landmines
UXO
battlefield
minefield
battle field
minefield
battle field
mine
landmines
UXO
UXO
mine
landmines
UXO
UXO
mine
landmines
UXO
mine
landmines
UXO

[unit]
m2

Target
28.000.000

cost/m2
m2
m2
m2
people
m2
m2
m2
m2
persons
m2

20.000.000
20.000.000
2.500.000
600.000
42.000.000
48.500.000
41.000.000
51.500.000
1.075.000
34.700.000

m2

54.500.000

m2

33.000.000

m2

54.000.000

people
m2

1.000.0000
27.200.000

m2
UXO
m2

73.500.000

m2
UXO
people

67.500.000

m

22.300.000

1.270.000

2

Achievement
33.620.930
33.752
192.639
US$0,60
130.200.000
49.230.514
986.000
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
34.200.000
27.951
75.700.000
265.344
37.100.000
467
77.900.000
1.046
1.500.000
24.000.000
13.975
80.300.000
298.370
32.100.000
202
90.200.000
521
1.080.000

%
120%

651%
246%
164%

99%
139%
112%
144%
150%
88%
109%
144%
134%
85%

729.761
431
270

m2

301.397

m2
mine
UXO
mine
UXO

m2
m2
m2
m2
people

49.000.000
104.500.000
61.800.000
100.600.000
1.860.000

149
115
> 463.435
8
19
64.900.000
169.200.000
33.400.000
167.300.000
3.087.231
272.869

mine

XXX

m2

36.793
2.769
882.323
33.900.000
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Survey

EOD

9768

UNMAS

Awareness
Clearance

01/01/2004
Netherlands:

€ 499.500
Marking

Education

UXO
APM
ATM
UXO
mine
UXO
APM
ATM
UXO
APM
ATM
UXO

m2

high priority
reconstruction
needs
former
battlefield
high priority
reconstruction
needs
former
battlefield
grazing
school teachers
other teachers

m2

69.200.000
18.979
5.318
1.727.461
38.300.000
66.400.000
522
31
510
829
2.913
565.510
2.595.690
21.400.000

m2

9.200.000

m2

73.900.000

m2

22.500.000

2

11.300.000

m2

34.000.000

m2
m2

m

m

2

120.000.000
25.000
5.000

*1 2001
*2 2002
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Table 0-25: Achievements in Angola
General information
Activity
AO005904
KZA/NPA
Clearance
01/10/1996
31/12/1998
Netherlands:
AO005906
01/08/1996

€ 2.643.392
WFP
31/10/1999*1

Netherlands:
Total:

€ 1.043.920
$ 3.000.000

AO006803
01/10/1997

MgM
30/06/1998

Netherlands:

€ 1.348.365

WW152703
01/01/1999

NPA
31/12/1999

Netherlands:

€ 319.311

Clearance

EOD
Survey
Clearance

Clearance

Verified
Clearance

MgM
31/12/1999

Netherlands:
Total:

€ 911.447
$ 1.680.000

WW165516
01/01/2000

WFP/MgM
31/12/2001

Clearance

WW165518
01/01/2000

NPA
31/12/2000

Clearance

Netherlands:

€ 420.656
Verification
NPA
31/12/2004

Netherlands:

€400.000

6466
01/01/2001

NPA
31/12/2004

Netherlands:

€ 129.426

road
APM
ATM
UXO

WW152717
01/01/1999

4423
01/01/2003

manual
APM
ATM
UXO
manual
mines
UXO
mechanical
mines
UXO

Clearance

Verification
Affected
Clearance

Verification
Affected

mechanical
APM
ATM
UXO
manual
MaD *2
MaM *2
mechanical
road
mines
UXO
road
area
mines
UXO
mechanical
EOD
APM
ATM
UXO
mechanical
EOD
area
road
APM
ATM
UXO
people
area
road
APM
ATM
UXO
people

[unit]
m2

Target

m2
m2
m
m
m2

cost/m2
cost/explosive
m2

3.750.000

m2
m2
m2
m2
m2
m
m
m2
m2
m2

500.000

m2
m2
m2
m

m2
m2
m

m2

Achievement
478.384
619
207
1.303
306.299
588
21
136.000
3
40.000
1.000.000
66.050
432.989
30
20
198
$1,55
$19.630
2.918.173
254
24
70.544
611.224
4.190
5.027
1.627
559.200
61.700
38
832
42.300
211.400
691
449
335.163
125.205
29
1
69.817
596
525.674
1.899.615
n/a
586
219
6.393
1.087.260
301.787
558.661
1.049.400
149
9
745
188.325
31.941

*1 Achievements for 22/06/1998 – 31/12/1998
*2 MaD = Mechanically assisted Dog Demining; MaM = Mechanically assisted Manual Demining
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Table 0-26: Achievements in Bosnia and Herzegovina
General information
Activity
BA007101
DHA
Clearance
01/01/1997
31/12/1997
houses
mines
Netherlands:
€ 453.780
UXO
Personnel
WW135106
UNDP/UNMAC
Clearance
01/01/1998
31/12/1998
houses
APM
Netherlands:
€ 952.938
ATM
UXO
WW152707
UNDP
Clearance*1
01/01/1999
31/12/2002
houses/facilities
APM
Netherlands:
€ 1.118.825
ATM
UXO
Survey*1
Efficiency
NGO
commercial
governmental
WW185811
UNDP
Clearance*2
01/06/2001
31/05/2003
houses/facilities
APM
Netherlands:
€ 1.078.724
ATM
Total:
$ 6.407.985
UXO
Survey*2
9685
UNDP
Clearance
01/01/2004
31/12/2004
mines
Survey
Netherlands:
€ 499.500
Total:
$ 4.722.188

[unit]
m2

Target

m2

m2

14.500.000

m2
Cost/m2
Cost/m2
Cost/m2
m2

7.250.000

m2
m2
m2

52.160.000

Achievement
4.500.000
3.144
28.245
19.572
1.460
6.446.380
701
3.815
229
2.722
6.001.392
300
1.532
251
1.575
55.594.000
$ 1,93
$ 1,33
$ 1,56
2.000.395
152
700
93
869
44.861.800
2.612.000
3.226
472.340.000

*1 Achievements for 2002
*2 Achievements for 01/01/2002 – 30/06/2002
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Table 0-27: Achievements in Cambodia
General information
Activity
KH006801
UNDP/CMAC
Clearance
01/07/1996
31/12/1996
Netherlands:
KH009201
01/10/1997

€ 2.317.361
UNDP/CMAC
31/03/1998

Netherlands:

€ 2.217.103

WW135108
01/10/1998

UNDP/CMAC
30/06/1999

Netherlands:

€ 2.270.570

WW165532
01/12/2000

HALO Trust
31/12/2001

Netherlands:
WW165534
01/03/2001

€ 376.322
NPA/CMAC
30/04/2002

Netherlands:

€ 1.051.324

NPA
30/04/2004

Netherlands:
Total:

€ 681.607
$ 4.108.271*3

Netherlands:
*1
*2
*3
*4

NPA
31/12/2004
€ 372.000

APM
ATM
UXO
fragments
working days

De-miners
Clearance *2

Marking
Clearance*4

EOD*4
Awareness*4
WW207101
01/01/2003

APM
ATM
UXO
fragments
working days

De-miners
Clearance *1

Clearance

Clearance
EOD
Risk
education

Target

m2

Clearance

EOD

WW192401
01/05/2002

mines
UXO

[unit]
m2

APM
ATM
UXO
platoon
APM
ATM
UXO
MMT
APM
ATM
UXO
total
MMT
platoon
APM
ATM
UXO
MMT
mechanical
MDD
explosives
presentations
participants
mechanical
UXO
participants

m2

m2

m2

1.140.000

m2

m
m2

m2
m2
m2

m2

6.200
32.000
1.272.000

36.000
96.000
384.000
7.200
80

Achievement
56.300.000
4.205
16.810
7.371.849
7.204
121
17.532
13.381.189
116.014
2.027.245
3.559
4
6.932
6.714.002
124.352
105.700
153
0
159
1.720.437
719
68
550
42.626
1.178
63
5.369
6.610
52.875
1.033.361
2.932
89
11.287
10.230
72.932
409.587
10.018
193
19.595
90.884
2.847
2.460

Achievements for 01/01/1998 – 31/03/1999
Achievements for 01/01/2001 – 31/12/2001
For the period 01/01/2002 – 01/07/2002
Achievements for 01/11/2002 – 31/10/2003
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%

151%

107%
165%
81%

28%
76%
107%
139%
241%
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Table 0-28: Achievements in Eritrea
General information
Activity
WW165535
HALO Trust
Clearance
01/12/2000
31/12/2001
Netherlands:

€ 4.671.559

EOD

Personnel

mines
UXO
stray ammo

[unit]
m2

Target

Achievement
1.026.892
1.638
109
0
4.554.505
32
363
6.329
465

%

Target
600.000
10.500
450
27.000
24
374
10.050.000
5.500
14.500
857
45.000
42.000
759
190.000
158
17

Achievement
1.588.100
7.515
678
35.583
n/a
327
7.430.000
n/a
14.016
2.046
n/a
66.522
813
256.582
127
21

%
265%
72%
151%
132%

20

20

m2

mines
UXO
stray ammo

Table 0-29: Achievements of some HMA programs in Laos
General information
Activity
LA001302
UNDP
Clearance*1
01/01/1997
31/03/1998
UXO
villages visited
Roving*1
Netherlands:
€ 88.487
UXO
courses
Awareness*1
students
WW165509
UNDP
Clearance
01/04/2000
31/03/2001
bombies
UXO
Netherlands:
€ 555.881
Roving
villages visited
Total:
$ 3.096.057
bombies
UXO
Awareness
villages
people
Training
de-miners
medics
surveyors and
additional
provincial
support staff
other
courses
Efficiency
cost per m2
cost per
beneficiary
WW185806
UNDP
Clearance*2
01/04/2001
31/12/2001
UXO
villages
Roving*2
villages
Netherlands:
€ 540.161
Awareness*2
Total:
$ 6.080.660
people
courses
Training*2
graduates
WW192406
UNDP
Clearance
01/01/2002
31/12/2002
UXO
Roving
villages
Netherlands:
€ 514.161
Awareness
villages
Total:
$ 7.940.000
people
9686
UNDP
Clearance
01/01/2004
31/12/2004
UXO
Survey
Netherlands:
€ 390.000
Roving
villages
Total:
$ 4.255.000
UXO
Awareness
villages
people

[unit]
m2

m2

XXXV

97%
239%
158%
107%
135%
80%
124%
100%

84
18
$ 0,34
$ 11,96
m

2

m2

m2
m2

9.500.000
80.000
927
847
324.631
8.090.000
80.000
1.392
753
100.000
11.316.000
1.073
1.108
542

8.730.000
82.724
2.107
766
181.963
21
241
8.425.230
15.920
1.454
683
160.053
12.550.000
50.203
n/a
1.570
50.203
495
125.341

*1 Achievements for 1997 only; *2 Achievements for 2001 wholly
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92%
103%
227%
90%
56%
104%
20%
104%
91%
160%
111%
142%
91%
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Table 0-30: Achievements in Mozambique
General information
Activity
MZ003314
NPA
Clearance
01/01/1996
31/12/1997
Netherlands:
Total:
MZ003315
01/09/1996

€ 1.488.347
$ 12.591.940
HI FR
31/08/1999

Netherlands:
Total:
MZ014501
01/01/1998

€ 428.382
$ 2.123.717
HALO Trust
31/12/1999

Netherlands:
WW135105
01/01/1998

€ 340.218
NPA
31/12/1999

Netherlands:

€ 542.854

WW165508
01/01/2000

NPA
31/12/2000

Netherlands:
Total:

€ 510.250
$ 4.149.857

WW165514
01/01/2000

HALO Trust
31/01/2001

Netherlands:

€ 600.000

WW185813
01/01/2001

NPA
31/12/2001

Netherlands:

€ 485.507

WW192405
01/01/2002

NPA
31/12/2002

Netherlands:
Total:

€ 496.933
$ 3.489.418

5809
01/01/2003

NPA
31/12/2004

Netherlands:

€ 266.529

roads
APM
ATM
UXO

Clearance

[unit]
m2
m

Target

Achievement
3.552.733
157.000
7.883
10
540
156.000
121
435

m2

APM
UXO
m2

Clearance
APM
UXO
Survey
Clearance
roads
APM
ATM
UXO
SAA
Clearance

Efficiency
Clearance

Clearance*1

APM
ATM
UXO
SAA
metal debris
cost/m2
APM
ATM
UXO
SAA
EOD
APM
ATM
UXO
SAA
fragments

Clearance

Staff
Clearance*2

APM
ATM
UXO
SAA
fragments
APM
ATM
UXO
SAA
fragments

m2
m2
m

4.400.000

m2

2.200.000

m2

m2

2.800.000

m2

2.200.000

m2

570
2.450.000

133.539
1.066
487
1.021.368
2.964.334
151.000
4.157
0
1.517
157.326
2.624.231
3.506
1
458
20.740
447.336
$1,89
106.120
198
0
138
36
101
1.321.342
1.712
0
85
1.052
113.127
1.989.935
468
4
191
21.911
418.971
n/a
1.200.641
94
0
187
20.183
113.430

*1 Achievements for 10/01/2001 – 26/10/2001
*2 Achievements for 01/01/2003 – 31/12/2003
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%

67%

119%

47%

90%

49%

